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ABSTRACT 
 
               Will China become a multiparty democracy? This is the research problem of 
this dissertation. My hypothesis is this: the greater the extent that Chinese elite thinking 
on development and change reconciles the tension between Chinese nationalism and 
collectivist, family-like ethics on the one hand, and the western democratic ideals based 
on each self-seeking individual’s subjectivity on the other hand, the greater the chance 
that China’s political development will lead to a multiparty democracy. The dissertation 
includes two parts: Chapters two to five are historical analyses, and chapters six to eight 
are the interviews. It is my assumption that Chinese elite thinking on China’s 
development and change has been influencing the Chinese practice of democracy since 
the Opium War (1839-1842), and will continue to have great impacts upon the Chinese 
pursuit of democracy in the next 20 years. I use chapters two to five of my dissertation, 
the historical analyses, to demonstrate the causal relationship between Chinese elite 
thinking on the development and change of Chinese society on the one hand, and Chinese 
historical practice of democracy (from 1839 till the current time, including “Leninist 
 iii
democracy”) on the other hand, the former being the independent variable and the latter 
being the dependent variable. The method used in chapters two to five is historiography, I 
develop my causal analysis based on extensive reading of historians’ and social 
scientists’ works. And then I use chapters six to eight of my dissertation , the interviews, 
as the most current information that reveals Chinese social trends toward the next 20 
years, and make an assessment of whether, in the next 20 years (2004-2024), China will 
become a western style, multiparty democracy—and if the answer is yes, what that 
democracy will look like. 
                For example, one could argue that such a democracy will be a combination of 
western democracy (based on the value of individualism) and Chinese culture (based on 
the value of collectivism). My judgment is based on chapters two to five, the historical 
analyses of the long-term trend, and chapters six to eight, the information gained from the 
interviewees. The method used in chapters six to eight is face to face, in-depth interviews. 
The interviewees come from the four elite groups in the current Chinese society: 
government officials, the enterprise people, media professionals, and intellectuals. The 
interview question does not directly ask question about democracy; rather, it asks the 
interviewee’s personal opinions about “the positive or negative factors that have been 
driving or limiting the development and change of X city (in the context of development 
and change of Chinese society since 1839), carrying it toward the next 20 years.” So the 
interviewees do not directly talk about democracy—they just express their views on 
positive and negative factors that might influence the development and change of the city 
that they are in. Because in urban development one can best experience the tension 
between traditional values and modern values, the development and change of a city (in 
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the context of the development and change of Chinese society since 1839) and how 
people deal with it in their thinking should reveal information about the social trends. 
                The major findings are these: 55.5 % of the interviewees are pro-democracy; 
22.2 % of them are not pro-democracy; 16.6 % of them are not concerned about the issue 
of democracy in China; and 5.5 % of them are uncertain. I have found substantial 
evidence of favorable prospects for democracy. So my conclusion is: China has favorable 
prospects for becoming a multiparty democracy; any democratic system that emerges 
likely will be a Confucian democracy (communal or social democracy); the Chinese 
culture will become a combination of liberalism and Confucianism; the balance of 
traditional elements (Confucianism) and modern elements (liberalism) will depend on 
each individual’s free will and free choice; the process of democratization will start with 
the intellectuals, and then spread to the whole nation. Finally, this democratization 
process will likely happen in the next 20 years (2004 to 2024), based on responses from 
the person I interviewed.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
                (1) Research Question 
                Will China become a multiparty democracy? This is a topic for 
continuous debates. In a recent publication, scholars comment on Professor Pan Wei’s 
proposal of a consultative rule of law regime and debate about whether China’s political 
reform should and will finally lead to western style multiparty democracy or stay on a 
course of rule of law as Professor Pan suggests.1 The former position is supported by the 
empirical events of the third wave of democratization,2 and the latter position, Professor 
Pan’s argument, is inspired by the developmental example from Singapore and Hong 
Kong, two Chinese societies that succeed in modernization without adopting democracy. 
Professor Pan rejects the possibility of multiparty, competitive electoral democracy for 
the direction of China’s political reform by presenting a theory that would trace polity 
type to its social origins. Pan states: “A particular regime is rooted in a particular social 
 
1 Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratization (Armonk, 
New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006). 
2 Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), The 
Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).  
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structure and a particular value system; and both are rooted in a particular division of 
labor, as well as a particular mode of production.”3 A regime type serves the need of 
social organization; different societies have different needs of social organization and this 
difference determines the choice of a particular regime type.  
Chinese traditional society was composed of “scattered, free, equal,” 
“selfish,” and “self-sufficient” “small farm families” that are difficult to organize (interest 
groups or classes). Therefore, consciousness of social class or interest group is alien to 
Chinese people. In contrast to pre-modern western Europe where Estates formed social 
cleavage and the church became a source of checks and balances of political power, thus 
forming pluralistic sociopolitical power structure, pre-modern China lacked meaningful 
social cleavages and this fact had prevented the emergence of pluralism. Chinese people 
did not have the need to form an interest group or party to protect or promote their own 
interests. And because of this, Chinese people did not develop a belief in the fairness of 
open power competition and majority rule. In other words, the value system developed 
from Chinese traditional, agricultural society lacks an appreciation of power politics and 
checks and balances. Because there was no fundamental conflict of interests among the 
“scattered, free, equal,” “selfish,” and “self-sufficient” “small farm families,” the 
 
3 Pan Wei, “Reflections on the ‘Consultative Rule of Law Regime,” in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), op cit., p. 247. 
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government they wanted was one that would represent the interests of all the people, and 
the fairness principle in such a collectivist value system required that their government 
(which was believed to be their father) must not lean to a particular interest—citizens (the 
peasant families) were like brothers and sisters, no one could enjoy more privilege over 
others.4 
In addition to a lack of social cleavage among equal, free small farm 
families, there was also no basic conflict between the ruling elite (imperial civil service 
government officials) and the ruled peasant citizens (small farm families). The social 
division of labor was quite simple: the ruling group’s job was to maintain order, peace 
and harmony in society without disturbing peasant citizens’ ordinary life except by 
necessary taxation and modest levels of community services. The ruled peasant citizens 
enjoyed high levels of freedom as long as they fulfilled their duties regarding taxes and 
services and complied with the social order without committing criminal conduct such as 
theft, robbery, or murder. Social mobility between these two groups, in the longer term, 
was not very hard, and the chance was open to every citizen. Everyone, theoretically, had 
equal chance of social mobility by mastering Confucian scriptural knowledge and 
 
4 Pan Wei, “Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China,” in Suisheng Zhao, op cit., pp. 3-40. 
About the difficulty of social organization in traditional Chinese society, and the contrast between Chinese 
traditional ways of social organization and the ways developed in the western modernity, please see a 
useful overview of Chinese history: Ray Huang, China: A Macro History (Armonk, New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1988).  
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competing with others to pass qualification examinations for imperial Civil Service.5 
Since there was basically equal chance for social mobility, there was no meaningful 
conflict of interest between the upper and the lower levels of the social stratum. One day 
you were the ruled citizen, and another day you might become a member of the ruling 
elite, depending on how hard you worked to master official Confucian knowledge. Thus, 
there was harmony between the ruling and the ruled groups, except for the excessive 
corruption of the political regime often seen at the latter end of one dynasty.  
Another important reason for such harmony between the ruling elite 
and the ruled citizens was the ideas of Confucian teachings. Confucian teachings see the 
emperor-subject relationship as that of father-son; thus the family ethics of filial affection 
from son to father and merciful love from father to son were the moral basis of social 
order and were extended to political life, so that the emperor-subject relationship would 
reflect the family ethics and display such affection and love. Ethics in political life should 
reflect the ethics of social life based on family ethics, and it is in this way that politics is 
rooted in culture and social structure based on family, lineage, clan ties, and other social 
bonds of patron-client relationship that also simulated the ethics of father-son relationship. 
 
5 One might be able to climb the ladder of social status via a conscious cultivation of patron-client 
relationships, but this was not a typical channel that an ordinary citizen was able to expect in his life unless 
members from his families, lineage or clan, or village community had been a member of the ruling group. 
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Therefore, the whole society is interpreted as a family: the ruling elite should display 
merciful love and bear the responsibility of taking good care of all the citizens like a 
father, and the citizens should extend their filial affection toward the ruling elite like a 
son or daughter. There were thus no clear divisions or meaningful boundaries between the 
ruling group and the ruled citizens. Thus state-society dichotomy did not appear in 
traditional Chinese society, and this social-political oneness, the whole society being one 
family where social-political harmony was seen as crucial for social-political life, has 
become the cultural-psychological basis of contemporary Chinese politics.6 One 
implication of this is a continuous debate over whether an independent and autonomous 
civil society, and later, a multiparty democracy, will be able to emerge and form in the 
reforming Chinese society.7 Scholars inspired by the third wave of democratization tend 
to give a positive answer to the above question, but most of them focus on the virtue of 
democratic institutions and few of them take serious the arguments from cultural and 
social structural perspectives, as evidenced by Pan Wei’s critics.8 In contrast, scholars 
 
6 Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981), Asian 
Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimension of Authority (Cambridge: Hardvard University Press, 1985), 
and The Mandarin and the Cadre: China’s political Cultures (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, the 
University of Michigan, 1988). 
7 See Suisheng Zhao, op, cit.; Chih-yu Shih, State and Society in Chinese Political Economy: The Cultural 
Dynamics of China’s Socialist Reform (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), Zhongguo Wenhua Yu Zhongguo De 
Min (Chinese Culture and Chinese Citizens) (Taipei, Fongyun Luntan Publishers, 1997), and Shuping 
Zhongguo (Book Reviews on China Studies) (Taipei: Hanlu Publishers, 1998). 
8 Suisheng Zhao, op cit. 
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who argue from cultural and social structural perspectives tend to be skeptical about the 
positive answer. I find myself identifying with cultural and social structural perspectives, 
but less skeptical about a democratic outcome appearing in China in the years ahead. 
Both Japan and Taiwan are Asian societies that have similar Asian values and 
patron-client social structures, and both have become multiparty democracies while 
staying very much Asian (a dialectical integration of modernity and tradition).9 So at 
least theoretically, one cannot exclude multiparty democracy as a possible outcome of 
China’s political development. My research question, therefore, is: given this particular 
cultural psychology and patron-client social structure, will China’s political development 
lead to a multiparty democracy? 
               (2) My Hypothesis 
              Chinese culture places great emphasis on the role of the elite in leading 
and educating the mass peasants10 to live a moral life that complies with the natural law 
of the universe. If you follow the natural law, not only at the micro-level you and your 
family will be blessed by heaven to succeed in farming production (reaping rich harvest) 
or climbing the social ladder (raising yourself to the upper level of the Civil Service), but 
 
9 Chie Nakane, Japanese Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970). About the 
integration of modernity and tradition , please see chapter nine of this dissertation. 
10 Elite-mass (intellectuals-peasants, or , rulers-citizens), patron-client, senior-junior, men-women, 
father-son, these are similar relationships in terms of the Confucian family ethics described in the first 
section: the mutual flowing of filial affection (from son to father) and merciful love (from father to son).   
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also at the macro-level the whole society and political regime will receive blessings from 
heaven so that peace and prosperity will be bestowed upon the whole civilization. If you 
live a life or govern the society against the natural law, there will be negative results. This 
knowledge has been conveyed through Confucian scripture and Confucianism-influenced 
historical writings. In real life, who is to convey such knowledge? The two most 
important sources of knowledge are the intellectual elite (Confucian students) through 
teachings and the political elite (the emperor and his imperial officials) through political 
practice.11 Therefore, it is both intellectual and political elites that are responsible for the 
cultural life of a particular period of time. 
                When China first encountered the challenge of modernization 
through the material advantages of western weapons (a series of military defeats since the 
Opium War in 1839 by invading western powers who were driven by commercial 
interests), it was once again the intellectual and political elites that first felt the imposing 
pressure from the western powers, and the urgent need of modernization. Such a feeling 
of urgency to catch up with the West has since occupied Chinese elites’ minds and hearts, 
and eventually spread to the whole civilization’s citizens. Nationalism thus dominated 
 
11 The first four emperors of Qing dynasty (1644--1795) are sincere believers of these Confucian religious 
teachings on the natural law and heavenly blessings for the civilization. All four ruled the civilization by 
sincerely following the natural law, and had attained the highest achievements since the age of Confucious. 
All four are Confucian intellectuals themselves.   
 8
                                                
Chinese minds and became the most powerful driving force of the society’s development 
and change. Up until now, generation after generation of Chinese intellectual and political 
elites have been thinking and practicing different prescriptions to save this country.12 
National wealth and power has become the shared, collective goal for the whole nation to 
pursue. 
                How will China fulfill that goal of national wealth and power? This is 
the single most important issue that has been driving Chinese elites to seek answers, and 
different prescriptions and projects for China’s development and change have been 
formulated, which lead to different practice of democracy in modern Chinese history. 
Such practice of “democracy” includes: late Qing dynasty’s constitutional monarchy, 
multiparty parliamentary democracy in the early years of the Republic of China, Chiang 
Kai-shek’s single-party dominated constitutionalism, Mao Zedong’s version of Leninist 
democracy (including People’s Democratic Dictatorship and Proletarian Dictatorship), 
and the socialist democracy plus rule by law in the reform era. Because Chinese cultural 
characteristics emphasize the role of the elite in leading the citizens in political, social, 
and cultural lives, all the historical practice of “democracy” has been significantly 
 
12 Chinese worldview and self-image has changed from being the center of human’s civilization to being 
only a member of the international world composed of modern nation-states. 
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influenced by Chinese elite thinking on development and change, which has been driven 
by an aspiration to save China—in other words, nationalism. Now because of elite 
leadership and teachings, nationalism has spread across the whole population. Whether 
China’s political development will lead to a multiparty democracy will depend on how 
Chinese elites reconcile the ideals of democracy and Chinese nationalism. I see culture as 
an ongoing process of social construction in which the ideas of the elite play the most 
crucial role--this is especially true in a Chinese cultural context that emphasizes top-down 
education or mobilization to carry out political-social-cultural civilization ideals. My 
hypothesis, therefore, is this: the greater the extent to which Chinese elite thinking on 
development and change reconciles the tension between Chinese nationalism and 
collectivist, family-like ethics on the one hand, and western democratic ideals based on 
each self-seeking individual’s subjectivity on the other hand, the greater the chance that 
China’s political development will lead to a multiparty democracy. 
 
(3) Literature Review 
                The development of analytical models in China studies goes from  
the totalitarianism model in the 1950s and 1960s; to the pluralist approach in the 1960s 
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and 1970s which includes the factionalism model and structural-functionalism; and then 
to new institutionalism in the 1980s and 1990s. All three periods bear the imprint of 
liberalism and carry an expectation that China will someday become a liberal democracy. 
Therefore, the fourth category will include different versions of cultural and social 
structural perspectives that provide views different from the previous three categories. 
1. The Totalitarianism Model13 
                In the 1950s and 1960s, it was the cold war atmosphere of 
confrontation between the free camp of liberal democracies and the communist bloc of 
totalitarianisms that influenced the researchers’ perspectives. The totalitarianism model 
conveyed an image of China where individuals did not have any channel or space for 
political participation. All policies and institutions were decided by the communist party. 
Decision-making was top-down, and the communist regime was able to penetrate and to 
completely control the whole society. A typical research question was: through what 
kinds of means could the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) attain such total control of 
Chinese society?14 Analyses were devoted to the understanding of ideological control, 
                                                 
13 Most of the analyses and citations in the next paragraph, are from Chih-yu Shih, “The Faith in 
Individualism in University of California Press for Thirty Years,” in Chih-yu Shih, Shuping Zhongguo 
(Book Reviews on China Studies) (Taipei: Hanlu Publishers, 1998), pp. 25-26. But the last sentence is a 
comment on this model from Yu-shan Wu, see footnote 18.   
14 The most famous work is: Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1963). 
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dogmatization of society, the scale of brainwashing,15 the purge and crackdown after the 
building of the People’s Republic of China,16and how peasant nationalism was exploited 
by Mao Zedong to help his rise to power in China.17This model assumed that the CCP 
leadership was united, and policy was based on consensus.18 
                Despite its virtue, there are several problems with this model. Firstly, 
focusing on the means and skills that the communist regime used to attain the capability 
of total control of the citizens leaves one thing unexplained: why were people willing to 
be mobilized? Why did Chinese people choose the CCP during the civil war when they 
had an alternative, the KMT? The capability of control after the building of the PRC had 
to do with the CCP’s great popularity among Chinese people even before it had won the 
regime. Chinese people wanted Mao and the CCP to lead them out of the 
hundred-year-long national humiliation that had taken place since the Opium War. It was 
this aspiration for national liberation that constituted the strong popular support for Mao 
 
15 Some examples are: Robert Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalitarianism (New York: 
Norton, 1961); Rensselaer W. Lee III, “The Hsia Fang System: Marxism and Modernization,” The China 
Quarterly 28 (October-December 1966): 40-62; Franklin Houn, To Change a Nation (Glencoe, III.: The 
Free Press, 1961). 
16 Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957); Ellis Joffe, Party and 
Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1965); Doak Barnett, China on the Eve of Communist Takeover (New York: 
Praeger, 1963). 
17 Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1962). 
18 Yu-Shan Wu, Russian Transitions 1992—1999: A Political Economic Analysis (Taipei: Wu-Nan 
Publishers, 2000), p. 48. 
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and the CCP, and it was because of such almost unconditional support that the CCP was 
able to carry out any of its projects, because the Chinese people believed that this was for 
the good of the whole nation. It might be brainwash, it might be propaganda, but the real 
reason for its success was much more than just means, skills, and excellent strategies. 
One can imagine, if this aspiration and strong support turn to a belief in liberal 
democracy (through elite education) someday, what a blessing will this be to the 
democratic promise for China! In short, a belief in individualism had prevented the 
researchers from paying attention to the causal power of this strong collectivist aspiration 
for national liberation.   
                Secondly, the model implies that the CCP had fully penetrated 
Chinese society, thus the total control of it. If this was the case, why was it that during the 
Great Leap Forward many local cadres were able to fabricate production figures to cheat 
the center? And this cheating generated significant political outcomes since it misguided 
the leadership into believing in the correctness of this movement, which turned out to be 
a great disaster. Whether the CCP fully penetrates Chinese society was one of the heated 
debates of the 1980s.19 Thirdly, the model assumed that the CCP leadership was united, 
and policies were based on consensus. During some periods of time this might be the case, 
 
19 See the third category of analytical model: new institutionalism. 
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whereas in other periods, factionalism prevailed. This leads us to the second category. 
2. Pluralism (Factionalism Model, and Structural-Functionalism) 
(1) Factionalism Model20 
                In the 1960s and 1970s, cultural revolution and the open dispute 
between China and the Soviet Union made the totalitarianism model inapplicable. The 
assumption of a united leadership and consensual policies had been questioned. There 
seemed to exist serious conflicts within the ruling elite, and plural political forces 
competing in the power arena for self-interests seemed to be relevant; thus the 
factionalism model emerged to replace the previous totalitarianism model.21 Factions 
were seen as small groups, and therefore interest group analysis seemed to apply.22 The 
organizations and resource distribution of factions were analyzed; the power politics 
behind the shift of policies were presented.23 And China’s sudden change of foreign 
policy from pro-Soviet to pro-US was a good subject for analysis.24 
                                                 
20 Most of the analyses and citations in the next paragraph are from Chih-yu Shih, “The Faith in 
Individualism in University of California Press for Thirty Years,” in Chih-yu Shih, Shuping Zhongguo 
(Book Reviews on China Studies) (Taipei: Hanlu Publishers, 1998), pp. 26-27. 
21 Andrew Nathan’s work could best represent this new turn to factionalism. See Andrew Nathan, “A 
Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,” China Quarterly, no. 53 (January-March 1973), pp. 34-66. 
22 Martin King Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1974). 
23 Andrew Nathan, “Policy Oscillations in the People’s Republic of China,” China Quarterly 68 (1976).   
24 See Thomas Gottlieb, “Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origin of the Strategic Triangle,” 
Rand Report, R-1902-NA (November 1977) (Santa Monica, Ca: Rand); Kenneth G. Lieberthal, 
“Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s,” Rand Report R-2342-NA (July 1978) (Santa Monica, Ca: Rand); John 
Garver, China’s Decision for Rapproachment with the United States, 1968-1971 (Boulder: Westview, 1983); 
Roger Brown, “Chinese Politics and American Policy,” Foreign Policy 23 (Summer 1976): 2-24. 
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                There are two problems with this model, and both relate to 
researchers’ lack of cultural sensitivity. Firstly, the above pluralist factionalism model 
was based on individualism: it assumed that each self-seeking individual had his own 
policy position based on his self-interests, that those individuals who had similar policy 
positions would come together to form a faction, and because there existed plural 
conflicting interests, different policy positions based on different interests would conflict 
with one another and engage in power competition. In this model, the final policy 
outcome would reflect the outcome of such power competition behind policy disputes. 
Therefore, factions could be classified according to different policy orientations. In short, 
policy positions were prior to the formation of factions, and a particular faction reflected 
a particular policy position. Policy position was the cause, and factional competition was 
the effect.  
However, because of Chinese collectivist culture, the reality in China 
seemed to be the opposite: the formation of factions was prior to policy positions, and 
policy positions were determined not by each individual’s policy preference, but by the 
immediate leader of a faction to which each individual belongs. In Chinese culture, an 
individual does not see himself as an independent, self-seeking entity with a subjectivity 
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that cannot be penetrated by any collectivity; instead, each individual sees himself as a 
part of various social relationships that he enjoys being a part of and is ready and willing 
to make contribution by devoting himself to the collective good. Part of this devotion 
may come from social or collective pressure, and part of it may be out of sincerity. 
Whether it is a moral pretension out of collective pressure or an affectionate enjoyment 
out of sincere heart, open pursuit of self interests and open competition for a particular 
interest is both embarrassing and uncomfortable, and in some occasions unbearable. 
Therefore, factional competition is usually carried out in a very subtle, informal way, 
unless the highest central authority has lost its neutral status and involves itself in the 
competition. This would lead to open conflicts since the highest leader can no longer be a 
neutral arbitrator for the dispute. Therefore, policy positions are determined by a factional 
leader, or patron who competes with and defeats opponent factions, and the lower level 
followers or clients will comply. Even when an individual has not come to full 
understanding of the moral implications or material benefits of a particular policy 
position, in his heart he has already decided to support such policy position because of his 
trust in his leader or because he is willing to show his filial affection (loyalty) to his 
patron. And in return, his patron will take good care of him. Such mutual relationships 
 16
                                                
involve both material interests and adoring love, and are thus more than just rational 
cost-benefit calculations. In short, factional competition develops prior to policy positions, 
and instead of a particular faction reflecting a particular policy position, factions use 
policy positions to engage in power competition: factional competition is the cause, and 
policy position is the effect. 
Secondly, the above pluralist factionalism model explains foreign 
policy by tracing the decision-makers’ foreign policy considerations back to “domestic 
political ecology and balance of power.”25 Here the image of a decision-maker is a 
rational individual who is only engaged in a cost-benefit analysis of the domestic reality 
of relative power advantages; the moral principles stated in China’s foreign policy were 
not taken seriously by the researchers cited above. Such analyses based on rationalism 
and individualism may only convey part of the truth and neglect that an important part of 
choice-making may come from identity. In the case of China’s foreign policy, national 
identity and sub-national collective identity may offer rich accounts for the policy 
outcomes.26 
 
25 Chih-yu Shih, “The Faith in Individualism in University of California Press for Thirty Years,” in 
Chih-yu Shih, Shuping Zhongguo (Book Reviews on China Studies) (Taipei: Hanlu Publishers, 1998), p. 
27. 
 
26 See Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim (eds.), China’s Quest for National Identity (Ithica, N. Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1993); also, Chih-yu Shih, China’s Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy 
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993), and The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Psycho-cultural View 
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(2) Structural-Functionalism 
                According to Harry Harding, the kinds of messages at hand will 
determine researchers’ research content. Indeed, the lack of information available in the 
1950s and 1960s contributed to an interpretation of China as under the total control of a 
totalitarian, united regime. In the 1970s academic interest in systems theory had turned 
researchers’ attention to policy inputs, and such research interest coincided with the 
appearance of many refugees in Hong Kong, which offered researchers an unprecedented 
opportunity to carry out in-depth interviews and thus research the roles that individuals 
played in the policy input process.27 
                Structural-Functionalism conveys an image of China as a system,  
and various phenomena in society as inputs to the system, which generates policies as 
outputs. In the general model, input functions include interest articulation and interest 
aggregation, the former being “the way interests are expressed typically in either spoken 
or written discourse by individuals and the groups or parties to which they belong,”28 and 
the latter being “performed by political parties and other groups as structures, each 
                                                                                                                                                 
(London: Macmillan, 1990). 
27 Chih-yu Shih, “Pingjie The American Studies of Contemporary China” (“A Review on The American 
Studies of Contemporary China”), in Chih-yu Shih, Shuping Zhongguo (Book Reviews on China Studies) 
(Taipei: Hanlu Publishers, 1998), p. 80.   
28 Mark V. Kauppi and Paul R. Viotti, Comparative Politics Theory ( New York:Longman, forthcoming), 
chapter 1.  
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grouping holding at least some interests in common.”29 Then through political 
participation (competitive elections in democratic countries), these interests will be 
represented in the congress and compete with one another to become rules. So output 
functions include rule making, rule application, and rule adjudication, and they are 
“performed respectively by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of 
government.”30 The political process is launched by atom-like, self-seeking individuals 
and is thus bottom-up participation, from society to state. But in the case of China, not 
only the input functions were carried out by a mono structure (communist party), but also 
the output functions. Political participation was usually through top-down mobilization 
launched by the elite, thus in this model China was seen as incompletely differentiated, 
and its participatory culture was categorized as subject culture which belonged to a less 
developed category.31 
                Critics of this model have long pointed out its weaknesses.32 Among 
them, ethnocentrism is the most severe criticism. In the case of China, just stating that 
 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 See Gabriel Almond and G. Binghan Powell, Comparative Poltics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: 
Little Brown, 1966), and Comparative Politics: System, Process, and Policy (Boston: Little Brown, 1978); 
Gabriel Almond and G. Binghan Powell, Jr. (eds.), Comparative Political Studies (Boston: Little Brown, 
1984); and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1963). 
32 Please see Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), New Directions in Comparative Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1991 & 
2002), chapter 1; also, Howard J. Wiarda, Introduction to Comparative Politics: Concepts and Processes 
(Orlando: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 2000), pp. 56-60.    
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China’s political system is incompletely differentiated did not guide researchers to 
understand the real input functions (like, consultation function) and some subtle practice 
of output functions (like, the dilution or intentionally misinterpretation of the center’s 
policy spirit at the local or lower working level instead of open resistance of a policy) that 
occurred under the current institutions of democratic-centralism. It did not help 
researchers to appreciate the pressure that decision-makers faced in a collectivist culture: 
for example, Mao had to pretend to keep a neutral moral position among the competing 
factions, but at the same time was able to promote the policy that he really wanted, like: 
the decision to shift from leaning to the Soviet Union to a pro-United States foreign 
policy, during cultural revolution when the aura of the time was still one that was filled 
with the extreme sentiment of anti-American imperialism. It did not direct researchers to 
be sensitive to China’s usually subtle political language that may signal significant 
changes about to occur.33 Finally it failed to bring researchers into close observation of 
 
33 For example, there is a subtle difference between the definition, in constitution, of China as “a socialist 
state of the dictatorship of the proletariat” and the definition of China as “a socialist state under the people’s 
democratic dictatorship.” When the latter expression replaced the former one in constitution, it signaled a 
big change of the central theme in the current era: it downgraded the importance of class struggle. See 
Suisheng Zhao, “Toward a Rule of Law Regime: Political Reform under China’s Fourth Generation of 
Leadership,” in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratization 
(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), p. 238. 
  Other examples include: the different expressions of the “central work” usually signaled a new era in 
different time, see Pan Wei, “Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China,” in Suisheng Zhao, op 
cit., p. 36; The inclusion of Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” into the constitution signaled the party has 
shifted from representing the mass to representing both the mass and the elites—a huge change since the 
establishment of the CCP in China.       
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changes in China’s political development. Without the functions and plural structures 
listed in this model as necessary for an advanced, fully developed system, and without 
bottom-up political participation based on each individual’s interests to be qualified as an 
advanced civic culture, the political system and participatory culture in China would be 
interpreted as underdeveloped and seen as static, with little change going. 
                Nevertheless, this model still had its virtue. Some scholar tried to 
refine this model and combine some of its elements with other conceptions (incentive 
types in sociology, and incentive direction in new institutionalism) to make it a useful 
design to account for the change of the communist regime to democratic institutions. This 
might have important implications for China’s political development.34 
3. New Institutionalism35 
                In political science, there are three versions of new institutionalism: 
rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and sociological 
                                                 
34 See Yu-shan Wu, Gongchan Shijie De Bianqian: Sige Gongdang Zhengquan De Bijiao (The 
Transformations in the Communist World: A Comparison of Four Communist Regimes) (Taipei: Dongda 
Publishers, 1995). 
35 Most of the analyses, citations, and critiques in this section are from Chih-yu Shih, “The Faith in 
Individualism in University of California Press for Thirty Years,” in Chih-yu Shih, Shuping Zhongguo 
(Book Reviews on China Studies) (Taipei: Hanlu Publishers, 1998), pp. 28-32, and “The Blind Spots of 
Contemporary New Institutionalism on China,” in Chih-yu Shih, op cit., pp. 57-71, also,  Zhongguodalu 
De Guojia Yu Shehui (The State and Society in China Mainland) (Taipei: Wunan Publishers, 1994), pp. 
28-31. 
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institutionalism.36 Most researchers in China studies who adopt new institutionalism as 
an analytical approach belong to the rational choice version. So in this section, when I 
refer to new institutionalism, it will mean rational choice institutionalism. Beginning 
from the 1980s, China’s reforms had changed the academic impression of a totalitarian 
regime, and although the phenomenon of factional competition was still occurring, the 
main concerns in China seemed to be centering on economic and political reforms, both 
involving the prospect of institutional change. And at the same time, mainstream 
academic interest in the 1980s has turned from a pluralist approach (including group 
analysis and structural-functionalism, popular in the 1960s and 1970s) to a state-centered 
approach consisting of the state-society analytical model and new institutionalism. 
Therefore, in China studies, new institutionalism became popular. New institutionalism 
emphasized that institutional design could change, strengthen, or sustain a person’s 
behavior and values, by the direction of incentive structure. It conveyed an image of 
Chinese politics based on the patron-client (cadre-citizen, or central cadre-local cadre) 
reciprocal relationship, instead of based on a one-way relationship of state’s total control 
of citizens, as described by the totalitarian model. It did not assume that political flow 
 
36 Please see Thomas A. Koelble, “The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology,” 
Comparative Politics (January, 1995): 231-243; Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political 
Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies (1996): 936-957. 
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was bottom-up (from citizens to state) and interest groups were necessary structure to 
perform input functions, as structural-functionalism depicted. The patron-client 
relationship described in this model was based on individualism and materialism where 
the superiors who had resources in their command reached out to the inferiors to build a 
patron-client relationship by a particular means of resource sharing. The unit of analysis 
is individual and the incentive for actions is material; the superiors and the inferiors 
depended on each other for their personal self interests, so both benefited from such a 
relationship. Researches of this kind were conducted in both industrial and agricultural 
sectors.  
                In the industrial sector, a research on factory political culture 
discovered such a relationship. A cadre and a worker searched for each other just like two 
individuals searching for each other in the market. The cadre wanted to develop his own 
relationship network with workers in the factory, and among workers there were some 
activists trying to become the chosen ones by performing well in carrying out production 
missions and especially in the factory’s political learning sessions. The cadres relied on 
these activists to convey political message to workers and feedback message from 
workers back to the cadre; and the activists relied on the cadre to favor them with the 
 23
                                                
distribution of social, economic, and political welfare. So this was a reciprocal 
relationship based on mutual benefits, instead of a one-way, top-down total control; it 
was vertically structured rather than the horizontally structured interest groups in a 
pluralist model. It was unlike the traditional Chinese patron-client relationship which was 
based on ethical order, so such a decision-making culture was named 
“neo-traditionalism.”37  
Neo-traditionalism was criticized, however, by another researcher 
who offered a different image of the cadre-worker relationship. This was named “unit 
socialism.” In neo-traditionalism, the activist workers (the clients) were depicted as 
faithful followers of the state cadres (the patrons) in the factory, and such a relationship 
naturally strengthened and consolidated the political authority of the state. In contrast, 
“unit socialism” emphasized the autonomy and self protection of a factory (as a 
community) against the state. Workers in most cases were lifetime employees of a factory 
and their material welfare (the basic needs of life, including income, residence, marriage, 
and retirement fund) was dependent upon the factory. Factory cadres could not dismiss 
these lifetime employees, and cadres themselves usually had to stay at a factory for many 
 
37 See Andrew Walder, Communist Neo-traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986) 
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years before transferring to another enterprise or being promoted to higher position, so 
they needed to develop a harmonious relationship with workers in order to attain effective 
management. A factory became a community and both state cadres and workers 
developed a collective identity of the factory; the most crucial political issue in the 
factory, therefore, was the collective income of this enterprise and bonus distribution. 
Any decision, thus, was attained by the consensus between cadres and workers. So the 
decision-making culture depicted in unit socialism is unlike the patron-client image in 
neo-traditionalism. The latter was criticized as a coating of the totalitarianism model 
since factory cadres’ resources depended upon the communist party and ultimately it was 
the party that commanded the factory decisions.38 
In the agricultural sector, there was a parallel debate between new 
institutionalism and neo-classicalism. New institutionalist researcher Oi held a similar 
view of patron-client relationship between state cadres, village cadres, and peasant 
citizens. Before reform, village cadres and villagers needed to maintain good 
relationships with state cadres in a planned economy in order to gain favorable treatment 
regarding the quantity and quality of grains levied; in many occasions, villagers had to 
 
38 See Brantly Womack, “Transfigured Community: Neo Traditionalism and Work Unit Socialism in 
China,” The China Quarterly 126 (June, 1991): 313-332. 
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sacrifice their interests to meet the state commissioned production mission. The village 
appeared weak and lacked any autonomy before the state. After reform, the property 
rights were transferred from the state to the village, and thus enhanced the bargaining 
power of village cadres when facing the state cadres. Therefore, a new type of 
patron-client relationship had developed where the villagers became loyal to their 
immediate village leaders. The role of the state began to withdraw, and village 
communities gained more autonomy.39 Neoclassical scholar Shue, in contrast, saw v
communities, before the reform, as autonomous from the state. Peasant cadres were 
always able to find ways to deceive the state and engaged in various economic activit
that benefited the local village community. The Communist party, before, did not really 
penetrate Chinese society, and citizen peasants were still only loyal to traditional 
now disguised as village cadres under communism. In short, traditional regional 
protectionism did not change under the communist state. But after reform, the penetratio
of the market was so powerful that it changed villagers’ loyalty to the gentry. Now village
peasants could themselves become free competitors in the market, and no longer relied 
local gentry to raise their living standards. The state became more powerful in exert
 
39 Jean Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 
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influence on village communities due to its ability to influence the market using financia
policies as leverage tools. The role of the state began to rise, and the autonomy of village
communities was weakened.40 Later, Oi was criticized for neglecting the power of the 
market.41 In response to that critique, Oi argued that lots of non-market means (using 
social relationships, including “backdoor economy”) were being utilized, and she 
accounted for such phenomena by appealing to each individual’s rational considerations 
of material interests. This is a typical argument of new institutionalism in down
the market myth of neoclassicalism.42  
Despite their debates, all the above researchers did not question their 
assumption of individualism and materialism. In analyzing the formation of a 
patron-client relationship or the bargaining between state cadres and local village cadres, 
the unit of analysis was always individual, and the individual actor’s considerations were 
always about personal material interests: welfare, job promotion. What was neglected 
was that an individual might not be a self-seeking subject as assumed by rationalism. 
This is similar to the formation of a faction discussed previously in the factionalism 
 
40 Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1988)  
41 Nee Victor, “A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism,” 
American Sociological Review 54, 5 (1989): 663-681.  
42 Jean Oi, “Rational Choice and Attainment of Wealth and Power in the Countryside,” in Goodman and 
Hooper (eds.) (1994): pp.64-79. 
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model. Workers and cadres were not like individuals searching for each other in the 
market and forming a relationship based only on materialist concerns. Before the 
formation of the network in a factory, social relationships had already existed. Factory 
network, like factions, were an  opportunity for the existing social relationship to utilize. 
Behind the formal factory network were private relationships coming from relatives, 
lineage or clan linkage, neighbors, or old factional acquaintance during the Cultural 
Revolution. It was after a worker had become a member of the formal network that he 
began to develop the kind of activism being observed by Walder, in order to honor the 
existing, informal, social relationship as an expression of his filial affection. This was in 
opposition to Walder’s theory that he tried to be active, performing well in order to attract 
the attention from the cadres, for more material gains. Therefore, researchers’ assumption 
of rational individualism created blind spots in the appreciation of the decision-making 
culture in the factory. Similarly, a research agenda of existing social relationships 
between the bargaining cadres was not included in Oi’s research; thus the rich bargaining 
information collected was only interpreted in terms of two independent individuals’ 
personal interests. The collectivity that the bargaining cadre represented, and the pressure 
generated from such collective identity, was absent in the analyses, which was pitiful in 
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terms of the time and energy devoted, and the rich information collected in the field work. 
Similar rationalist analyses had been presented in several other studies of the 
power-money exchange between state cadres and enterprise cadres,43 or policy 
coordination between central and local cadres,44 but again, each individual cadre was 
seen as representing himself and his personal considerations were limited to personal 
gains.45 Still another researcher, Yang, sticking to the position of new institutionalism, 
interpreted the abolishment of the commune system in the village as liberalization, 
bottom-up development. But he actually understood the importance of political power 
struggles in launching reforms, which had little direct relationship with the transaction 
cost of the commune system. So he termed village reform as a path “rupture” from the 
previous path of the commune system to the current liberal one. The problem is, instead 
of a “rupture,” the reform is actually a return to a traditional collectivist path (the small 
farm system) where peasants’ concerns were usually based on another collective identity. 
In short, despite his good understanding of Chinese collectivist reality, his position of 
 
43 Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1992). 
44 Yaseng Huang, Inflation and Investment controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local 
Relations during the Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1996). 
45 According to Chih-yu Shih, Huang actually displayed much richer understanding of Chinese social 
relationships and its crucial causal role in accounting for political phenomena, but he wanted to simplify the 
analyses and treat social relationship as a tool for rational individuals to use for personal job promotion, 
thus Huang’s position became closer to new institutionalism and sacrificing his rich understanding of social 
relationship.  
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new institutionalism guided him to claim that village reform was the achievement of the 
maximization of individuals’ interests.46 
In addition to the issue of the patron-client relationship and path 
rupture, another important study concerns the issue of property rights. For new 
institutionalism, different arrangements of property rights offered different incentive 
structures, and thus different opportunities for each self-seeking individual to maximize 
his personal interests. Designing clear norms of property rights would enhance each 
individual’s personal incentive to pursue efficiency, and thus enhance efficiency at the 
macro-level; the normative implication of this was, therefore, a call for democracy in the 
process to truly guarantee the protection of private property rights. In contrast, cultural 
and social structural perspectives would notice the crucial role of social relationships in 
accounting for an individual’s concerns over his social relationships (moral incentive or 
moral pretension that generated pressure for upholding, or being not affordable to neglect, 
the collective identity and collective interests), and the resulting behavior of using the 
opportunities offered in different design of property rights to seek benefit for the 
collectivity that he represented, or to consolidate the relationship that he was a part of. So 
 
46 Dali Yang, Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Industrial Change since the Great 
Leap Forward Famine (Standford: Stanford University Press, 1996). 
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the same kind of behavior might have different interpretations from a new 
institutionalism perspective versus the cultural and social structural perspectives. 
Granick thought that the difference in the arrangement of property 
rights would account for both the phenomena that Chinese enterprises had many 
“mothers-in-law,” and the extent that enterprises exceeded their quota of work in 
production missions.47 That is, he used the change in property rights to explain the 
change both in the environment of enterprise administration, and in enterprise behavior. 
The problem was that he might have confused with cause and effect.  Because his 
starting point was the change in property rights, he failed to analyze the policy 
negotiations among central agencies, local governments, and enterprises that had led to 
the existence of or a change in the property rights. When there was a change in property 
rights, a researcher should first discover who (the mothers-in-law: which central agencies, 
which local governments) had launched the change, and when the local government had 
obtained or returned a particular enterprise’s property right, it would mean that all parties 
in the policy negotiation had achieved policy consensus about how to distribute the 
production missions and interests, and how to define the responsibilities of administration 
 
47 David Granick, Chinese State Enterprises: A Regional Property Rights Analysis (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1990). 
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and guidance. Therefore, change in property rights was an effect, and the agreed policy 
by all negotiating parties (mothers-in-law) was the cause. And how a particular enterprise 
would change its production behavior was also an effect of the policy that had determined 
the quota of production missions and left the room for extra-production. So researchers 
had to first discover who the negotiating parties were, and what collective interests each 
negotiating individual represented. 
Another scholar, Lee, presented a three-layer patron-client 
relationship to analyze interactions among state cadres, enterprise cadres, and workers, 
and observed their behavioral adjustment under different property rights institutions. Lee 
understood Chinese social relationships (insiders’ conspiracy for collective gains), but 
again, like Walder, he saw those social relationships only as tools for each individual to 
exploit when taking advantage of the unclear state of property rights. It was seen as a 
conspiracy between self-seeking individuals, the unit of analysis being each individual. 
Instead, a cultural and social structural view would see any such opportunity as a chance 
to be grabbed by an existing social relationship. Any activity, policy, or business would 
carry the imprint of interactions among many existing social relationships. The unit of 
analysis is each such relationship of which an individual sees himself as a part. Such a 
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collectivist spirit may or may not change in the future, but up until now it is still a very 
important source in accounting for Chinese people’s behavior.48 
Adopting a purely analytical path (no normative implications 
involved), Wu tried to compare four Leninist-party led areas (Mainland China, Hungary, 
the Soviet Union, and Taiwan) and see their different developmental paths under the 
change in property rights.49 In order to keep his commitment to a purely analytical 
attitude, he developed an abstract classification of three types of property rights. But in 
the real world the states of property rights were actually vague, so Wu claimed that his 
analysis would not be a structural analysis, but a process analysis, which emphasizes 
dynamics and details. But emphasizing dynamics and details caused further problems 
because it was very hard to build causal linkage between abstract classification (clear 
state of property rights) and the dynamic world in process (constant change of the states 
of property rights). So Wu attributed the change of property rights to four outside factors: 
ideology, national security, agricultural type, and international financial pressure. In this 
way Wu departed from the orthodox new institutionalist position. But he tried to return to 
an individualist position and said that each individual maximized his personal interests 
 
48 Keun Lee, Chinese Firms and the State in Transition: Property Rights and Agency Problems in the 
Reform Era (Armonk, N. Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1991). 
49 Yu-shan Wu, Comparative Economic Transformations: Mainland China, Hungary, the Soviet Union, 
and Taiwan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). 
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under the restrictions structured by these four outside factors. Like other new 
institutionalists, Wu did not believe that social relationships accounted for people’s 
behavior. Huang , Wu, and Lee all assumed that government officials, managers, and 
economists were all commissioned by the state, and that their personal interests lay in the 
fulfillment of state directives in raising productivity, and thus getting career promotions. 
But many of them took advantage of the unclear states of property rights for personal 
gains which would threaten the state interests. The problem is that such opportunism 
actually reflected both the unclear state of property rights and the ongoing operation of 
the existing social relationships. Without analyzing the operation of the existing social 
relationships, the interpretation would not get to a full understanding of the influence of 
change in property rights: that is, how these collective social relationships contribute to or 
restrict the direction of change in property rights, and how after the reform of property 
rights people used new arrangements of property rights to consolidate the existing social 
relationships. Institutions, in whatever type, new or old, changed or unchanged, are all 
opportunities for people to benefit and consolidate the existing social relationships. 
Therefore, one may well be skeptical about the claim that the introduction of democratic 
institutions would bring about the behavioral adjustment expected by new 
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institutionalism. 
4. The Cultural Approach (Cultural-Psychological Model)50 
                The above three categories of models are the mainstream models that 
have been popular in China studies since the 1950s. There have been very few scholars 
adopting a cultural psychological model in China studies. Here I will divide  the cultural 
approach into two groups: the first group does not take a teleological view of China’s 
political development, and therefore the position is closer to cultural relativism, on the 
issues of human rights, the appearance of a civil society based on pluralism, and the final 
transformation of China’s political institutions to a multiparty democracy. In short, it 
rejects the modernization school, both the initial and sophisticated versions. The second 
group is from the modernization school that believes China’s authoritarian culture will 
need to change to a democratic culture with economic development and differentiation of 
social interests. Here I will present Chih-yu Shih to represent the first group and Lucian 
Pye to represent the second. 
                Chih-yu Shih has long been reminding the academic circle that 
liberalist approaches (whether it is totalitarianism model, pluralism in the form of 
                                                 
50 In this model, social relationships have been related to cultural psychology, and can actually be absorbed 
into this model. Therefore, I did not put social structure in the title, because the cultural psychological 
model has actually included it. 
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factionalism model or in the form of structural-functionalism model, state-centered 
approaches in the form of state-society analysis or in the form of new institutionalism) 
have all carried a cultural bias based on rationalism and individualism. A good study of 
China should be able to enter into the Chinese mindset and the Chinese people’s hearts, 
which were formed in the millennia-long cultural tradition and in the century-long clash 
of civilizations between China and the West. Both collectivism (from cultural tradition in 
the past several millennia) and nationalism (from clash of civilizations in the past century) 
should be taken seriously. A collectivist perspective will need to start with the social 
relationships that an individual’s identity has been rooted in, which will mean that an 
individual’s cognition of “self” may not be independent from the social relationship that 
he belongs to. Nationalism should not be seen just as one element of national interests, 
because nationalism is a strong collective identity instead of a tool for rational calculation 
like the discourse of national interests would present it to be; also, it may not be pertinent 
to see nationalism as an antithesis of democracy, though in many occasions it appears so, 
which actually comes from clashes of civilizations between modern China and the West. 
                In his examination of the change in Chinese traditional political 
culture under the practice of a socialist economy, Shih argued that the change had been a 
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change in nature, not just a cyclical turn that would turn back after some time of 
departure, and this was because of the practice of socialist economic institutions. In a 
word, there had been a permanent decline, since the Production Great Leap Forward, in 
traditional cultural psychological belief in the political regime as a moral regime. The 
decline of such a belief was due to the regime’s abuse of moral calling power (calling 
people to make tremendous sacrifice to pursue the moral goal of communism that turned 
out to be a fake image) to coercively develop communist economic institutions. After that 
attempt had failed, the regime still stayed in power and pretended that the moral goal of 
communism was still in process and was about to succeed, which made people, from 
cadres up to central leaders all become cognizant of the fact that the regime had been 
only pretending its moral teachings. The Cultural Revolution which aimed at saving the 
regime’s legitimacy (as a moral regime pursuing communism for the benefit of the people) 
further led the society into moral bankruptcy, the result of which was the Three 
Credibility Crises (Sanxinweiji). Twelve years of reform had proved that the regime was 
unable to rebuild moral authority in the political domain. Therefore it seemed that the 
moral decline (both of the regime and of the political culture) since the Production Great 
Leap Forward had not been just a temporary phenomenon, but a continuous normalcy. 
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The proof was all the phenomena occurring in the reform era, which included the wane of 
the monoist value system, the openness of factional power struggle , the irrelevance of 
ideology, the maturity of regional economic forces, the universalization of market 
behavior, the establishment of enterprise identity, the relaxation of the plan system, the 
appearance of the local elite, and the loss of people’s goal of life.51 
                In a work that questioned the effectiveness of the popular 
state-society analysis, Shih presented a theory of two “partial selves” to account for the 
seemingly cyclic turns of China’s political-economic development. Each individual, 
especially the middle-level cadres (like the enterprise leadership or the village cadres), in 
current Chinese society had within his heart two conflicting “partial selves”: one is a 
collective identity with the state and its interests, and the other is a collective identity 
with the enterprise community or village community that he was in. These two “partial 
selves” were in constant struggle within his heart. The way to reconcile such conflicts 
was to take turns to satisfy each “partial self” at different time, in different occasions, and 
on different issues. In one occasion, he might need to prove himself as a very spiritual 
person that had only the state interests at heart, and in another occasion he might just 
 
51 See Chih-yu Shih, Zhongguo Dalu Zhengzhi Jingji Yanli (The Reason of Mainland China’s Political 
Economy) (Taipei: Wunan Publishers, 1992). 
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forget his identity as a state official and turn to a citizen that very much cared about the 
material interests of his community or his personal social relationships. Thus the 
macro-level political-economic development would take turns to reflect the rotational 
expression of the two partial selves at the micro-level. So each individual in current 
Chinese society actually acted as the agent of the state at one moment, and as the agent of 
society at another moment, thus making the model of state-society analysis not an 
effective or relevant one. In the logic of such an analysis, the expectation of the 
appearance of a civil society, and later, democratization in China is groundless, and could 
be self-deluding, because people had their own way to pursue their private material 
interests (as described above), they wound not need an autonomous civil society, let alone 
democratic institutions to protect their private interests.52 
                Shih’s other works center on similar concerns about the bias of 
liberalism in China studies. His cultural understanding of the Chinese mindset and 
Chinese heart made him very skeptical about the expectation of democratization in 
China’s political development. In short, Shih emphasized the particularity of Chinese 
cultural psychology. China’s political development, Shih argued, might lead to feudal 
 
52 See Chih-yu Shih, Zhongguodalu De Guojia Yu Shehui (The State and Society in China Mainland) 
(Taipei: Wunan Publishers, 1994).  
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pluralism (plural social forces based on collective identity, instead of self-seeking 
individual’s subjectivity) and collective democracy (under a single communist party).53 
                Long famous in the circle of China studies, Lucian Pye interprets 
communist China’s authoritarian political culture as an offspring of traditional imperial 
ideology coming from Confucianism. Even the subtle way of factional politics during 
Cultural Revolution could be successfully accounted for by Pye’s political psychological 
analysis.54 The reform in the 1980s did not change Pye’s belief in the applicability of 
traditional Chinese collectivist culture.55 For Pye, Chinese political culture of 
authoritarianism is rooted in the unique way Chinese saw power. Power was related to 
social status. Those who had higher status would not seek power openly, because that 
would be seen as selfish; rather, power was devoted to them automatically by those who 
had lower status. The leadership only needed to pretend to be moral, neutral, and 
representative of all the people without caring about their personal interests or leaning to 
one particular faction’s interests. Harmony needed to be maintained on the surface, 
though factional politics might be going on heatedly. If factions engaged in open 
 
53 See Chih-yu Shih, op cit., chapter 1, and Collective Democracy: Political and Legal Reform in China 
(Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999). 
54 See Lucian Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968). 
55 See Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981), 
Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimension of Authority (Cambridge: Hardvard University Press, 
1985), and The Mandarin and Cadre (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, the University of Michigan, 
1988). 
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competition, it would have serious moral implications because that would mean the 
highest leader had lost his moral calling power to harmonize the competing interests. This 
would in turn cause anxiety across the whole society whose order was based on the 
harmonious relationships among citizens and between the moral ruling elite and the 
materialistic, selfish peasant citizens. Social mobility is actually moral mobility. Higher 
status usually implied higher moral knowledge. Thus the breaking of harmony is the most 
unbearable thing. Not only would open competition among citizens not be encouraged, 
open challenge to the leadership was something unthinkable-- the leadership represented 
the whole society, the whole civilization. Since factions would not engage in open 
competition, they would compete in all kinds of subtle ways, for example: hiding behind 
policy positions to pretend to compete for moral principles contained in each policy 
position. Similar patterns of behavior appeared in the reform era. Negotiation style was a 
reflection of social relationships, and material pursuit was an expression of collective 
identity and interests. In short, this was a collectivist society and collective identity 
needed to be taken seriously. Finally, Pye was a believer of the modernization school, 
though a sophisticated one. He expected a change of authoritarian culture would 
gradually happen with increasing differentiation of social interests. His interpretation of 
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democratization in Taiwan was this: Taiwan was a good example of the traditional thesis 
of the modernization school, that economic development would lead to the emerging of 
the middle class, which in turn would lead to increasing level of political participation, 
which was the process of democratization.56 Obviously, this would be his expectation of 
China’s political development.  
(4) Methodology 
                The title of my dissertation is Chinese Democracy: How Elite 
Thinking on China’s Development and Change Influences Chinese Practice of 
Democracy (1839—the Current Time). It includes two parts: chapters two to five are 
historical analysis, and chapters six to eight are the interviews. The methodology is 
qualitative methodology, involving case studies based on historical methods for chapters 
two to five, and face-to-face, in-depth interviews in field research for chapters six to 
eight.    
It is my assumption that Chinese elite thinking on China’s 
development and change has been influencing the Chinese practice of democracy since 
the Opium War (1839) and will continue to have great impacts upon the Chinese pursuit 
of democracy in the next 20 years. I use chapters two to five of my dissertation, the 
 
56 From Pye’s lecture in 1991 (citation to be checked) 
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historical analysis, to demonstrate the causal relationship between Chinese elite thinking 
on the development and change of Chinese society on the one hand, and Chinese 
historical practice of democracy (from 1839 till the current time, including “Leninist 
democracy”) on the other hand, the former being the independent variable and the latter 
being the dependent variable. The method used in chapters two to five, therefore, is 
historiography. I develop my causal analyses based on extensive reading of historians’ 
and social scientists’ works. And then I use chapters six to eight of my dissertation, the 
interviews, as the most current information that reveals Chinese social trends toward the 
next 20 years, and make an assessment of whether, in the next 20 years (2004 to 2024), 
China will become a western style, multiparty democracy—and if the answer is yes, what 
that democracy will look like. For example, one could argue that such a democracy will 
be a combination of western democracy (based on the value of individualism) and 
Chinese culture (based on the value of collectivism). The method used in chapters six to 
eight, therefore, is face-to-face, in-depth interviews. 
            Whether the argument given in the above example is true is subject to 
empirical examination of future events, but it is my job to make a judgment at the present 
time in my dissertation, and the judgment is based on chapters two to five, the historical 
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analyses of the long-term trend, and chapters six to eight, the information gained from the 
interviewees. Although the interviewees (in chapters six to eight) were not necessarily 
elites, they came from the four elite groups in current Chinese society: government 
officials, intellectuals, businessmen, and media professionals. Their views, I believe, 
could represent those views commonly shared by current Chinese elites, and therefore, 
according to my assumption, would have significant impacts upon the Chinese pursuit of 
democracy in the next 20 years. The interview question did not directly ask question 
about democracy; rather, it asked the interviewee’s personal opinions about “the factors 
that have been driving or limiting the development and change of X city (in the context of 
development and change of Chinese society since 1839), carrying it toward the next 20 
years.” So the interviewees did not directly talk about democracy—they just expressed 
their views on positive and negative factors that might influence the development and 
change of the city that they were in. Because in urban development one can best 
experience the tension between traditional values and modern values, the development 
and change of a city (in the context of the development and change of Chinese society 
since 1839) should reveal valuable information about the social trends. 
The interviewees were advised to follow the four-point guideline 
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included in the questionnaire: (1) general understanding (the general answer to the 
question asked); (2) state role (positive and negative) in the process of development and 
change; (3) self role (positive and negative factors for self fulfillment), including career 
role (positive and negative), with both roles placed in the bigger picture of  the society’s 
development and change; (4) expectations for the future (positive and negative). The talks 
were open-ended, and semi-structured as described above. From the talks, one could gain 
an understanding about the relative weight that an interviewee placed on the state and self 
(including his profession). From that, one could make judgments on the social trends: 
whether the society was moving toward a culture that will place more emphasis on 
individual rights, whether collectivist ethics would still strongly dominate Chinese 
people's minds, and if both individualism and collectivism were elements of the value 
system of this society, what would be the balance or combination between them? Such 
information would include very useful clues for one to judge on the future of the Chinese 
practice of democracy (Leninist democracy? western style democracy? or what 
alternative routes would emerge?) 
The interviewees included four groups of people: 
(1) Government officials: those who were employed by the government, worked at a 
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government agency or department, and gained their regular income from the 
government because of their service in governmental office. This group included the 
party cadres. 
(2) Scholars (intellectuals): those who taught at universities, and conducted research as 
their regular activities besides teaching. This group included those who worked for 
research institutes and only conducted research without regular teaching obligations. 
This group also included graduate students. 
(3) Enterprise people (businessmen): those who owned a company, or worked for an 
enterprise. The enterprises included state-owned, collectively owned, privately owned 
enterprises, and joint ventures owned by Chinese and non-Chinese. 
(4) Media professionals: journalists and program broadcasters who worked for 
newspapers, magazines, televisions, or broadcasting networks. This group included 
dramatists.  
These were face-to-face interviews. Each participant talked for about thirty minutes, or 
more if he or she so chose. The interviewee's responses were open-ended; I just took 
notes and did not intervene during his or her talks except in necessary situations or for the 
purpose of clarification (making sure what I had heard was the same as what he or she 
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had just said). It was the interviewee's thoughts and feelings that I wanted to learn from. I 
adopted a role like a student to humbly learn from the interviewees, with full respect to 
their expressed thoughts and feelings. 
                I have collected around 120 interviews, and in this dissertation, I 
present 18 of them57 drawn from Shanghai as representative cases, based on my own 
judgment that these 18 persons’ opinions can best represent the richness and diversity of 
the four groups I am examining. The reason for limiting my initial focus to Shanghai is 
that if democratic ideas are to take root in China as a whole, they likely will take hold 
first in major, cosmopolitan cities like Shanghai. Although this dissertation is limited to 
these 18 cases, I will continue this project in my post-doctoral research on the prospects 
of Chinese democracy using the data and other new information from other cities like 
Beijing and Guangzhou that are not included in this dissertation. In other words, this 
dissertation is only the first part of the project; there will be other parts in the days ahead.  
                Why do I choose Shanghai instead of Beijing or Guangzhou to 
represent China’s future? Compared with Shanghai, Beijing has very little modern 
elements: its bureaucrats lean too much toward ideology and its people toward 
 
57 See chapters six to eight. 
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narrow-minded nationalism;58 Guangzhou is more business-focused and is not concerned 
very much with the issue of democracy.59 Democracy is less likely to begin in these c
Shanghai is the most advanced and the most westernized city in the big cities of China. 
believe that the future of China likely will be a fusion of Chinese culture (the traditiona
elements) and the western culture (the modern elements). So there are three reasons tha
choose Shanghai. (1) Shanghai has a character that is able to include and intermingle all
kinds of different elements; historically it has achieved a good fusion of Chinese culture
and western culture, so the fusion of different cultures is not unfamiliar to this city. (2) 
The tension between traditional elements and modern elements is best represented in
development of this city, so this city’s residents must learn how best to tackle such 
tension to achieve a balance. (3) The problems emerging in the process of 
modernization60 in this fastest growing city are the most obvious, so its citizens 
 
58 See chapter eight, the talks from interviewee No. 15. 
59 Here is the reason why: 
        The Chinese academic field has been placing their greatest hope for social reformation on          
the class of private business owners. However, considering how business owners survive in China, one 
can easily see that they have developed a symbiotic relationship where their interests depend on the 
political elite. For many of them, instead of accumulating wealth through market competition, they 
become rich as a result of favors bestowed by government officials. The government officials who 
have the power to allot formally national or collectively owned resources have become the ones to 
‘create the rich.’ The white-collar and high-tech elites who work in foreign enterprises regard ‘staying 
away from politics’ as their core value. They are only interested in becoming rich and having fun and 
do not want to endanger the very source of their income. 
See He Qinglian, “The New Myth in China: China’s Rising Middle-class Will Accelerate 
Democratization.” In (http://www.danke4china.net/ywwz/15.htm).  
60 Like lacking concerns of the relationship between human beings and nature, lacking concerns of the 
relationship between development and stability, lacking concerns about health or quality of life, and lacking 
concerns about each individual’s psychological maturity in the developmental process. See chapter 7, the 
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experienced those problems the most closely. From the above three reasons, I believe 
Shanghai likely could best represent the future of China as a fusion of Chinese culture 
and the western culture. From these 18 interviewees from Shanghai we can see how the 
people of Shanghai deal with such tension between tradition and modernity in their 
thinking, which may give us a clue about what the future of China (as a fusion of Chinese 
culture and western culture) will look like.61  
                
                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
talks from interviewee No. 13. 
61 See chapter nine. 
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Interview Question 
 
What are the factors that have been driving (or limiting) the development and change of 
this city, carrying it toward the next 20 years? 
 
                                                                                    
1. general understanding 
2. state role (positive and 
negative) 
3. self role (positive and 
negative), including 
career role (positive and 
negative) 
4. expectations for the 
future (positive and 
negative) 
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The interviewees include four groups of people: 
 
(1) government officials 
(2) scholars (intellectuals) 
(3) enterprise people (businessmen) 
(4) media professionals 
 
Each person can answer the question for about 30 minutes, or more if he or she so 
chooses. The question is open-ended and semi-structured, as shown above. 
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(5)  Outline of the Chapters 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Chapter Two: The Qing Dynasty in Crisis (1839—1911) 
Chapter Three: The Politics in the Republic of China (1912—1949) 
Chapter Four: The Years under Mao Zedong (1949—1976) 
Chapter Five: The Reform Years (1978—the current time) 
Chapter Six: The Interview Cases in Shanghai (1) 
Chapter Seven: The Interview Cases in Shanghai (2) 
Chapter Eight: The Interview Cases in Shanghai (3)  
Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
                In chapters two to five, I will demonstrate the causal link between the 
elites’ views of China’s development and change and the practice of democracy; both 
domestic and international contexts will be discussed, so that the formation and change of 
elites’ thoughts (the evaluations of and prescriptions for China’s challenges in face of the 
West) will become clear. Both collectivism (the elites’ cultural ideals) and nationalism 
(the elites’ aspirations to save China) will be included in the analyses.  In chapter two, 
the late Qing dynasty’s imperial officials and Confucian intellectuals were forced to face 
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the power of modernity imposed on them by the invading western powers. The 
intellectual and political elites’ views of western advantages have changed from material 
weapons to political institutions. Constitutional monarchy was suggested, promoted with 
failure, and finally adopted by the late Qing regime. But the regime did not have chances 
to seriously practice it, because it was overthrown in just a few years. Before the final 
adoption of constitutional monarchy, there was a big debate between the elites about 
which path China should follow: keep the imperial system, or revolutionary change to a 
republic system? This will be discussed. 
                In chapter three, the practice of multiparty parliamentary democracy 
and the reason for its final failure will be analyzed. After the building of the republic, 
both the reformist and the revolutionary intellectual elites were engaged in party politics 
in the parliament. The Chinese were bent on democracy, and the spirit of republicanism 
dominated the intellectuals’ minds. Then Yuan Shikai, with his personal, selfish ambition, 
destroyed this newly budding democracy by trying to bring the nation back to its old 
imperial path and becoming the Emperor himself. Both the reformist and the 
revolutionary intellectuals, cherishing the hard built republic and the enlightened spirit 
contained in it, actively devoted themselves to military revolts against Yuan, and finally 
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saved the republic. The subsequent politics, up until 1949, did not offer a chance for 
China to continue its practice of democracy, but the spirit of republicanism had been 
inherited by the intellectuals of the May Fourth Movement (1915-1923), and carried by 
generation after generation of liberal intellectuals.                   
In chapter four, Mao Zedong Thoughts and the Communist Party’s 
practice will be analyzed. As argued before in this chapter (chapter one), the CCP had 
been popular and won the mind and heart of Chinese people. And it was because of such 
unconditional support from the Chinese people that communist party was able to carry 
out any project, as long as the Chinese people continued to believe that it would benefit 
the whole nation. Nationalism accounted for such strong support, which gave Mao an 
unprecedented opportunity to experiment with his utopian romanticism. It turned out to 
be a great disaster. How did history develop like this? The reason behind this will be 
analyzed.  
                Chapter five discusses the institutional origin of the major problems 
that China has been facing in the reform years. The problems will be classified into four 
categories: the economy, the social structure, the politics, and the culture. These problems 
have to do with the communist party’s insistence on the one party dictatorial rule. Deng 
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Xiaoping Theory will be investigated, and Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represent” discourse 
and Hu Jintao’s ideas of “scientific development” and “the harmonious society” will be 
briefly discussed.  
In chapters six to eight, the interview information will represent the 
most current views and attitudes on the social trend toward the next 20 years (2004 to 
2024). How will an individual see himself? Is there a difference between generations? 
How will people reconcile nationalism and individualist values? How will people see the 
state’s role? In chapter nine, I will try to detect whether there is a trend in elites’ ideas to 
reconcile nationalism and democracy, and then make my own judgment of China’s 
political development. From 1839 to the current time, and further to the next 20 years 
(2004 to 2024), there must be a trend, I assume, and the empirical information will give 
us the answer. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE QING DYNASTY IN CRISIS (1839-1911)  
 
                As stated in chapter one, the Chinese intellectual elite, the educated 
stratum, has been both the political and/or cultural leaders of the society and the driving 
force of societal change. In traditional, dynastic China, an important part of the ruling 
elite--the imperial bureaucracy--had been composed of and recruited from intellectual 
elite who mastered in Confucian doctrine on how to govern a society based on a set of 
moral principles that was believed to be rooted in the natural law of the universe. Thus, 
traditionally an intellectual62 had two ways of self fulfillment: he could either join the 
imperial bureaucracy and become a member of the ruling elite (the political and cultural 
elite), or stay outside of the officialdom and become a member of the cultural elite by 
engaging in teaching or illuminating Confucian knowledge and spreading it to the whole 
society and generation after generation of Chinese to come. The role of the Chinese 
 
62 Chinese intellectuals are always Confucian intellectuals. Some of them might be interested in Taoism and/or 
Buddhism, but for the most part they will still master in Confucianism, because that is the only way of social mobility, 
and because the whole society was built upon Confucian moral principles.  
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intellectuals, thus, has been to carry a missionary spirit of safeguarding and spreading 
Confucian teachings of civilization ideals for the whole of mankind. It is because of this 
missionary spirit that Chinese elite (both intellectual and political) had difficulty in 
modern time (i.e., from the Opium War onward) in coming to terms with the seeming 
superiority of the western civilization to the Chinese one. 
                (1) The International Factors 
Traditionally China never faced a challenge coming from the ocean; 
its threats always came from the mainland, especially the northern nomadic tribes. 
Challenges from the ocean, posed by the western imperialist powers in the 19th century, 
seemed to be far more serious than the traditional ones. The threats contained three 
aspects: material, institutional, and cultural. Materially, the western powers were superior 
in national wealth and military power; institutionally, their constitutionalism with a 
parliamentary system seemed to operate better and more efficiently for the benefit of the 
citizens; and culturally, the doctrines and spiritual faith underpinning their civilization 
seemed to work better than the Confucianism that had been so central in the Chinese 
elites’ spirit. These three aspects had in turn occupied the mind and heart of Chinese 
elites in the modern time--that is, since the Opium War (1839-1842). 
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                Chinese elites, in their cause of “saving China,” had continually 
presented different types of prescriptions, respectively in different periods, to meet the 
challenges posed by the invading western powers. China had been militarily weak in the 
face of the advanced military technology of the West, so the first type of prescription, 
responding to the perceived material advantages of the west, focused on the military 
building with advanced weapons and gunboats.63 This was the core of the 
Self-strengthening Movement (1860-1893), led by several famous imperial officials (the 
political elite who were also Confucian intellectual elite) who had successfully defeated 
the intractable Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), and other rebellions.64 The efforts of the 
Self-strengthening Movement proved to be a thorough failure in a series of humiliating 
defeats in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895); the Northern Fleet that marked the 
military efforts of the past thirty years was totally destroyed. China, with its old ways, 
proved to be unfit for competition in the survival game in the new world.65 Thus came 
 
63 The efforts also included railroad building and mining. 
 
64 They are the Nian Rebellion (1853-1868) , the Southwest Muslim Rebellion (1855-1873), and the 
Northwest Muslim Rebellion (1862-1878) 
65 At the final stage of the determinant naval battle (in Feb., 1895), when Chinese commander-in-chief, 
with his high-ranking subordinates, was prepared to kill himself as a martyr for the Court, he even 
received a letter of persuasion of surrender from his Japanese counterpart that explained the reasons why 
China failed again and again in both land and naval battles. The reasons lay, according to the Japanese 
commander-in-chief, in the differences between China and Japan in the attitude in learning from the west, 
and therefore, China had to change its old ways and institutions, like Japan, in order to survive in the 
new world.  
          This letter, with its persuasion and mocking sarcasm. . . coming from the chief of the enemy 
 58
                                                                                                                                                
the second type of prescription: political reform (the institutional change).  
                The first effort at political reform was led by Kang Youwei and his 
student, Liang Qichao, both outstanding intellectuals from the southern intellectual group. 
Kang and Liang, inspired by the British model, wanted to change the Chinese imperial 
system to a constitutional monarchy. They sent their ideas (in the form of a petition) to 
the young Emperor in 1895 and organized a very powerful association, Qiangxue Hui 
(the Association of Learning on National Power) that won the support of several famous 
and powerful Court mandarins, including the teacher of the Emperor. The supporters of 
this association actually represented the intellectual elite of China at that time; this was 
because after the desperate defeat in 1895, the whole of the Chinese intellectual elite 
were aspiring to institutional change, seeing this as the only way to lead China to become 
a strong nation.66 
                In 1898, Kang and Liang gained an opportunity to fulfill their dreams. 
 
that had completely destroyed both Chinese army and its naval forces, was really a blow of ‘shock 
therapy’ to the long paralyzed Chinese political and intellectual elite, leading the defeated nation to 
awaken, to the message that ‘political reform’ was far more important than ‘technological 
reform.’ . . . And from then on, the call for ‘institutional reform’ was thus like an irresistible tempest, 
and thus emerged the environment for Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao.  
  For the citations here (italics by me) and the text of the letter of persuasion of surrender, See Degang 
Tang, Wanqing Qishi Nian, San: Jiawu Zhanzheng Yu Wuxu Bianfa (The Seventy Years in Late Qing 
Dynasty, Book 3: the War in 1894 and the Institutional Chang in 1898) (Taipei: Yuanliu Publishers, 1998), 
pp. 128-130. 
66 Unfortunately, Kang was not good at handling human relationship. Almost all Court mandarins were 
pushed away by his uncompromising dogmatism in Confucian knowledge, which seriously damaged the 
political base of the Association. The Association was impeached and forced to be dismissed in 1896. 
The collapse of the Association had sown the seed of failure in the Hundred Days Reform in 1898. See, 
Degang Tang, op cit., pp.179-189, 192-195, 199-200.  
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The international powers had recognized the internal weakness of the old Court after its 
defeat in 1895, and fearlessly, since 1897, engaged in carving up its territory into spheres 
of influence; China was facing the crisis of partition. The young Emperor was eager to 
save this country. Thus occurred the historic Hundred Days Reform. Both the Emperor 
and Kang were so eager to conduct a complete, radical, immediate change that it 
stimulated tremendous resentment among the old, obstinate bureaucrats, who brought 
their hatred to the Empress Dowager Ci Xi, the emperor’s “mother” and the real powerful 
figure despite her recent retirement from the Palace, and strongly asked her to come back 
to the Palace. The factional politics thus undermined the Hundred Days Reform, with a 
tragic end that witnessed the Emperor being placed in confinement, Kang and Liang 
fleeing to Japan, and six figures related to the Reform getting killed67.  
                Both Kang and Liang were unsuccessful in their efforts to build a 
new China. After fleeing to Japan, Liang became the most influential figure in bringing a 
whole generation of Chinese youth to enlightened thoughts by his tremendously attractive 
articles68. From 1899-1901, Liang advocated constitutional monarchy and attacked the 
Court politics. But staying long in Japan gave Liang an opportunity to broaden his ideas. 
 
67 Kang’s younger brother had nothing to do with the Reform, but he was among the six that were killed. 
For the story in this paragraph, please see: Degang Tang, op cit., pp. 190-200.  
68 Liang started several publications sequentially to convey his ideas since 1899. 
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He contacted many Japanese, read extensively on western learning, and met Sun Yat-Sen 
and was moved by revolutionary ideas. From 1901-1902, Liang became an ardent 
advocate of revolution and therefore separate from his teacher Kang Youwei, though he 
did not leave Baohuang Hui ( The Association of Protecting the Emperor)69. But 
beginning in 1903, after his trip to America, Liang changed again and returned to the 
camp of constitutional monarchy. Liang was disappointed by American democracy and 
what he saw as the low quality of overseas Chinese in America. If overseas Chinese who 
had better economic and educational status were not qualified for a republic, how could 
the poorer and less-educated citizens back in China form a successful republic? Thus, 
until the successful revolution in 1912, Liang did not change his hope of a constitutional 
monarchy in China to save this country.70  
                The second effort at political reform, initiated by Sun Yat-Sen, was 
revolution. Sun started this effort when he witnessed the Qing’s incapacity, evidenced by 
the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, to deal with international challenges. Sun first started 
Xingzhong Hui (The Association of Reviving China) in 1894, with a slogan of “expelling 
 
69 Kang launched this association after fleeing to Canada, and then to Japan, in an effort to protect and save 
the Guangxu Emperor and continue the abortive political reform, so the association became the house of 
constitutional-monarchical faction, as opposed to Sun Yat-Sen’s revolutionary faction.  
70 See, Gongquan Xiao, Zhongguo Zhengzhi Sixiang Shi (The History of Chinese Political Thoughts), 
BookⅡ( Taipei :Lianjing Publishers, 1984), pp.782-783, 798-801. Also, Andrew Nathan , Chinese 
Democracy, Chinese translation (Taipei: Wu Nan Book Company, Ltd. ,1994) pp. 89-94. English version, 
(1985), chapter 3.  
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Tatar, reviving China,” so this was a revolution based on ethnic identity. In 1905, Sun 
organized Tongmeng Hui (the League of Associations) whose slogan expanded to 
“expelling Tatar, reviving China, establishing republic, equalizing land.” The political 
outline stated in its declaration was this: overthrowing the Manchurian government and 
returning a Han regime to Chinese; establishing a national government whose people 
enjoy the rights of political participation, and instituting the constitution of the Republic 
of China; reforming social-economic organization, and finally setting the price of land, 
attributing land to the state, and having it shared by all people. The polity had to be 
changed to a democracy, whose ethos was “freedom, equality, and fraternity.” The 
procedure to carry out such a political program was divided into three stages: first, the 
military rule; then, the provisional constitutional rule; and finally, the constitutional 
rule.71 
                After 1905, the revolutionary faction versus the constitutional- 
monarchical faction were engaged in a series of debates that lasted for more than two 
years; Sun Yat-Sen’s followers fighted against Liang Qichao. The central concern was: 
how could China become a wealthy and powerful nation, in the face of the western 
 
71 Please see, Tingyi Guo, Jindai Zhongguo Shigang (The Outline of Modern Chinese History), (Hong 
Kong: Chinese University Press, 1980),pp. 374-380. 
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challenges?72 The debates centered on four areas. First, on revolution: Liang argued that 
revolution would lead to domestic disorder, which would invite international powers’ 
interference and thus cause the partition of China, so China must improve the current 
government and perform constitution building. The revolutionary faction argued that 
revolution was an internal affair, not xenophobia; the international situation would not 
permit the partition of China, and even if it did cause interference, there was nothing to 
be afraid of, for this would just stimulate national indignation. There was no way to 
improve the current government, so the only way was to overthrow it. Second, on 
excluding Manchus: Liang argued that the political and legal equality between Manchus 
and Hans had been achieved, and we should engage ourselves in ethnic integration to 
become a nation capable of resisting foreign nations. For Liang, insistence on excluding 
Manchus was equivalent to “revanchism” and violence. Liang also expressed his concern 
that the Han people were not yet capable of building a nation. The revolutionary faction 
argued that excluding Manchus was to exclude the bad Manchurian government, and 
after Manchus stepped down, domestic ethnic groups would naturally integrate; 
excluding Manchus was the pre-condition of political revolution, and, once again, it’s 
 
72 See, Michael Gasster, “The Reform and Revolution in China’s Political Modernization Movement,”   
in Chinese abridged translation by Weiying Gu, in Nengshi Lin, and Pingsheng Hu (eds.), A Selected  
Compilation of Papers on Chinese Modern History (Taipei: Huashi Publishers, 1984), p.58. 
 63
futile to pin hopes on Manchus to institute a constitution.  
                Third, on people’s rights: Liang presented his views that Chinese 
citizens were not qualified for a republic, not even for a constitutional monarchy, and 
managing to force its performance would only lead this nation to perish; ten years of 
enlightened autocracy would be appropriate. The revolutionary faction presented 
Rousseau’s ideas of natural rights, arguing that people were inherently qualified for a 
republic and their capability would finally surpass that of the government; the spirit of 
freedom and equality were commonly shared by all human beings, and Chinese were not 
an exception. Fourth, on state ownership of land: Liang argued that Chinese economic 
and social organizations were better than those of the West; land annexation had not been 
very serious; if state ownership of land was performed during the period when a 
revolutionary army rose, the wandering rascals would grab the opportunity to rob all 
property of the rich people and cause overall national disorder, and if it was performed 
after the revolution, the ill effects also abounded. Liang said the priority should be 
resolving the issue of capital first, and then the issue of land, and rewarding the capital 
should override the protection of laborers; otherwise China would be filled with foreign 
capital and the Chinese would become slaves forever. The revolutionary faction argued 
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that revolution was for the welfare of poor people; when land was owned by the few, like 
in America, capital would also be owned by them, thus the gap between the rich and the 
poor would be huge. Therefore, the revolutionary faction argued, “to solve social 
problems, it was necessary to first resolve the issue of land,” and state ownership of land 
would prevent the land from falling into the hands of the few. When land was owned by 
the state, they said, capital would also be owned by the state; thus the state would become 
a great capitalist to produce for the benefit of all people.73 In about six months, the 
revolutionary faction gained the upper hand over Liang, and after the building of the 
Republic of China in 1912, Liang totally changed his position and became one of the 
most faithful figures of the republic.74 
                (2) The Cultural Ideals  
                The Chinese intellectual stratum is a group of people that carry the 
cultural ideals of Confucianism, which sees the collective welfare of mankind as the 
responsibility of each individual. Thus, an individual, well-schooled in Confucianism, 
tends to see his purpose of life as improving the lives of all human beings.75 How will he 
be able to achieve that? Here comes the Confucian belief of human nature as basically 
 
73 The above four areas of debates were from Tingyi Guo, Jindai Zhongguo Shigang ( The Outline of 
Modern Chinese History) (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1980), pp. 381-382. 
74 See, Gongquan Xia, op cit., p. 802; pp. 822-823.  
75 In Chinese term, it is called Tianxia Shengmin, means: all people under Heaven.  
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good. If an individual is sincerely and diligently engaged in cultivating his innate good 
nature, the benevolent love born of Heaven, he will then be able to take good care of his 
family, and next, be able to govern the country well, and finally, be capable of pacifying 
the world. Either being a teacher (a cultural leader) or being a ruler (a political leader) 
can fulfill the above goals. A teacher can assist others to cultivate their inner benevolent 
love and spread it to the whole human community, and a ruler can base his political 
practice on the same power of love and help people follow his example. The fundamental 
belief is that all men are born equal, with the same benevolent love in their heart.76 
People can love each other as they love their families. This is how a country can be 
governed well and the world can be pacified--through the power of love and mutual 
assistance.  
                Chinese intellectuals in late Qing period (1839-1911) all carried such 
cultural ideals. In the face of western challenges, they aspired to save this country; they 
wanted to learn from the west, but at the same time they cherished their cultural ideals so 
much that they could not help presenting all kinds of prescriptions that would preserve 
Chinese cultural ideals as the core, and absorb Western advantages as they perceived 
 
76 See the classical Confucian scriptures; Lunyu (The Analects of Confucius) ; Mengzi (The Book of 
Mencius) ; Daxue (The Great Learning); Zhongyong (The Golden Mean); Datong (The Great Harmony). 
All could be found in (Taipei: Shangwu Publishers).  
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differently. Thus, the intellectual-political elite in the Self-strengthening Movement 
(1860-1893) only saw the material aspect of the West as worth learning: they thought that 
as long as they could be strong enough to repel the Western invasion, they would be fine. 
They never thought of changing the Confucian political institutions as an alternative. 
After the thorough, humiliating defeat in 1895, political reform was deemed necessary 
and urgent. Thus came Kang Youwei in 1898. But still, in Kang’s ideas, the monarchy 
should be preserved, and Confucianism as the guiding principles (the national religion) of 
the political society should be maintained; what was needed was introducing 
constitutionalism, the western educational system, western military training, mining, and 
railroad building. After fleeing to Japan, Kang clearly opposed Sun Yat-Sen’s revolution 
because, for Kang, the survival of a nation lay in its history, customs, and culture.77 
                Liang Qichao changed his positions very often, but overall, he was 
“an enlightened patriot” close to British liberals.78 Liang saw Confucius as the 
representative of Chinese civilization, and as the pivot upon which Chinese integration of 
oneness over the past two thousand years relied, and therefore, Confucian teachings 
should be the central principles of social education in the days ahead.79 But at the same 
 
77 See Gongquan Xiao, op cit., pp. 746-747. 
78 See, ibid.., pp.791-823, especially pp. 821-822.  
79 See, ibid., p.821. 
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time, he emphasized the importance of independent thinking and reminded his readers 
not to become slaves of the ancient saint, Confucius. Sun Yat-Sen also carried such 
Confucian cultural ideals. Sun’s ideas were best represented by his Three Principles of 
the People, which was an integration of Confucian doctrine and Western thoughts. In the 
first Principle, Nationalism, he extolled Confucian political philosophy: governing the 
country and pacifying the world based on self moral cultivation and taking care of the 
family, seeing it as the best in the world which had not been discussed by any foreign 
thinker. Then he asked the Chinese not to learn from the imperialism of the world powers, 
but to revive the old Chinese virtue of peace-loving and helping the weak, so that when 
China became strong, it could help the weak nations, extinguish world imperialism, and 
pacify the world. He said that this was the responsibility of China, and each individual 
Chinese should assume such responsibility and lead the world to “Great Harmony”--the 
ultimate ideal of Confucian politics.80 
 
 
 
 
80 See, Sun Yat-Sen, “Nationalism,” the sixth section, in The Three Principles of the People (Taipei: 
Liming Cultural Enterprise, Ltd., 1988), pp. 62-75, especially pp. 74-75. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  THE POLITICS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(1912-1949) 
                 
                The building of the Republic of China (on Jan. 1st, 1912) did bring 
about a modern parliamentary democracy that lasted for only two years (1912-1913). 
During that period, with freedom of speech and association, Chinese were bent on 
democracy, and both the reformist and the revolutionary factions in late Qing China were 
now, continuing their competition, engaged in party politics in the parliament.81 
Unfortunately, Yuan Shikai, the president at that time, totally destroyed this newly 
budding democracy by dissolving the parliament in 1914 and trying to restore the 
imperial monarchy from 1915 to 1916. The attempt foundered and Yuan died shamefully. 
That is to say, the republic won over autocracy in Chinese minds. This means the Chinese 
had turned to the road of modern civilization. Although politics in the subsequent years 
(1916-1928) were dominated by warlord politics that carried no concerns for democracy, 
 
81 See Yufa Zhang, Zhongguo Xiandai Shi (The Modern History of China) (Taipei: Donghua Bookstore, 
1982), pp. 85-93. 
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the spirit of republicanism did not die. Here came the third type of prescription: the 
cultural reform. A new generation of prominent intellectuals, gathering in Beijing 
University, launched an intellectual movement (1915-1923) that thoroughly questioned 
the value of old ethics, customs, and knowledge. The essence of this movement was 
democracy and science. It carried the spirit of the western Enlightenment Movement, and 
advocated individualism and liberalism. Its goal was to educate Chinese youth to become 
independent individuals free from any intellectual, religious, or political authority. When 
Chinese youth all modeled themselves in the new thoughts, they would change Chinese 
society: its culture, its social institutions and customs, and its politics. In other words, the 
movement aimed at building a new civilization for China through the power of education. 
Thus, Confucian ethics and institutions, the domestic warlord politics, the invasion of 
China by foreign powers, were all barriers for China to pursue progress and independence. 
Students educated in such thoughts were strongly patriotic and idealistic. On the one hand, 
they were independent individuals with liberalism as their value; on the other hand, they 
were ready to shoulder the whole nation and devote all they had for the good of it.82 
                In the South, Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary efforts were inherited, after 
his death in 1925, by Chiang Kai-shek, who launched the Northern Expedition in 1926 
 
82 Ibid., pp. 264-265. 
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and united the nation in 1928. Chiang built the nationalist government in Nanjing, and in 
the next several years Chiang was embroiled in civil wars both with the Nationalist 
Party’s military factions (1929-1931) and with the Communist Party’s army. To annihilate 
the communist army, Chiang launched five military operations,83 which drove the 
communist forces out of their base in Jiangxi province, and forced them to flee to the 
north of Shanxi province to rebuild their base there. Chiang wished to continue his efforts 
to completely extinguish the residual communist army, but he was kidnapped in 1936 by 
Zhang Xueliang, head of the northeastern army, who did this to force Chiang to stop the 
civil war and begin to resist Japanese invasion. Chiang had to change his course, stopping 
the military operation against the communists and accepting their proposal of the 
“National United Front of Resistance against Japan.” Then, with the Japanese increasing 
military aggression, the War of Resistance started on July 7th, 1937. Thus began the 
eight-year long national struggle. In 1945, China won the war and Chiang became the 
national hero of that time, but civil war soon followed. The civil war ended with 
communist victory all over the country in 1949, and Chiang fled to Taiwan. 
         Politics in the Early Years of the Republic of China (1912-1916) 
 
83 The first time: Dec. 19th, 1930--Jan. 3rd, 1931; the second time: Apr. 1st, 1931--May 31st, 1931; the third 
time: Jul. 1st, 1931--Sep. 20th, 1931; the fourth time: Jan. 1st, 1933--Apr. 9th, 1933; the fifth time: Oct. 17th, 
1933--Oct. 14th, 1934. See, ibid., pp. 424-426. 
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                The success of revolution in October, 1911, was a chain reaction that 
caused many provinces to announce independence. Most of them were located in the 
South, and thus the situation was the South (the revolutionary forces) versus the North 
(the Qing Court). The Qing Court called Yuan Shikai, who used to be the head of the 
Northern Army and was removed from office due to factional politics, to come back to 
fight the revolutionaries with an offer of the premiership, and Yuan accepted.84 Yuan’s 
appearance brought hopes to the Qing Court, the revolutionary army, and the 
international powers. The Qing Court expected him to stop the revolutionary army; the 
revolutionary army expected him to dethrone the Qing Court, since he was a Han; the 
international powers, seeing Qing as a dead-end regime, expected him to be reconciled 
with the revolutionary army so that Chinese societal order could be restored and 
foreigners’ life and property could be protected. Yuan seemed to satisfy all three sides: he 
sent an army to capture Hankou, a stronghold of the revolutionary army; at the same time, 
he sent people to promote reconciliation with the revolutionaries; and he communicated 
his determination to restore domestic order to the foreign powers.85 
                The South was quick to elect Sun Yat-sen as the provisional President, 
 
84 Yufa Zhang, op cit., p. 68. 
85 For the above analysis, see, ibid., p.69. 
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on Dec. 29th, 1911, in Nanjing. Yuan was pretty unhappy about this because he wanted to 
be the head of the new China. But Sun had been clear in the reconciliation talks, saying 
that if Yuan approved of the republic and dethroned the Qing Court, he would resign and 
let Yuan assume the presidency. And so it happened; the provisional Senate elected Yuan 
as the second provisional President. Sun originally wanted Yuan to assume office in 
Nanjing so as to get him under control by the South. Yuan made an excuse86 to avoid this 
and assumed office in Beijing, so the provisional Senate finally had to move to Beijing, 
and thus the South and the North achieved national unification in April, 1912. 
                Though the revolutionaries did not obtain the presidency, a group of 
them in the provisional Senate, led by Song Jiaoren, thought that they could still obtain 
real power if they could win the parliamentary elections to influence the parliament and 
organize a party cabinet. Thus, Song actively absorbed the old bureaucrats and the 
radicals, expanding the Tongmeng Hui to become the Guomindang (the Nationalist 
Party)87, and Liang Qichao organized the Jinbudang (the Progressive Party) to compete 
with it. Thus China had party politics in the parliament in the early years (1912-1913) of 
 
86 There happened to be a mutiny in Beijing, which became a good excuse for Yuan to stay in Beijing to 
stabilize the situation there. See, ibid., p. 70. 
87 This Nationalist Party was built in August, 1912, and ended in September, 1913. The other Nationalist 
Party, the Kuomintang (KMT), or the Guomindang (GMD), was built in October, 1919, and still exists now 
in Taiwan. See, ibid., p. 88, and p. 356. 
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the Republic.88 
                Before Yuan Shikai revealed his later intention to turn the nation back 
to the imperial monarchy, Liang Qichao thought Yuan to be someone that he could 
cooperate with. So the Jinbudang’s position was to support the government’s policy, and 
in contrast, the Guomindang stood in opposition to the government. The two parties 
competed in the following areas: the parliamentary elections and several significant bills; 
the composition of the cabinet and its relationship with the parliament; and the attitude 
toward the formation of the constitution.89 
                Song Jiaoren advocated a parliamentary system, and Yuan Shikai 
wanted a presidential system. Song’s leadership did win the parliamentary elections and 
gain majority seats in both Senate and House in early 1913. The implications of such 
results were threatening to Yuan. Now the Guomindang could not only organize a party 
cabinet, but it could also compete for the presidency because the president was supposed 
to be elected by both Senate and House. After the elections, Song saw himself in a 
position of the future premier and so actively promoted his political views, which 
proposed a parliamentary system and emphasized that the election of the president should 
 
88 For the story in this paragraph, see, ibid., p. 71. 
89 Ibid., p. 93. 
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come after the formulation of the constitution, so that the presidential power would be 
constrained by the constitution. Yuan determined to assassinate Song, and so it happened 
in March, 1913.90 
                After the incident, Sun Yat-sen swore that Yuan must be removed 
because of the assassination of the founding father. He gained little support from his 
fellow party members, however.91 But several other highly controversial bills further 
made Yuan’s regime unbearable. Among them was the Big Loan. Because of Song’s 
assassination, Yuan and the Guomindang were in a state of increasing conflict, and he 
needed a big sum of money to prepare for it. Thus in April, 1913, after a contract was 
signed, he was able to gain a big loan from a bank group of five nations (including 
Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and Russia), with Chinese salt revenues and the 
Customs surplus as security. The bank groups’ people were permitted to be associate and 
assistant managers in the Audit Office, and its branches, of the Salt Sale. This loan further 
worsened the relationship between Yuan and the Guomindang, because after the 
assassination, Yuan’s plot to militarily handle the Guomindang had become clear, and the 
loan would facilitate the matters.92 
 
90 Ibid., pp. 95-96. 
91 Ibid., p. 109, and p. 137. 
92 Ibid., pp.109-110. 
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                In May 1913, four Guomindang’s provincial governors published an 
open telegram to denounce the government’s involvement in the Song case and the Big 
Loan. Yuan immediately counter-attacked by removing three of them from their positions 
in June, and continually sent armies to the South. Thus Guomindang started the Second 
Revolution in July, 1913, in Jiangxi province. Unfortunately, within two months, the 
Second Revolution failed. The reasons for that were pretty clear. First, most military 
forces supported Yuan. Secondly, the nation had just restored order, people were tired of 
war, foreign powers would not like China to continue its chaos, and the Jinbudang led by 
Liang Qichao supported Yuan, expecting him to build a strong government. Thirdly, there 
had been division in the revolutionary camp about whether to use force, and after the war 
started, the fellow provinces did not reinforce each other to form a united power.93 
                In the parliament, Yuan had been struggling for his power. Before the 
Second Revolution, Yuan had organized the Association of the Research of the 
Constitution to influence the formulation of the constitution in the parliament. The 
anti-governmental faction advocated a parliamentary system and decentralized authority, 
and the pro-governmental faction favored a presidential system and centralism. After the 
failure of the Second Revolution, the Jinbudang and the Guomindang agreed to elect the 
 
93 Ibid., pp.112-113; 114; 121-123. 
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president first, and then formulate the constitution. On Oct. 6th, 1913, Yuan was elected 
the president, and he continued to struggle for presidential power. Then, under the 
cooperation of the Guomindang and the Jinbudang, the legislators soon settled the draft 
of the constitution which stipulated that the polity was a unified democratic country; the 
parliament was made up of two Chambers; the government was a parliamentary system; 
the president would be elected by an electoral meeting organized by the legislators; and 
the amendment to and interpretation of the constitution was supposed to be conducted by 
a constitutional meeting organized by the legislators.94 
                Yuan was very upset about such results, especially about the 
stipulations that the president’s appointments and removals of administrators must be 
agreed to by the parliament, and that the president had no power to dissolve the 
parliament. He sent eight people to present his views but was rejected by the parliament. 
Thus, on Oct. 25th, 1913, Yuan published an open telegram to denounce the draft of the 
constitution as bad and the Guomindang as misleading the country. Soon governors, 
chiefs of civil affairs, and military commanders from every province published their open 
telegrams to advocate rescinding the draft of the constitution and discharging the 
Guomindang. The legislators still advanced to pass the draft of the constitution on Oct. 
 
94 Ibid., pp. 102-104. 
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30th, and present the constitutional meeting organized by both Chambers on Nov. 3rd.95 
                On Nov. 4th, Yuan Shikai gave an order to discharge the Guomindang 
and cancel its legislators’ qualification by retrieving their certificates. The purposes of 
this action were to remove his enemies in the parliament, and at the same time to stop the 
operation of the legislature. Up to 438 legislators were disqualified, and therefore both 
Chambers could not proceed due to lack of a quorum. Thus, the draft of the constitution 
had to be suspended. In addition, Senate on Dec. 3rd, and House on Dec. 17th both 
presented their interrogation on the issue of making up the quorum, only to get the 
answer that they could not perform their power of interrogation due to lack of a quorum. 
And again, governors and chiefs of civil affairs from every province published open 
telegrams to ask for the dissolution of the parliament. Thus on Jan. 10th, 1914, Yuan 
declared the termination of the legislators’ duty.96 
                The dismissal of the Guomindang and the closing of the parliament 
led to the dissipation of party activities in China. The parliament had been the locus for 
the parties to compete and associate with one another, and now it was gone. The utility of 
the Jinbudang for Yuan no longer existed since Guomindang was gone. The attitudes of 
 
95 Ibid., p. 104. 
96 Ibid., pp. 104-105. 
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the party members from all factions could be classified as three kinds. (1) Those who had 
lusted for fame and power originally joined a party as a stepping-stone of the path to 
success, and since the parties had dissipated, they left it soon. (2) Those who saw 
themselves as decent and clean and had from the very beginning taken little interest in the 
party activities, and whose membership of a party was mostly based upon the social 
relationships of relatives, friends, and subordinates, now found good reasons to escape. (3) 
Those who had political ideals in their mind and now found no channel to fulfill their 
dreams either were biding their time, like Liang Qichao and others, or turned 
underground to prepare for another military cause against Yuan, like Sun Yat-sen and the 
Guomindang people. For Sun and the Guomindang people, the hard built republic had 
been completely destroyed by Yuan, and the revolutionary cause had to be restarted.97 
                Yuan Shikai’s ambition to mount the throne under imperial monarchy 
did not emerge until late 1915. After the dismissal of the Guomindang and the closing of 
the parliament, Yuan was able to expand his power as he wished, and extended his forces 
deep to the South. Thus, in Feb. 28th, 1914, he gave an order to dissolve all the provincial 
councils. Now no forces could check his power. In March, 1914, a magistrate presented a 
proposal to change the tenure of presidency from a set term to lifetime, and Yuan gave 
 
97 For the above analysis, see ibid., pp. 105-106. 
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instant response to refer it to every provincial governors and chiefs of civil affairs. Thus 
started Yuan’s movement toward an imperial system.98 
                The movement was disguised as bottom-up. At first, a Columbia 
University professor Frank J. Goodnow published an article arguing that monarchy was 
better than democracy. At that time Yuan had inspired Yang Du,                 then 
the counselor of the Presidential Palace, to find some associates to promote his ideas. On 
Aug. 15th, 1915, six figures, led by Yang Du, started the Chouanhui (the Association of 
Operation for Peace) in Beijing for this purpose. On Aug. 26th, Yang published the views 
of the Association: “Constitutional Monarchy to Save the Country,” arguing that only 
constitution building could save the country, and only monarchy could achieve 
constitution building. Many regions sent open telegrams to approve of the views, and 
several provinces successively organized branch associations.99 
                In addition, the imperial faction maneuvered people to present 
petitions for polity change, and Yuan gave an order, on Aug. 30th, to accept them. Thus in 
September, an organization, called the United Association of National Petitions, was 
formed to present petitions from every province. But Yuan wanted the show to appear to 
 
98 Ibid., p. 126-127. 
99 Ibid., p. 127. 
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come from public wishes, so the United Association of National Petitions asked for 
Conferences of Citizens’ Representatives to resolve the issue of polity change. Thus the 
Conferences were built in every province. The fact was, the representatives in every 
province were those people who had already had relationships with the central 
government, the content of petitions had been written in advance by people 
commissioned by Beijing, and similarly, the content of the open telegrams of support sent 
by every province was written in the same way. People were silently in fear of Yuan’s 
power; only Liang Qichao, disregarding personal security, voiced his disapproval openly 
on Sep. 3rd, fiercely denouncing all these hypocritical shows. Ministers of Britain, Japan, 
Russia, and France had twice, on Oct. 28th and Dec. 15th, presented warnings and tried to 
persuade Yuan to postpone the polity change. On Dec. 11th, votes from every province 
were gathered in Beijing; national representatives in total were 1,993, and exactly 1,993 
votes were given in approval of both a constitutional monarchy and Yuan as the Emperor. 
With such a result, Yuan still pretended to be modest and rejected it, saying that he had 
taken an oath to honor the republic, and if he mounted the throne, he would be unfaithful 
to the oath, which would make him violate the moral principle of faithfulness. It took a 
second presentation of support on that same day for Yuan to feel comfortable and issue an 
 81
                                                
order the next day (Dec. 12th, 1995) to accept the throne.100 
                There was an episode here during the movement of polity change. In 
September, 1914, Japan sent its army to Shandong province and took possession of all the 
rights and interests previously enjoyed by Germany in the province. Yuan was then 
engaged in the suppression of the revolutionaries, and thus tried to please Japan in the 
hopes that Japan could expel the revolutionaries staying in Japan. Japan grabbed the 
opportunity to present the notorious twenty-one clauses in January, 1915, asking China to 
permit Japan to succeed to all previous rights and interests enjoyed by Germany in 
Shandong province, which included that all harbors and islands in this region could not 
be ceded or rented to other countries, and which even required the Chinese government to 
engage the Japanese as political, military, and fiscal advisors, and to accept that Japan 
and China administered together the policemen in important regions in China. This 
caused intense anti-Japanese emotions and activities in China. But Yuan did not reject 
such unreasonable requirements, because he wanted Japanese support on the domestic 
issue of polity change. Japan also wanted to use its fake support to get Yuan to accept 
these clauses. Thus Yuan accepted most of the clauses, and soon Japan moved to the 
opposite position to be against Yuan’s polity change, because if Yuan really built a strong 
 
100 Ibid., pp. 127-129; 143. 
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imperial country, Japan would no longer be able to obtain any interests in China.101 
                As Yuan’s imperial movement proceeded, the political forces against 
Yuan were creeping up. The Guomindang people were the first to perceive Yuan’s 
autocratic tendency. Although they failed in the Second Revolution, they never stopped 
their efforts. Sun Yat-sen reorganized the Guomindang for this purpose. The Jinbudang 
people felt that they were fooled and their ideals about democracy were destroyed. So 
they determined to revolt against Yuan. Since the Guomindang had reorganized itself for 
this purpose, the Jinbudang should not lag behind, considering its political future in this 
nation. For those from the Northern Army, being an official in a republic was far better 
than being a subject to Emperor Yuan, and in the days ahead they might have a chance to 
succeed Yuan as the President. For ordinary people, the days after the Second Revolution 
were hard because most local officials were corrupt remainders from the Qing Court; thus 
Yuan had lost the people’s support.102 Therefore, the resistance against Yuan’s imperial 
movement was nation-wide. This was totally beyond Yuan’s expectation. It meant the 
spirit of republicanism was deeply ingrained in the Chinese heart; no one could destroy it 
because of his personal wish. 
 
101 Ibid., pp. 130-132. 
102 For the above analysis, see ibid., pp. 134-135. 
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                Immediately after the failure of the Second Revolution in September, 
1914, Sun Yat-sen decided to revive the revolutionary spirit of the Tongmeng Hui, and 
reorganize the Guomindang, whose approach was a parliamentary one, and change it to 
the Zhonghua Gemingdang (the Chinese Revolutionary Party); it happened in September, 
1913. This time, Sun required the participants to swear an oath to “be obedient to Mr. 
Sun”103 to restart the revolution, and they had to sign with their fingerprints before they 
were accepted as the party members. One of the founding fathers, Huang Xing, expressed 
his objection to these two things; he thought such requirements were against the spirit of 
republicanism. Sun tried to explain that the party members of the previous two 
revolutions had not united well because they didn’t listen to him, and had thus missed the 
opportunities to succeed in several occasions. But he could only convince a part of the 
Guomindang leaders. Despite this, Sun continued his efforts and finally aroused a 
national revolt against Yuan.104 
                Laing Qichao originally wanted to guide Yuan Shi-kai on a path to 
democratic constitutionalism. After Yuan’s imperial ambition emerged and became clear, 
Liang was among the few to publicly denounce Yuan’s attempts. Yuan had tried to terrify 
 
103 Ibid., p. 135. 
104 Ibid., pp. 135-137; 139. 
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him or used material gains to tempt him, but Liang would not be moved. Liang stood for 
constitutional monarchy in Late Qing and was against democratic revolution; now he 
supported the democratic republic and opposed monarchy. Both positions contained a 
similar concern that radical change would upset the political situation and bring little 
benefit to the nation. Also, after the republic was built, as we discuss in chapter two, 
Liang’s idealism and liberal spirit would make the imperial reversal unbearable to him. 
                With military revolts of both the Zhonghua Gemingdang and the 
Jinbudang, the whole nation soon entered into a sweeping movement of anti-imperial 
monarchy. Thus, Yuan’s attempts had no chance in the newly built republic. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE YEARS UNDER MAO ZEDONG (1949-1976) 
 
                Mao Zedong’s ideas were influenced by Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, 
and the intellectuals’ enlightenment movement (the May Fourth Movement, from 1915 to 
1923) mentioned in chapter three. As stated in chapter three, the essence of this 
movement is democracy and science. The intellectuals in this movement wanted to create 
a new civilization for China by spreading liberal ideas of modern western civilization.105 
Unfortunately, after 1919, the leading intellectuals in this movement were divided into 
two camps: the leftist camp, represented by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, believing in the 
Russian path following its “October Revolution”106 in 1917; and the liberal camp, 
represented by Hu Shi, believing in the western liberal path since the Renaissance. Hu 
Shi used the term “Chinese Renaissance” to introduce to the western world this Chinese 
intellectual movement.107 Hu Shi’s ideas did not gain a chance to be fulfilled until 
 
105 Tse-tsung Chow, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960). 
106 For the Russian calendar, it’s October, 1917; for the western calendar, it was November, 1917. See, 
Stewart C. Easton, The Western Heritage (1966), chapter 2, the part about Russia.  
107 Shih Hu, The Chinese Renaissance (Chicago: 1934). 
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Taiwan’s democratization in the 1980’s.108 In contrast, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao’s 
Marxist-Leninist ideas got full opportunity to be experimented with in mainland China 
through Mao Zedong’s efforts toward a communist movement in this country. In 1921, 
Chen Duxiu built the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP), and Mao Zedong was one of 
its earliest members. Mao did not assume true leadership of the communist party until 
1935. After years of efforts, Mao successfully built the People’s Republic of China (the 
PRC) in 1949, and the country became a laboratory for his utopian ideas. 
                Early in his life, Mao Zedong had formed most of the ideas that 
would influence the practice of the communist party in China.109 Mao had a teacher, 
Yang Changji, who was a sincere Confucian scholar and guided his students to become 
Confucian practitioners. Under his influence, Mao became a worshiper of Confucius and 
wanted to become someone like Confucius. The most interesting part of this early 
romance with Confucianism was that Mao Zedong’s understanding and practice of 
Marxism-Leninism carried an imprint of Confucianism.110 In what follows, I will present 
how Mao Zedong’s approach and practice of Marxism-Leninism was tinted with 
 
108 Inspired by Hu Shi, the journals Ziyou Zhongguo (the Free China) and Wenxing (the Literary Star) were 
the intellectual center for spreading liberal ideas in the 1950’s and in early 1960’s, respectively, in Taiwan. 
Such intellectual heritage later extended its influence to the democratic movement in the 1980’s in Taiwan. 
109 Li Rui, Sanshi Sui Yiqian De Mao Zedong (Mao Zedong Before Thirty Years Old) (Taipei, China Times 
Publishing Company:1993); also, Li Rui, Mao Zedong De Gongguo Shifei (Mao Zedong’s Achievements 
and Mistakes, Right and Wrong) (Taipei, Xinrui Publisher: 1993). 
110 Wang Shubai, The Chinese Gene of Mao Zedong Thought (Taipei, Rizhi Tang,: 1991); also, Li Rui, op 
cit. 
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Confucian ideas or a Confucian style of doing things. 
                Confucius believed that there was a linkage between earthly affairs 
and Heaven. If a person led a moral life in a heavenly way (i.e., merciful love in all kinds 
of human relationships), he would receive heavenly blessings and get promotion in social 
mobility or prosper in his agricultural harvest or through business. On the contrary, if he 
did the opposite, there would be bad results. Similarly, if a king ruled a country in a 
heavenly way, he and his country would receive heavenly blessings and the whole nation 
would prosper and even the whole earthly world would be in great harmony. For 
Confucius, the purpose of life was to cultivate one’s spirit to become a saint, and if 
possible, to help others become saints, too. The way to attain such an ideal was either to 
become a moral statesman (i.e., a saintly king, or a saintly official) and lead the whole 
nation in a heavenly way, or to become a spiritual Master and guide disciples to become 
saintly people.111 Therefore, Confucius believed in voluntarism: a person was able to 
change his own fate and even the whole world’s fate by spiritual self-cultivation. One 
could change history and one should! 
(1) Ontology: Dialectics and the Philosophy of History 
 
111 Chen Fangman, Daxue Zhengshi (The Testimony and Explication of The Great Learning) (Taipei: 
Yuzhen Bookstore Publisher, 1991); Cihui, Zhongyong Zhengshi (The Testimony and Explication of the 
Middle Way) (Taipei: Yuan-chern Publishing, 1993); Lin Qinghe, Yijing Zhengshi (The Testimony and 
Explication of the Book of Change) (Taipei: San Yang Printing Enterprise Co. Ltd.), Vol. I-VIII.  
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                Confucian ideas about ontology overlapped with Lao-tze’s ideas. 
They both saw the creation of the universe as, “One begets two, two begets three, and 
three begets all things.”112 This means Heaven the Almighty (the “One”) creates Yin (the 
feminine force or the negative force) and Yan (the masculine force or the positive force); 
Yin and Yan are the “two”; the interplay of Yin and Yan is the “three”; all things and all 
phenomena are created by the interplay of Yin and Yan (“three begets all things”). This 
simple description has its scientific supporters in the quantum physics of the 20th 
century.113 The interplay of Yin and Yan creates everything and every phenomenon both in
the natural world and in the social world. For example, in the social world, the fath
relationship is the prototype of Master-disciple (teacher-student), husband-wife 
(men-women), senior-junior, monarch-subject (ruler-citizens), elite-mass 
(intellectuals-ordinary, uneducated people), educated class-laboring class, and Chinese 
patron-client relationships. These relationships reflect Yan-Yin relationship (or 
Heaven-Earth relationship), and as described in chapter one, it is a relationship of mutual 
flowing (or interplay) of love: filial affection from the son to the father (or from Yin to 
 
112 See Lin Qinghe, op cit. Vol. I; and Lao-tze, Daode Jing (The Scriptures on Morality) (Taipei: Shangwu 
Publisher). 
113 Fritjof Capra, The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising Culture (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1982), and The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels between Modern Physics and 
Eastern Mysticism (Boston: Shambhala Publications Inc., 2000); Gary Zukav, The Dancing Wu Li Masters: 
An Overview of the New Physics (New York: Willam Morrow and Company, Inc., 1979). 
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Yan), and merciful love from the father to the son (or from Yan to Yin). If Yin and Yan 
love and respect each other, there will be  
a harmonious relationship between the pair of roles. Thus, role playing is crucial in 
Confucian ethics, with loving harmony as its essence.114 
                Then come Confucian and Lao-tze’s understanding or teachings of 
dialectics. The relationship between Yin and Yan was either loving harmony (like that 
between lovers) or competitive rivalry (like that between enemies).115 It all depended on 
the situation. A man and a woman could fall in love with each other and get married; they 
could also fight each other bitterly and get divorced. Similarly, in the ethics of role 
playing, citizens were not always required to love and respect their king. If the king led 
the country in a heavenly way (i.e., with merciful love and wisdom in all things), and you 
revolted against him, then you would be seen as disgraced morally. On the contrary, if the 
king acted like a brutal beast (i.e., dictator), then you had both the responsibility to 
overthrow him and the honor to rebuild the country in a heavenly way. Revolution was 
justified in such a case: the relationship between you and your motherland was not 
always peaceful. In some cases, for the sake of love, you had to stand up to reproach your 
 
114 Chen Fangman, op cit.; Cihui, op cit.; Lin Qinghe, op cit. 
115 See Chen Fangman, op cit.; Cihui, op cit. 
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own government or even revolt against it. It all depended on the situation. 
                From the above explanation, Confucian philosophy of history 
becomes clear. An individual has the honor and responsibility to create history by his own 
spiritual cultivation and moral role playing. He may help his king to build a heaven on 
earth in his country or overthrow his king so that a heaven on earth will not be ruined by 
his king. His honor and responsibility is to cultivate himself spiritually and then lead and 
guide others well by setting a good example. Of course the opposite could happen: a 
person might be a bad guy but he happens to be smart enough to get to a high position; in 
this case, the hope will be that another person will obtain the Mandate of Heaven and 
deal with the situation. The proof that the Mandate of Heaven has been bestowed on 
somebody is the fact that the majority of people support this person. These ideas are 
basically Confucian teachings on history and politics. 
               Mao Zedong was a sincere believer of the above ideas before he 
became a Marxist-Leninist. He was a Confucian intellectual and believed in voluntarism 
which emphasized that an individual could change history by cultivating himself 
spiritually; if every individual was changed by moral self-cultivation, then the whole 
nation would be changed accordingly and the nation would be saved. It was Mao 
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Zedong’s dream to save this country as soon as possible, and the most efficient way that 
Mao learned from Confucius was to devote himself to becoming a saint and then to lead 
and guide the whole nation to become a country full of saints. Moral cultivation, thus, 
was the best tool to save this country. This was why Mao placed great emphasis on mass 
movements in carrying out any of his projects. As long as the masses were mobilized 
with great moral enthusiasm (in Mao’s understanding, it meant selfless sacrifice for the 
sake of all or for the sake of socialism), Mao believed, any miracle could happen. This 
explained the mass zeal in the Great Leap Forward and in the Cultural Revolution. 
Everybody in the mobilized mass believed that he was engaged in something great and 
beneficial to this nation, and that his personal selfless sacrifice was worth the honor. 
Everybody mobilized was carrying a spirit of heroism, which was called by Mao socialist 
activeness or revolutionary spirit. During the Great Leap Forward, Mao expected the 
mass to exert their socialist activeness to create miracles for this country, and during the 
Cultural Revolution Mao called the youth to overthrow the current party-state apparatus 
to embroil the whole nation in a revolutionary high tide so that every person’s spirit 
would be changed to become fully revolutionary. Revolutionary spirit or revolutionary 
ethics required each individual to be a moral figure like a brave combatant to fight any 
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hint of selfishness emerging in one’s mind and devote himself fully to serving the nation 
(or called “serving the people”) and any goal that Chairman Mao pointed out for the 
nation. Mao believed that when each and every individual was well equipped with the 
revolutionary spirit, the whole nation could fight any enemy, achieve any engineering 
projects and any production mission, and overcome any challenge to achieving national 
wealth and power long pursued by generation after generation of national aspirants since 
the Opium War (1839-1842). 
                But Mao failed. His dream was not fulfilled, this nation was not 
saved, the goal of national wealth and power was not achieved, and people’s lives did not 
improve. The reason lay in his belief in dialectics. In Confucian teachings, if one 
individual wanted to succeed in ruling a country and pacifying the world, he needed to be 
a king or a Master filled with love, and the essence of Yin-Yan dialectics was loving 
harmony; revolution was temporary and was done for the sake of love, and he needed to 
return to loving harmony once the goal of revolution was achieved. But Mao had become 
a Marxist-Leninist, and he believed that revolution (or class struggle) should be constant, 
and the essence of dialectics was struggle rather than loving harmony. Put it in another 
way, Confucius aimed at perpetual peace and Mao believed in perpetual struggle. 
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Confucius managed to achieve loving harmony in any human relationship, and Mao 
looked for struggle in any human relationship or social situation. Mao always emphasized 
that class struggle was constant, and peace and harmony were temporary; imbalance was 
absolute and constant and balance was relative and temporary.116 This was why Mao 
always launched mass movement to combat class enemies, seeing this as the way to 
achieve any goal. When the whole nation was embroiled in constant struggle and conflict, 
how could he achieve the goal of national wealth and power? How could people’s lives 
be improved? From a Confucian point of view, Mao’s failure had been foretold by his 
belief in constant class struggle: there was no hope for such ideas to achieve anything 
that would lead to the fulfillment of Mao’s dream.  
(2) Epistemology: The Relationship between Knowledge and Practice 
                Confucian ideas on epistemology were inspirational. Knowledge was 
delivered through ancient saintly king’s examples on politics: their practice of 
governance, and the ethos of sacrificial rites, moral customs, and spiritual music 
instituted by them. On how to achieve good governance, although the military affairs 
were seen as necessary, Confucius would place the priority on sacrificial rites, spiritual 
 
116 Mao Zedong, “On Contradiction,” in The Selective Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing: Renmin Publisher, 
1967), pp. 274-312. 
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music, and moral examples, moral teachings, and moral customs. A good disciple, in 
Confucius’ eyes, would model himself on the ancient saintly kings, and cultivate himself 
spiritually to become someone like those kings or like Confucius. Therefore, the 
knowledge that Confucius wanted his disciples to learn was about the building of one’s 
moral personality and the capability to rule a country and pacify the world. The way to 
obtain such knowledge was by studying the examples, institutions, and music of those 
ancient kings embodied in six books of scriptures edited by Confucius, and also by 
questions and answers between Confucius and his disciples. 
                The question of epistemology is: how does a Confucian follower (or 
an individual) know or acquire knowledge?117 The answer lies in the Confucian belief in 
ontology. All beings are created by Heaven the Almighty, and all men are created equal. 
Each and every individual was born with the same innate noble spirit. It was only through 
developed habits that people became different. In other words, each and every individual 
had the same chance to become a saint as long as he made that choice. Any individual 
could obtain the same knowledge as acquired by the ancient saintly kings because all 
men are created equal, and every individual has the same cognizant capability as 
 
117 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppy, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, 
and Beyond (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1999), p. 477. 
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acquired by those kings. Because everyone is created from the same origin (Heaven the 
Almighty), even an ordinary individual has the same cognizant capability that was born 
from Heaven. Such cognizant capability allows every individual, be they an ordinary 
person or a saint, to obtain the same spiritual understanding and moral knowledge, and 
thus to have the same opportunity to make his choice (under free will) to become a 
saint.118 It is clear that such a belief will serve as the intellectual seed for Chinese 
democracy in the future. 
                Mao Zedong’s ideas on epistemology also had something to do with 
Confucianism. He believed in Confucian teachings on the relationship between 
knowledge and practice: knowledge is for the purpose of practice. Thus, knowledge 
should be rooted in social practice. Social practice, for Mao, included scientific practice, 
literary and artistic practice, the practice of labor, and the practice of class struggle. From 
social practice, one gained knowledge, and to complete the process of knowledge, one 
should use the knowledge that he obtained to return to social practice again. Without the 
latter step, the process of knowledge was seen as incomplete. Thus the sequence in Mao 
Zedong’s epistemology was, first, you were engaged in social practice, and then, you 
obtained knowledge from that practice, and finally, you should use that knowledge to 
 
118 Chen Fangman, op cit.; Cihui, op cit.; Lin Qinghe, op cit. 
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enter into social practice again. Only in this way (i.e., involving yourself in social 
practice) would you gain full knowledge.119 A person needed to do the same laboring job 
as peasants and workers in order for him to understand the mind and feelings of the 
proletariat. Only through that kind of social practice could one person develop sympathy 
with the exploited class, and then he had to enter into social practice again to stand on the 
side of the exploited class and fight the exploiting class. Only through social practice and 
class struggle could he identify the right versus the wrong (good versus evil), and be able 
to distinguish between “us” (the good people) and “the enemies” (the bad guys). 
                The intellectuals and the bourgeoisie, in Mao Zedong’s views, did not 
have more knowledge than peasants and workers, because their knowledge was not 
rooted in social practice— in labor. Thus Mao Zedong made the intellectuals and the 
bourgeoisie have a feeling of original sin because of their lack of social practice (i.e., 
labor) as peasants and workers: their souls were inferior to the souls of the peasants and 
workers (the proletariat). They needed to be re-educated by learning from the peasant 
mass and the worker mass. Therefore, when the situation of class struggle became bitter, 
their fate would be to be sent down to the labor camp to go through labor, which was 
 
119 Mao Zedong, “On Practice,” in The Selective Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing: Renmin Publisher, 1967), 
pp. 259-273. 
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actually a punishment just because of their state of being—being an intellectual and being 
a member of the bourgeoisie meant carrying the original sin (defined by Mao’s ideology) 
all through their life. Here one can see how Mao’s knowledge brought suffering to the 
people. The intellectuals and the bourgeoisie were seen as inferior citizens, and they and 
their families were treated unfairly and on some occasions brutally. In the western 
countries, the intellectuals and the bourgeoisie were the most creative segment of the 
society; in Mao’s China, they and their families were in constant insecurity and fear. Thus, 
the most creative segment of this society was constantly suppressed. How could this 
nation achieve anything that would lead to the fulfillment of its people’s dream—national 
wealth and power, and the improvement of people’s lives? This government was 
incapable of meeting its people’s needs. 
(3) Political Ideal: the Great Harmony 
                Confucius described his political ideal in one of his 
scriptures:       
When Tao is fulfilled, the wealth of the world belongs to all people. Selected 
will be the moral; elected will be the capable. Respected will be the faithfulness; 
cultivated will be the harmony. Therefore, people will not just adore their parents, 
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and will not just love their children. The old will enjoy their days, the men in their 
prime will contribute what they can offer, and the young will be nurtured and 
educated. The widows and the widowers, the orphans and the childless, the disables 
and the sick, will all be taken good care of. Men will have their professions, and 
women will settle down in their marriage. Goods will be shared, and services will 
be devoted. Thus tricks will stop, thefts, banditry, and rebellions will disappear, and 
therefore, the doors of people’s houses need not to be closed. This is called the 
Great Harmony.120 
                Mao Zedong believed in this Confucian political ideal and saw this as 
his career goal.121 As one can see, this Confucian ideal revealed a spirit of sharing and 
fraternity, with love, mutual help, and a concern for the collective welfare. After 
becoming a Marxist-Leninist, Mao’s image of such Confucian ideals turned into a 
Marxian communist heaven. During the Great Leap Forward in 1958, Mao described his 
political ideal of the People’s Commune: 
        At that time there will be many communist communes in the rural areas of our 
country, and each commune will have its own agriculture and industry, will have 
 
120 Confucius, “The Great Harmony,’ in Liji Jinzhu Jinyi (The Current Notes and Translations of Liji) 
(Taipei: Shangwu Publisher, 1970). 
121 Wang Shubai, op cit., p. 149. 
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universities, high schools, and elementary schools, will have hospitals, will have 
scientific research institutes, will have commercial stores and service businesses, 
will have traffic businesses, will have nurseries and canteens, will have clubs, and 
will have police force, etc.; several villages enclose a city to further become a 
bigger communist commune.122 
In another occasion, Mao’s ideas were published: 
        Our direction is, step by step, in much order, to organize a big commune that is 
made up of industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, and militia, and 
make the commune the basic unit of our society.123 
So Mao’s political ideal was to integrate industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and 
education, and militia to become one unit, in which all kinds of human needs will be 
provided for, and all types of discrimination and inequality will be extinguished, thus 
building a just, equal, and pure society.124 This ideal was Mao Zedong’s dream, even a
tens of millions of people had died because of the Great Leap Forward, he never chang
his faith in and adoration of such kind of socialism.125 At the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1966, “he once again displayed such an ideal blueprint before the whole 
 
122 Li Rui, Mao Zedong De Gongguo Shifei (Mao Zedong’s Achievements and Mistakes, Right and Wrong) 
(Taipei, Xinrui Publisher: 1993), p. 280. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid., p. 308. 
125 Ibid. 
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nation,”126 only adding to it “drastic class struggle.”127 
                It looked like Mao was very determined in his pursuit of a 
humanitarian political ideal like the Confucian one; then, why did he fail? The reasons 
for Mao’s failure were clear when one compares the Confucian teachings and Mao 
Zedong’s practice. Firstly, in the pursuit of the Confucian political ideal—the Great 
Harmony—one needs to be patient. The most efficient way and the only way is to first 
cultivate oneself spiritually to become a saint to set an example for the whole nation to 
follow. It takes time and free will for people to make their choice to follow a spiritual path 
and to succeed on that path. When many people are determined to follow that path, it 
becomes possible for such an ideal (i.e., the Great Harmony) to be fulfilled. Mao did not 
follow the above principle. He pushed it so hard and made it so urgent, wanting to 
achieve a big goal in just a few years, and disregarding people’s capability and free will. 
Such a lifestyle as in the People’s Commune might be tolerable for people in a period of 
time, but would not last for too long, because it was against humans’ basic need of family 
life and family love. In the People’s Commune, family life and family love was 
suppressed, traditional village life-style of human connections was destroyed, and the 
 
126 Ibid., pp. 308-309. 
127 Ibid., p. 309. 
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normal desire for material wealth was suppressed. So this practice of the People’s 
Commune was against people’s will, which meant it was against Mao’s mass line that he 
emphasized so much: every policy needed to correspond with people’s concerns and 
people’s interests. Such a mass line, if fully followed, could be to some extent similar to 
the Confucian emphasis on the ancient saintly king’s politics, as long as it reflects the 
principle of merciful love. When you violate people’s will, people’s concerns, and 
people’s normal desires for material needs, how can you and your policy succeed? 
                Secondly, as stated above, a Confucian path is a path of love and 
harmony, and it takes time to convince people that these are the correct ways which will 
benefit all. But Mao’s way of pursuing ideals was through class struggle128 instead of 
convincing logic. Although the ends contained elements of humanitarianism, the means 
were too savage, too brutal, too anti-humanitarian. When the means do not reflect the 
spirit of the ends, ultimately, the ends will not be realized. When the means are totally 
opposite to the spirit of the ends (i.e., humanitarianism), there is no hope for success in 
any way. Mao’s disregard of human cost and lack of sympathy toward innocent lives 
morally disgraced his ideal, no matter how noble it was. Many intellectuals or idealists 
that once adored Mao and Mao’s path found themselves alienated in the process of 
 
128 Ibid., pp. 312-335. 
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following Mao. They just could not believe the things that were happening before their 
eyes.129 
(4) Class Struggle: The Way to Attain Political Ideal130 
                In the 22 years (1927-1949) of political struggle with the KMT, Mao 
Zedong had seen competition of power between the CCP and the KMT as the political 
reflection of class struggle in Chinese society at that time, with the KMT seen as 
representing the bourgeois interests, and the CCP representing the people’s (or the worker 
masses’ and the peasant masses’) interests. Since the revolt of the revolutionary forces 
(the CCP) against the reactionary forces (the KMT) was seen by Mao as good versus evil, 
of course in his eyes the good had to and would finally win over the evil. Even after the 
KMT had been defeated in China completely, the class struggle (a struggle of 
life-and-death) would continue to exist, only adopting different forms. According to Mao 
in 1959, such life-and-death struggle not only existed during the previous ten years 
(1949-1959), but would also continue to exist and last for at least 20 years (1959-1979), 
and maybe for half of a century (1959-2009). Mao said the philosophy of the communist 
party is the philosophy of struggle. In 1966, which was the beginning of the Cultural 
 
129 One of them was Dr. Li Zhisui, Mao Zedong’s private doctor. See Li Zhisui, The Private Life of 
Chairman Mao (Random House, 1994). 
130 The title is from Li Rui, op cit., p. 312, the subtitle of section 8. 
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Revolution, Mao emphasized that one “should see everything and analyze everything 
from the point of view of class struggle, and from the method of class analysis.” 
Therefore, the whole history of the PRC under Mao Zedong was seen by him as within 
constant class struggle, which was seen as the basis of everything and every phenomena 
in society. 
                Each individual in that society, according to Mao Zedong’s method of 
class analysis, would be given a class attribute. Those who were defined as the middle or 
poor or employed peasants, the workers, or the urban poor, would be seen as good people 
who were laboring masses; those who were defined as landlords, rich peasants, 
reactionaries, bad guys (usually the criminals), and the rightists (bourgeoisie and its 
intellectuals)—called “the black five classes”—would be seen as the people’s enemies 
who had exploited the people, the laboring masses. The communist party represented the 
interests of the laboring class and practiced proletarian dictatorship toward the people’s 
enemies. Thus the laboring masses belonged to the class to be protected, and “the black 
five classes” were subjected to dictatorship. These class attributes not only followed a 
person all through his lifetime and would be passed on to whatever work unit he moved 
to, but they also disgraced his families and his offspring. This led to serious social 
 104
                                                
discrimination in which a person could be treated like social trash once he was born into a 
family of “the black five classes,” and to make things worse, there was no way for a 
person to change his attribute of black class.131 Thus, all through your lifetime, you had 
to carry the burden of disgraceful identity wherever you went. In serious situations of 
class struggle, these black-classed persons would have to go through severe physical 
violence and mental insults; in less serious situations, their load of work distributed to 
them was heavier than others and their payment was the lowest in an urban work unit or a 
rural production team. Would this situation change? Not during Mao’s years. 
                Mao’s method for conducting class struggle was through mass 
movement. Confucian ways of carrying out political ideals were as follows: you had a 
saintly king or a spiritual Master (charisma), you had spiritual knowledge (ideology), and 
you had a group of followers (spiritual practitioners or vanguards), and the mass (the 
people); when the king or the Master called, the followers, well equipped with spiritual 
knowledge, would come to the mission, setting examples for the people to follow, and 
thus carry out a mission or a project. In pretty much the same way, Mao Zedong carried 
out a project through the political movement of class struggle. There was charisma 
 
131 Very rare cases did happen when Mao Zedong wanted to change somebody’s class attribute; it usually 
happened on those people who had personal relationships with him. In Mao’s years, Mao was the only one 
in China who had the power to change a person’s class attribute. For example, the class attributes of Dr. Li 
Zhisui’s parents-in-law were changed because Li was the private doctor of Mao Zedong. See Li Zhisui, op 
cit. 
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(Chairman Mao), there was ideology (the Mao Zedong Thoughts), and there were 
communist practitioners or vanguards (the party cadres), and the people (the masses); 
when Chairman Mao called, the party cadres, well equipped with the Mao Zedong 
Thoughts, would come to the political mission, and mobilized the people (i.e., provoked 
the political activeness from the people) to carry out a project. Class struggle required 
people to become political activists in a political movement; if you were not active 
enough, you would be seen as a laggard. Being a laggard would place you in an 
unfortunate situation of political or social discrimination, or even mean becoming subject 
to dictatorship; therefore, no one wanted to be seen as a laggard in a political movement. 
Thus, whenever there was political movement, you would see people doing many things 
in whatever they could to demonstrate their zeal and to show that they were political 
activists. This is why there were 90 million people advancing to the mountains to chop 
down the trees, which caused very serious damage to the Chinese natural environment. 
Magic (but fake) production figures were reported to Mao during the Great Leap Forward, 
and this is why the whole generation of national youth responded to Chairman Mao’s call 
to come to the mission of revolution, creating national chaos. In short, everyone wanted 
to become an activist, so that he would gain respect in that social aura: I am a brave guy! 
 106
I am not a coward! This also led to personal worshipping of Chairman Mao, since it was 
Chairman Mao who called them to the truth, who led them to the revolutionary Holy land, 
and who guided them to become heros. 
(5) The Problem of “Democracy” 
                Since Mao had divided people into two groups: the people and the 
people’s enemies (or the proletariat and the bourgeoisie), the “democracy” defined by 
Mao was equal to dictatorship. Democracy, for Mao, meant the people became the 
masters of this country. But the people were an uneducated mass, and they needed to be 
educated and guided by the vanguard (the party member); this led to the claim of 
leadership of the communist party. Therefore, in the final analysis, who would be the 
master of this country? The party! Whose will would be the basis of any policy? The 
party’s! Who would shoulder the “burden” of educating the people? The party! Who 
would point out the right direction for the people and help them correct their errors and 
blindness? The party! Who would give the people jobs? The party! Who would be the 
people’s mother or father that nurtured them to become mature? The party! Who would 
be the one that held the truth and was therefore able to guide the people to communist 
Heaven or the revolutionary Holy land? Still, the Party! 
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                But, what’s wrong with that if the communist party really represents 
the interests of the people? The problem lay in our above discussions of social 
discrimination, plus the so-called “people’s democratic dictatorship.” If you belonged to 
“the black five classes,” you would be subject to dictatorship. If your son did not want to 
be a laggard in a political movement, he would have to draw a clear line, politically and 
publicly, between you and him, and in some occasions he would publicly insult you or 
physically attack you to demonstrate his political activeness or revolutionary pureness. 
Thus, during the Cultural Revolution, cases of children attacking their parents, students 
attacking their teachers, workers attacking their leaders or managers, and husbands and 
wives drawing a clear line between each other were not rare. What kind of society was 
this? Also, when you participated in such behavior, you even had to feel grateful for the 
grace of the party’s leadership or encouragement, because without the party, you would 
not be so brave to attack your loved ones. And “healthy” love only existed between you 
and Chairman Mao. Your love toward your parents or teachers or managers, if not filtered 
by so-called “class feelings,” was something to be criticized and to be discarded. This 
was a beastly society. 
                Then comes the problem of mass line. In Confucian teachings, “the 
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people” meant all individuals except the king. In Mao’s mass line, “the people” meant the 
laboring masses (i.e., the peasant masses and the worker masses); it excluded the people’s 
enemies (i.e., the bourgeois rightists, and national bourgeoisie and its intellectuals, or “the 
black five classes”). Thus any policy would correspond with the interests of the laboring 
masses (the people) rather than the interests of the black classed persons and their 
families (the people’s enemies)—the number of the latter amounted to hundreds of 
millions132 during the history of Mao’s PRC. 
                Another problem was democratic centralism. Because Mao’s central 
concern was class struggle, and most of the time he saw struggle as life-and-death 
struggle, he believed that if the socialist forces did not win, the capitalist forces would 
win in that society. Thus, class enemies were seen as being everywhere in all fields of 
daily life; any criticism to Mao’s policy would be read by him as crazy attacks from class 
enemies, or as wavering of class position and leaning to the enemies’ side. Both were not 
tolerable for Mao. Thus, dictatorship toward “the people’s enemies” was seen as crucial 
for the life-and-death struggle. Witch-hunts for the counter-revolutionaries or the 
right-leaning opportunitists were a serious part of every political movement. In order to 
 
132 Chen Yizi, “Zhongguo Gaige Sanshinian Ji—Jianlun Mao Zedong De ‘Sige Chuangzao’ ” (A Memorial 
Ceremony for China’s Thirty Years of Reform—Also on Mao Zedong’s “Four Creations”), 
see( http://www.cgarden.net/StubArticle.asp?issue=080302&total=102). 
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guarantee victory in each political struggle, Mao naturally centralized political power to 
his hands, because even the party cadres and the central party leaders were seen as 
possibly reactionaries, right-leaners or revisionists that would stand on the way of Mao’s 
fulfillment of his utopian dream. Those local followers (party secretaries at the local 
levels) of Mao also centralized political power to be able to carry out the mission from 
Mao’s calls. Only by centralizing power could the dictatorship toward “the people’s 
enemies” succeed, and only by such practice could Mao be confident that he could freely 
fulfill his ambitious ideals without any barrier from “the people’s enemies.” Thus 
democratic-centralism was always geared toward the central side, both in the relationship 
between him and other party leaders and cadres, and in the relationship between the party 
(under Mao’s will) and the people. The lack of true democratic practice was an important 
reason why Mao could make such serious mistakes in pursuing his dreams. There was 
only top-down command and control, and no reasonable check and balance, and no 
tolerance for criticism or even mild views of disapproval. Under such kind of 
“democratic dictatorship,” how could Mao succeed in any way in his pursuit of the 
fulfillment of his dreams? 
(6) The Problem of Mao Zedong’s System: A Summary 
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                Class struggle was the essence of Mao Zedong’s worldview. The 
purpose of life, for Mao, was to fight against the bourgeoisie for the interests of the 
proletariat, and to build and consolidate a regime of proletarian dictatorship (so that 
China would be on the road of socialism). A person had to choose to stand on the 
proletarian side; otherwise he would be subject to dictatorship. The problem was: who 
had the right to decide which person belonged to which class? In China, in Mao Zedong’s 
years, only Mao and his trusted followers had this right. Once you were classified as the 
object of dictatorship, you were subject to severe physical and mental suffering, or even 
death. Only in very rare cases could a person or a family change their attribute of class, 
which would follow a person all through his lifetime wherever he went. People were thus 
terrified to speak from their heart. So many people suffered severely in Mao’s China. And 
Mao saw such suffering as nothing in comparison with the ideal world that he was going 
to build. As stated before in this chapter, when the means did not reflect the spirit of the 
ends, the ideals that one pursued would be corroded, and when the means was totally 
against humanitarianism, nothing noble could be achieved. 
(7) Prescription: A Suggestion of How to Fix Mao Zedong’s 
System—the Building of Liberal Democracy 
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Confucius proposed a noble ideal that carried a spirit of sharing and 
fraternity for all people in the world, which was the Great Harmony. The means to 
achieve such a noble ideal was through following the principle of love and respect for 
each individual. “All men are created equal”—this was the firmest and the most basic 
belief in Confucian teachings. Everybody was born equal and had the same capability and 
opportunity to become a saint; this was a belief beyond the division of class, gender, race, 
and religion. Once an individual decided for himself, under the principle of free will, to 
follow the Confucian spiritual path, he would be able to become a saint as long as he 
worked hard toward that goal. Nobody could make the decision for him except he himself. 
This was about a person’s self fulfillment and it was a totally free choice. Once a great 
number of people decided to follow the spiritual path, things became easier for the 
fulfillment of “Great Harmony.” The method was to cultivate oneself spiritually and set a 
good example for others to follow. When enough people acted as vanguards at many 
corners of the world to lead people toward the same ideal, “Great Harmony” would be 
fulfilled and each individual’s highest dream of self fulfillment would be achieved. 
                Here in Confucian teachings, the means did reflect the spirit of the 
end: the end was “Great Harmony,” and the means was through following the principle 
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of love and respect for each individual, through the recognition of each individual’s inner 
nobility, and through the respect of each individual’s free will. This was, from Confucius’ 
point of view, how an ideal of noble spirit could be achieved. The farther one stood away 
from the above principles (i.e., love and respect for each individual; the recognition of 
each individual’s inner nobility; the respect of each individual’s free will), the greater the 
failure of one’s self fulfillment—the fulfillment of one’s highest, noblest dream. From 
such point of view, there was no chance for proletarian dictatorship to achieve anything 
noble, or anything beneficial to humans. Thus, the answer is clear to the question of how 
Mao Zedong’s system could be fixed. First, an individual’s inborn value (i.e., his inner 
nobility) must be honored, and this implies the respect of human rights; secondly, an 
individual’s free will must be respected all the time, and this implies the building of a 
civil society in the spirit of the western liberalism; thus the building of a liberal 
democracy would be just a question of time. Do leaders in the reform years follow these 
principles? The answer will be clear in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REFORM YEARS (1978—THE CURRENT TIME) 
                 
                After 30 years of reform (1978-2008), many Chinese intellectuals 
became disillusioned with China’s reform.133 This is a system of political dictatorship 
plus market economy.134 China could have achieved a great success in the building of 
democracy if its leaders (Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao) had that in mind. 
But from the very beginning, Deng Xiaoping had made it clear that the reform should 
insist on economic reform on the one hand, and political dictatorship (the four cardinal 
principles) on the other hand. The whole purpose of reform, for Deng Xiaoping, was to 
rebuild political legitimacy for the communist governance and consolidate its rule of 
China—to save the party from the disastrous situation resulting from Mao Zedong’s 
Cultural Revolution.135 The four cardinal principles, proposed by Deng Xiaoping in 
March 1979, were: “firstly, we must insist on the socialist road; secondly, we must insist 
 
133 See He Qinglian, Zhongguo Xiandaihua De Xianjing (China’s Descent into A Quagmire) (Sunnyvale: 
Broad Press Inc., 2003); also, He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), Zhongguo Gaige De De Yu Shi (The 
Gains and Losses of China’s Reform) (Hong Kong: Broad Press Publisher, 2007). 
134 He Qinglian, op cit. 
135 He Qinglian, “Daixu: Gaige Shenhua De Zhongjie Yu Chongsu Shehui Rentong De Kunjing” (The 
Preface Substitute: the Termination of the Myth of Reform and the Difficult Situation of Reconstructing 
Social Identity), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.) op cit., pp. 1-24. 
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on the proletarian dictatorship; thirdly, we must insist on the communist party’s 
leadership; fourthly, we must insist on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong 
Thoughts.”136Deng saw these four principles as prerequisite to the four modernizations: 
modernizations of agriculture, industry, national defense, and technology.137 This meant, 
in the pursuit of China’s economic development (i.e., the four modernizations), China 
would always be a socialist country, which would be characterized by the proletarian 
dictatorship, which in turn would be guaranteed by the leadership of the communist party, 
and the communist party would be ideologically well equipped with Marxism-Leninism 
and Mao Zedong Thoughts to be able to lead China to maintain its proletarian 
dictatorship to pursue the socialist goal.138 The most important thing in the four cardinal 
principles was the communist party’s leadership; only with its leadership could China 
maintain its nature of socialism. Liberal democracy was seen as a bourgeois political 
institution, the building of which would bury the current institution of proletarian 
dictatorship, and thus the possibility of liberal democracy should be guarded against all 
the time. So Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thoughts would continue to be the 
 
136 Gao Hui, Shehuizhuyi Zai Renshi—Zhonggong  “Chujie Lun” Zhi Yianjiou (The Re-understanding of 
Socialism—A Study of the Chinese Communist Party’s “the Initial Stage of Socialism”) (Taipei: Yongye 
Publisher,1991), p. 130. 
137 Gaohui, op cit., pp. 129-130. 
138 I was inspired by Zhao Xianyun about this interpretation of the internal logical relation of the four 
cardinal principles. 
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ideological guide-lines to lead the party and the whole country. 
                From the four cardinal principles, one can see that it is impossible for 
liberal democracy to take root in China as long as the communist party is still in power. 
So one would expect to see economic development on the one hand, and communist 
dictatorial rule on the other. There would be no such things as freedom of speech and 
publishing, freedom of assembly and association, let alone multi-party competitive 
elections for political power in the political field.139 And because of this insistence on 
political dictatorship, China’s economy became a predatory economy,140 its social 
structure became an elite-dominating social stratification which sacrificed the interests of 
the peasants and workers and other people at the bottom, who has little chance for 
upward social mobility,141 and its culture became a bureaucrat-based culture that was 
deeply involved with institutional corruption.142 In what follows, I will divide my 
discussion into four areas: the economy, the social structure, the politics, and the 
culture.143 All four areas were filled with serious problems that came with the institution 
 
139 China does have competitive elections at the village level, but has nothing similar beyond that level. 
140 He Qinglian, op cit. 
141 Ibid. 
142 See Cheng Xiaonong, “Fanrong Conghe Erlai—Zhongguo Jingji Xianzhuang He Qushi De Fenxi” 
(Where Does Prosperity Come from—An Analysis of China’s Current Economic Situation and Trend), in 
He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), op cit., especially pp. 204-210. 
143 These four areas could be expressed as a model pictured like a baseball field, with economy 
representing the home base, social structure the first base, politics the second base, and culture the third 
base. For detailed explanations of the model, please see Mark V. Kauppi and Paul R. Viotti, Comparative 
Politics Theory (New York: Longman, forthcoming), chapter one.  
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of a one-party dictatorial rule which carried the ideas of the four cardinal principles. 
(1) The Economy 
                The whole point of economic reform was to stimulate each 
individual’s or enterprise’ production activeness to increase productivity. This was 
because under the original planned economic system, the individuals or enterprises had 
lost the zeal for production since they did not produce for themselves. Mao Zedong’s way 
of stimulating revolutionary zeal or using moral incentive proved to be ineffective. 
People had to work for themselves in order for them to be active economically. Therefore, 
the People’s Communes were dismissed one after another, and each peasant family was 
allowed to produce for themselves if they simultaneously accomplished the quota of 
production mission distributed to them. Such a system did boost agricultural production 
and brought about rural prosperity. Then the communist leaders wanted to transplant the 
rural successful experience to the urban economy. 
                Under the original planned economic system, the state-owned 
enterprises were obliged to perform the production directives issued by the administrative 
bureaucrats. Institutionally, the enterprise was only an affiliate to the governmental 
administrative apparatus. It was not an autonomous organization independent from the 
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government. Therefore, before the reform years, instead of looking to the market for 
guidance of their investment or production behavior, the state-owned enterprises looked 
to their governmental administrative superiors for guidance of production mission. They 
did not have the power to decide on which products to produce, how to produce them, 
where the raw materials would come, and where the products should go. They did not 
decide on the price and amount of the things they produced. The administrative superiors 
would make all the decisions and give directives to the enterprises, and the enterprises 
only listened to their superiors and accomplished the production mission. Thus, market 
behavior was totally alien to the enterprises. Most of the state-owned enterprises were in 
constant economic loss because, once again, they did not produce for themselves. The 
reform aimed at activating their productivity with material incentive. Thus, it was 
required by the central leader that the administrative superiors should loosen their control 
over or interference with the enterprises, and should release the enterprises from the 
heavy load of tax and profit which was originally supposed to be paid to the government. 
But the reform of the state-owned enterprises was a very difficult job. 
                The difficulty was both internal and external. Internally, there were 
two problems. The first problem was about the heavy reliance of the workers on the 
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enterprise for their income and welfare; the workers had been accustomed to the iron rice 
bowl that guaranteed their economic security (i.e., their wages) and social welfare, 
including housing, medical care, and old-age pension. But because there were too many 
redundant workers in an enterprise, which had become a huge burden for the enterprise, 
many of the workers, for the sake of reform, had to leave their long protected 
employment and welfare. Huge population under unemployment thus became a serious 
social problem both for the cities and the nation as a whole. The second problem was 
about the short-sighted economic behavior of the state-owned enterprises. The 
state-owned enterprises were short-sighted in their investment behavior; most of them 
pursued either unnecessary expansion of infrastructure or careless investment on goods 
popular in the market at a certain time. This led to redundant construction and 
over-production, and thus led to waste of the investment money. But the state-owned 
enterprises would never change such short-sighted investment behavior, because they did 
not spend their own money--it was money from national finances, or national banks. 
Even if they owed debts to the banks, they would not bother to pay the debts since the 
state would not let them go bankrupt because they were both the ideological and the 
fiscal pillar of the socialist state. Their significance for the economy was also because the 
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employees of the state-owned enterprises and the state apparatus were the main body of 
urban residents; the state had to constantly raise their wages and level of welfare so that 
these residents would make a big urban consumption market to attract the investment of 
foreign capital. Social stability was also easier to maintain when the urban residents 
received higher payment and higher welfare than the rural areas because the urban unrest 
would be harder than the rural unrest to deal with.144 Therefore, the state-owned 
enterprises, with their significant role in the economy and social stability, could always 
gain a loan from the national bank (under the directives from the state) even if they were 
in constant or even serious economic loss. That’s why the state-owned enterprises would 
not change their short-sighted economic behavior. So, internally the above two problems 
made the reform of state-owned enterprises a most tough job. 
                Externally, there was one problem and it had to do with 
government-enterprise relationship. There had been too much administrative interference 
from the enterprise’ “mothers-in-law” (i.e., administrative superiors). Both the central 
departments and the local governmental agencies could exert their power to interfere in 
the internal affairs of state-owned enterprises. They could interfere in the personnel 
arrangement or production projects. They could also impose on the enterprises 
 
144 Cheng Xiaonong, op cit., pp. 196-204. 
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unreasonable fees, fines, and share of payments by many excuses (e.g., the enterprises 
might be required to pay some money in a public event). The reform gave a green light to 
central departments and local governmental agencies to create their own “second fiscal 
channel.” Thus all kinds of “mother-in-law” bureaucrats (i.e., the superiors of the 
enterprises) focused on the enterprises for money. 145 And this was only about asking for 
money. If the enterprise wanted to initiate or perform a project, sometimes it would need 
hundreds of stamps for permission.146 So the system was very ineffective. That was why 
the state-owned enterprises had been in constant economic loss and was very hard to 
cure.147 The root of the problem lay in the government-enterprise relationship. If the 
government did not change its behavior of constant interference in the affairs of the 
enterprises, there would be no hope for the state-owned enterprises to improve 
themselves and become profit-making enterprises. The government had to change its 
practice of paternalism, which had to do with its nature of dictatorial rule.  
(2) The Social Structure 
                China’s social structure, on the distribution of wealth, was a pyramid. 
In an article written in 2000, He Qinglian said,  
 
145 Yang Huiming and Tang Buyun, 1992: Zhongguo De Beishue zhizhan (1992: The Last Battle of China) 
(Taipei: Fengyun Shidai Publishing Inc. Ltd.,1993), pp. 121-132. 
146 Ibid., p. 122. 
147 See Yang Huiming and Tang Buyun, op cit. Also, see Su Ya and Jia Lusheng, Baimao, Heimao (White 
Cats, Black Cats) (Taipei: Xinchao She, 1993). 
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        I developed two criteria. . . to evaluate the income level and professional 
acknowledgement. . . I estimated that the upper-class-level constitutes four percent 
of China’s population; the middle class counts for 11 percent; and the lower class 
including marginalized groups counts for about 85 percent.148  
In 2004, her analysis stated “that the middle class in China including the upper middle 
class totals about 15-16 percent of the population,”149 and the social structure was still a 
pyramid one150 where a small part of the people occupied a huge amount of national 
wealth, and about 80 percent of the population lived at the bottom. China’s economy is a 
predatory economy dominated by a coalition of political, economic, and a small part of 
intellectual elite. The reform does not bring everybody to wealth as the party promised; 
rather, it winks at corruption and lets a powerful elite group “rob money” from most of 
the people in that society.151 
                How did this happen? As He Qinglian points out, “the reality of the 
reform was in fact to gradually change the state of possession of social resources through 
the adjustment of interests.” And she continues,  
 
148 He Qinglian, “The New Myth in China: China’s Rising Middle-class Will Accelerate Democratization,” 
see (http://www.danke4china.net/ywwz/15.htm). 
149 Ibid., p.3. 
150 Ibid., p.2. 
151 He Qinglian, “Dangqian Zhongguo Shehui Jiegou Yianbian De Zongtixing Fenxi (A Total Analysis of 
the Evolution of the Current Chinese Social Structure), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), op cit., 
p.352. 
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        The change of the state of possession of resources in China’s reform took the 
road of the privatization of the power of political elite starting with the 
marketization of the power.152  
In other words, as long as a bureaucrat had power to allot economic resources, he would 
use the power to engage in rent-seeking activities, illegally giving out policy favors, 
prerogatives, or special permission to the economic elite and obtaining material gains in 
return, thus making China a rent-seeking society. A coalition of political, economic, and a 
part of the intellectual elite (to justify such activities with academic theories) had formed 
in China’s society that had a very powerful ability to dominate and monopolize the 
allocation of public resources in their favor. And because this elite group had overly 
monopolized social resources, not only the growth of the middle class in China was 
impeded, but also the interests of other social strata .153 This was why about 80 percent o
the people lived at the bottom, and a small part of the people (about 5 percent154) enj
a high standard of living. 
                One noteworthy thing is that most of the economic elite either 
 
152 Ibid., pp. 326-327. 
153 Sun Liping, “Jiouling Niandai Zhongqi Yilai Zhongguo Shehui Jiegou Yianbian De Xin Qushi” (The 
New Trend of the Evolution of Chinese Social Structure since the Middle of the 1990’s), in He Qinglian 
and Cheng Xiaonong  (eds.), op cit., p.369.  
154 He Qinglian, “Dangqian Zhongguo Shehui Jiegou Yianbian De Zongtixing Fenxi” (A Total Analysis of 
the Evolution of the Current Chinese Social Structure), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), op cit., 
p. 352.  
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originally were the party bureaucrats or had bureaucratic backgrounds,155 or were closely 
intertwined with the party so that they could get rich.156 Don’t forget this is a r
society: the political elite are the ones who can make you rich or poor. Therefore, 
businessmen will not be the class promoting democracy in China as many people expe
Another noteworthy thing, pointed out by He Qinglian, is as follows:            
        Chinese middle class is the beneficiary of economic reform and the current 
political order. The main body of the middle class is still the Chinese Communist 
Party staff and government agencies. They are not only the defenders of the current 
political system, but also the beneficiaries of the system.157  
He Qinglian also points out, the middle class people, like other Chinese people, do not 
have any channel to voice their opinions; without any institutional protection of their 
rights and interests, they can not even fight for themselves; therefore, the expectation that 
a rising middle-class will accelerate democratization in China is just a “new myth.”158 
She further points out,  
        The white-collar and high-tech elites who work in foreign enterprises regard 
‘staying away from politics’ as their core value.” They are only interested in 
 
155 Ibid., p. 329. 
156 He Qinglian, “The New Myth in China: China’s Rising Middle-class Will Accelerate Democratization,” 
see (http://www.danke4china.net/ywwz/15.htm), p. 4. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. 
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becoming rich and having fun and do not want to endanger the very source of their 
income.159 
                The bureaucrat-based social structure in China also has a serious 
problem. According to Cheng Xiaonong, being a “state cadre” enjoys high social status 
and “special socioeconomic identity.” “Before the reform,” “there had formed” “a stable 
socioeconomic structure” “in the urban society,” Cheng continues,   
        The socioeconomic status of each individual member of this society was 
determined and controlled by the party and the government, and was protected by a 
whole set of socioeconomic institutions. Whether one could live in the city, get 
promotion, get housing was determined by the party and the government.  
according to one’s political performance, work years, and educational level.160  
According to Cheng, the “promotion of socioeconomic status was not necessarily the 
result of fair competition, but was often possibly just the reward by the party for one’s 
political loyalty.” Cheng continues,  
        Since the socioeconomic status of social member had to be endorsed by the 
government, this ensured that the government had control over the social member’s 
 
159 Ibid. 
160 Cheng Xiaonong, “Fanrong Conghe Erlai—Zhongguo Jingji Xianzhuang He Qushi De Fenxi” (Where 
Does Prosperity Come from—An Analysis of China’s Current Economic Situation and Trend), in He 
Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong, op cit., pp. 226. 
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behavior. As long as he would not offend the government, his status would be 
protected.161  
Also, according to Cheng, “the government often guaranteed that each social member” 
“would get promotion” “once he achieved a certain educational level or work years.” 
Therefore, according to Cheng, “the social mobility” “was usually one way”: only 
moving upward and very rarely moving downward. Thus, the bureaucrat-based “social 
structure” “gradually became an inverted pyramid structure.” Cheng continues,  
        For example, there were more and more public agencies and work units, each 
becoming bigger and bigger; in the enterprises, the proportion of managerial 
persons became too large and there were not sufficient front line workers; among 
the workers, the proportion of high-ranked workers was too large, and there were 
not enough non-technical workers who would do the heavy-labor jobs.162  
Cheng said that most urban residents had been accustomed to such stiff social structure, 
and up until the time being (1996), the government never wanted to change the 
social-political institutions to change such a stiff structure.163 
                This bureaucrat-based social structure caused serious problems. The 
 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid, pp. 227. 
163 Ibid. 
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bureaucratic system became too huge and there were too many bureaucrats who relied 
upon the government’s fiscal capability to feed them. Not only was the fiscal burden 
heavy, but the government’s efficiency was low. For example, to run a business, you 
might need to go through many governmental agencies for permission; if you did not 
have a special relationship with some insider officials, you might need to wait for a long 
time while your perfect business timing slipped away. Another big problem was that the 
peasants’ economic burden was unreasonably high even just to pay all kinds of taxes to 
feed the rural bureaucrats, let alone the unreasonable extra fees, fines, and share of 
payments under different excuses. The behavior of many rural base-level regimes became 
more and more like underworld gangsters; some of them even hired bully-boys to enforce 
the unlawful tax and payment “laws” to the peasants .164 Again, all these problems had to 
do with the communist party’s dictatorial rule which created the bureaucrat-based social 
structure. 
(3) The Politics 
                Development and stability (i.e., social-economic-political stability) 
have been two pillars of China’s reform, but without the sincere pursuit of human rights, 
 
164 He Qinglian, “Guojia Jiaose De Shanbian: Zhengfu Zuowei De Fei Zhengdanghua Qushi Fenxi” (The 
Evolution of the State Role: An Analysis on the Trend of Illegitemization of the Government’s Behavior), 
in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), op cit., pp. 397-434.   
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freedom, and western style democracy, these two pillars may not be sustainable. 
One-party dictatorial rule has been the institutional origin of most of the problems 
emerging in the process of China’s reform in the past 30 years (1978-2008). Why was the 
coalition of political, economic, and a part of intellectual elite able to occupy 
unreasonably huge amounts of national wealth? Because the monopoly of political power 
by the communist party bureaucrats made them able to use their power of allocation of 
social resources, to be engaged in rent-seeking activities with the economic elite who 
were adept in collusion with the party bureaucrats. The elite coalition did this at the 
sacrifice of the interests of most people (about 83% of the people165) who were 
disadvantaged or marginalized in the society.166 If there had been sound democratic 
institutions, the disadvantaged or marginalized would have a channel to appeal for or 
represent their interests in the process of policy-making; the media might have performed 
the function of supervision of the policy-making process. If that had been the case, there 
would not have been the policies of so called “housing reform,” “medical reform,” 
“educational reform,” and “reform on social protection” that seriously undermined the 
interests of people at the bottom. By the same token, there might not have been the 
 
165 Ibid., p. 428. 
166 He Qinglian, “Dangqian Zhongguo Shehui Jiegou Yianbian De Zongtixing Fenxi” (A Total Analysis of 
the Evolution of the Current Chinese Social Structure), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), op cit., 
pp. 350- 352. 
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suppression of Falun Gong in 1999, the cracking down on Tibet in 2008, or the 
completely predatory requisition of the peasants’ land in the rural area or the 
gangster-like tearing down of people’s houses in the urban area. In recent years, there 
have been many events of mass protest or confrontation due to unjust land requisition or 
forced house demolition.167 And obviously, if there had been multi-party competition, 
there would have been more reasonable and flexible policies toward Taiwan. Democracy 
may not be the answer to all problems, but it could help policy deliberation, and without 
it, a wrong policy could go so far and deep as the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap 
Forward during Mao’s years. Chinese leaders of the reform years still have not learned 
the lessons.  
                The injustice in China’s reform leads to further social instability. The 
feud between the people on the one hand, and the local government and housing estate 
merchants on the other hand in the case of land requisition or house demolition has led to 
mass protests as stated above. There are also crimes committed against the rich people by 
the poor and hopeless people who become criminals to either vent their feelings of 
 
167 Here are the surprisingly large numbers of mass protest events (to protect their rights on land or housing 
or their other rights): 58,000 in 2003, 74,000 in 2004, and more than 87,000 in 2005. See He Qinglian, 
“Guojia Jiaose De Shanbian: Zhengfu Zuowei De Fei Zhengdanghua Qushi Fenxi” (The Evolution of the 
State Role: An Analysis on the Trend of Illegitemization of the Government’s Behavior), in He Qinglian 
and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), op cit., p. 398. 
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imbalance about the gap of wealth distribution or plunder wealth from the rich.168 
Chinese local governments’ way of dealing with mass protest had been unwisely using 
public violence to suppress the mass; in many cases, the behavior of local governments 
was close to or the same as the Mafia or gangsters.169 How could a political regime keep 
its legitimacy when behaving like that? This behavior led to “structural tension”170 
between the disadvantaged and the government, and was thus not good for the future of 
the regime. In short, China’s lack of democracy led to a power monopoly, which in turn 
led to power abuse in almost all fields of daily life. Although revolution may not happen 
because of the regime’s social control, the regime is neither in security nor exempt from 
social unrest within the next decade. 
(4) The Culture 
                The guideline for the reform was Deng Xiaoping Theory that was 
generalized as “one center, two basic points.” The “one center” meant economic 
development: the central job of the party and the state would shift from Mao Zedong’s 
class struggle to the reform government’s economic development. The party would 
specifically focus on modernizations in four areas: agriculture, industry, national defense, 
 
168 Ibid., p. 429. 
169 Ibid., pp. 397-430. 
170 Ibid. 
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and technology. The “two basic points” are: on the one hand, to insist on the four cardinal 
principles (as explained in the beginning of this chapter), and on the other hand, to insist 
on reform and openness.171 Deng Xiaoping emphasizes that both basic points were 
crucial for China’s socialism. Therefore, Deng’s attempt is to develop an economy 
without changing the one-party dictatorial rule. This Deng Xiaoping Theory has been 
upheld until the present time, and will continue to be followed, according to Deng, for a 
total of a hundred years (1978-2078).172 Jiang Zemin added the “Three Represents” to t
Deng Xiaoping Theory: the communist party represents the interests of the broadest 
range of the people, it represents the most advanced productivity, and it represents the 
direction of the development of the most advanced civilization. Jiang Zemin’s purpose 
was to justify the existing coalition of the political elite and the economic elite, and to 
include the capitalists in the party. This “Three Represents” may not be as positive as 
some people think, seeing it as a sign that the Chinese communist party has turned its 
direction from socialism to capitalism. It aims at a justification of the predatory coalition 
of the elite in China.173 
                Hu Jingtao adds to the Deng Xiaoping Theory, too. He advocates 
 
171 For a useful research of this guideline, see Gao Hui, op cit. 
172 This came from Deng’s words, which said the guideline will dominate for a hundred years. See Ibid. 
173 He Qinglian, “Dangqian Zhongguo Shehui Jiegou Yianbian De Zongtixing Fenxi” (A Total Analysis of 
the Evolution of the Current Chinese Social Structure), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), op cit., 
pp.  325-360. 
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“human-based development,” “scientific development (or sustainable development), and 
“the harmonious society.” “Human-based development” was only a slogan or lip service 
since so many people were in difficult situation because of the predatory nature of the 
development. “Scientific development” or “sustainable development” placed emphasis on 
the issue of environmental protection, but this also had little use since the environmental 
situation in China have become worse and worse.174 The slogan of “constructing a 
harmonious society” is beautiful, but in dealing with mass protest events, Hu himself still 
believed in state violence. The use of state violence to suppress the so called “unstable 
factors in its budding state” was the real practice to keep citizens silent and made them 
comply with the state policy or state position. What kind of “harmonious society” is this? 
                Besides the ideology, Hu Jintao also tried to come close to 
Confucianism, which had always been misused historically to justify the ruler’s 
supremacy and to require the subjects to be loyal to the emperor and the Court 
unconditionally. In other words, Hu borrowed from Confucianism in order to reject the 
western democracy. Therefore, once again, Confucianism becomes the tool of dictatorial 
governance for the ruler—a constant tragedy that happened repeatly in Chinese history.              
 
174 He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong, “Yi Zoudao Jintou De Xiaonong Jingji—Guanyu Zhongguo 
Nongcun, Nongmin Yu Nongye De Duihua” (The Small Peasant Economy that Has Gone to Its End--A 
Dialogue about Chinese Village, Peasants, and Agriculture), in He Qinglian and Cheng Xiaonong (eds.), op 
cit., pp. 271-322. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE INTERVIEW CASES IN SHANGHAI (1) 
 
                In what follows, I will present the interview cases in Shanghai. There 
are 18 cases that I am going to present, including three government officials, six 
enterprise people, four media professionals, and five intellectuals. The interviews were 
conducted from late April to the middle of June, 2004. I use these interview cases to 
obtain data that will reveal a long-term trend in the development or evolution of Chinese 
democracy. This long-term trend started with the Opium War (1839-1842) when Chinese 
civilization first encountered the modern, western civilization, and was forced to start its 
long process of modernization. China today is still in that process. Shanghai is one of the 
most modernized cities in China. How did these interviewees see the positive factors and 
the negative factors that drove or impeded the development and change of the city that 
they lived in? What were their evaluations of the roles of self and state in Shanghai’s 
development and change? What were their expectations of the future, including their own 
future and the city’s future? 
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(1) The Government Officials 
                Interviewee No. 1 was a party cadre; his age was slightly over 50. He 
first explained the characteristics of the Chinese political system, saying that the party 
and the state were not separate. Even if currently China was in the reform years, it was 
still the party that had the final say in everything. The government was the accessory of 
the party. Now in China there were discussions on the separation of the government from 
the party, saying that the party should change its role from the role of management to the 
role of service, and let the government assume the responsibility of governance; 
originally the government’s role was absent. Chinese traditional government was 
different from the government in the western political science. Then he said that the 
above description was context; anything that he was going to say was all within this 
context.175 
                Then, he discussed the currently-hot topic of institutional change 
regarding the separation of the party-government. He explained that the main body of the 
government was still the party members, so even if the party and the government were 
separate, [the political system after] such governmental transformation was different from 
the west: it was one-party rule. Then he turned to another hot topic: the legitimacy of the 
 
175 Talks from interviewee No. 1. 
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[communist] party’s rule. There were legal legitimacy and political legitimacy. Regarding 
legal legitimacy, the birth of Chinese Communist Party was different from the situation in 
the west. China had the party first, and then came the state. In the west, they had the state 
first, and then came the party. The legal legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party was 
sure because it had passed, in the procedure, the negotiation of the Council of Political 
Negotiation and the agreement of the Congress of People’s Representatives. This meant it 
had gained the support from the people. Further, the Congress of People’s 
Representatives instituted the constitution that admitted the legal status of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s rule. So legally, there was no problem. Regarding political legitimacy, 
the Chinese Communist Party represented the people and was supported by the people. 
“Now we say ‘Three Represents’”: the party represented an even bigger part of the 
people. The party kept a close relationship with the people and was pragmatic, and this 
further resolved the issue of political legitimacy. [If] a party wanted to rule successfully, 
it needed to win the heart of the people.176 
                The interviewee then gave a short theory of the difference between 
Chinese and western political culture. He said that Chinese civilization was a “big river” 
civilization, and western civilization was an “oceanic” civilization. “Big river” 
 
176 Ibid. 
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civilization meant agricultural society, which depended on water for living. In that case, it 
needed a chief [as the authority] to allocate water areas, and rules [as the authority] would 
not work. The civilization depended on the leader’s will to make the allocation. In the 
“oceanic” civilization, each individual rented a boat to plunder things for allocation; thus 
rules and institutions were crucial. So the difference between China and the west was 
determined by such cultural background. He continued,  
        We have a joke. . . if you enter into China’s inland areas and ask the peasants 
about what they need, the answer will be a good leader. And in the United States 
and the Western Europe, it is institutions that are crucial, [and] it will be fine if a 
leader is a fool. But in China, the leader cannot be a fool.177  
He further continued,  
        No matter how the government will change, it’s impossible to change to be like 
the western style [because] the cultural tradition is functioning, the popular base, 
the people’s cultural psychology.178  
His expectation of the future was that even after 20 years of change, such traditional 
culture would still play a determinative role, and he said that even if Shanghai was 
 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
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characterized by its power to contain different kinds of culture, in essence, it was still 
Chinese traditional culture that would dominate: People would follow individual persons, 
not institutions. People’s knowledge about government was via specific persons 
[officials]. His emphasis implied that Chinese people would not know the government by 
a set of rules or institutions.179 
                Another important point he made was about his self role in driving 
the city’s development and change. He said that he was 52 years old, and his life goals 
were to be diligent and sincere, acting as a bolt in the machine of the party. He said that 
Maslow talked about an individual’s value fulfillment, “people in our generation do not 
have such [desire], as long as our family is in harmony, our income is stable, we will be 
satisfied. We are more realistic.”180 The younger generation thought differently. His child 
said that he would never did a job like his father’s job as a party cadre, which did not 
carry significant social status; he wanted to be a big boss and be able to travel around the 
world. The interviewee said that there was a generation gap involved: the value direction 
was different. For him, the greatest joy was to serve the people, but for his son, if he had 
the same attitude as the interviewee, it would influence his personal development within 
 
179 Ibid. 
180 Here “realistic” means that they are not pursuing idealistic things such as self value fulfillment talked 
about by Maslow. 
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the peer group, and would make him discordant with the current society. Here the 
interviewee expressed an important point. People in his generation held a value of self 
sacrifice for the benefit of the collectivity (the work unit or the nation as a whole). Now 
the social values had changed to more self-centric, focusing more on earning money and 
becoming rich rather than on collective interests. But still, his way of leading the younger 
party members was that they should learn from his occupational attitude (i.e., self 
sacrifice for the collective interests), and in other aspects they could just follow each 
one’s own character as long as they would not violate morality and law. Speaking of 
spirit civilization181 and how to develop a young party member, once again he 
emphasized the difference between the western way and the Chinese way. The western 
way, in his views, was by institutions, laws, credit, and punishment, and the Chinese way 
was by education. “Confucius opposed most punishment without education first,” he said. 
So he emphasized education. To awaken the people’s moral consciousness (common 
ideas or ideals, common morality, and common sprit aspiration) was the content of spirit 
civilization. He saw this as the political mission of the party. 
                On how the party worked (i.e., the political process), he explained 
 
181 Spirit civilization is a term used by the CCP to distinguish non-material values from material 
civilization which means economic development or earning money. The CCP emphasized that both 
material civilization and spirit civilization were important. For example, corruption is a serious problem in 
the category of spirit civilization. 
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that, first the party made the decision, and then mobilized the people. The crucial part 
was the party members; they should play a leading, vanguard role in the mobilization.182 
What if the people did not like the policy made by the party? He said that the policy ideas 
should come from the people, and then shift to public policy or norms to manage public 
affairs. In other words, his words implied that the party should always know what people 
thought and what their concerns were, and the policy should always reflect the interests 
and concerns of the people—this is mass line advocated by Mao Zedong. He continued to 
explain this point of mass line, though he did not mention the term. How would the party 
know what people thought or what their concerns were? The way to attain such purpose 
was through the connection between upper-level and lower-level party members. The 
lower-level party members should express their viewpoints to the highest party leader. 
And the highest leader of the party should spend a long period of time with the people, to 
investigate and research people’s wishes, and this had been institutionalized within the 
party. If people’s wishes were normal and reasonable, those wishes will be 
 
182 This meant that the party members should set an example for the people to follow in any policy. They 
should be the first ones to uphold and carry out the policy which had been made by the party.  If the policy 
required the people to sacrifice their self interests, then the party members, as the vanguard of people, 
should go first to sacrifice their interests for the people to follow. This had become a traditional way of 
doing things for the CCP—using political mobilization to call the people to a mission, whether it was 
economic development, one-child policy, suppression of Falun Gong, or house tearing and resettlement. 
This way of carrying out policies had been created by Mao and had been inherited by the reform 
party-government. That’s why being able to be accepted to become a party member was sometimes seen as 
an honor. The party cadres were to serve the people, not to serve their own interests or any concerns about 
self.     
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institutionalized; if their wishes were not reasonable, the party would persuade them into 
giving up those wishes. Here lay a problem that the interviewee did not raise: Who 
decides which wishes are reasonable and which are unreasonable? Of course it is the 
party that decides! If the party “persuades” you into giving up your concerns and interests, 
you will have no choice but to listen to the party and comply with the policy that has been 
made by the party. So this is the problem of mass line: In the final analysis, it is not mass 
line; rather, it is the party line—the party decides everything, rather than the people. 
                 
                Then he gave an example of house demolition and resettlement of 
people. Why did the party want you to follow and move? It was because, the party would 
tried its best to persuade you, that such movement would raise everybody’s living quality. 
Why should you move? It’s for your own long-term interests, and for your children and 
grandchildren and later generations’ interests which you might not be able to see during 
your life. So the party would reason with you, and then required every household 
involved to sign the contract. Using a “reasonable” way of counting the loss-- counting 
heads or counting bricks, depending on the situation-- the party-government would 
compensate you for the loss in the resettlement with a distribution of space of your new 
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residence. If 60% or 70% of the households expressed their view that the distribution was 
unreasonable, then the institution would be seen as unreasonable and the party and 
government would reconsider the whole thing. If some part of the households expressed 
their views which were unreasonable, then the government would have to do it 
anyway.183 
                Finally, he referred to the principles of the communist party’s 
discipline for all party members. (1) The individual should obey the organization (i.e., the 
party). (2) The lower level cadres should obey the upper level cadres. (3) The whole party 
[members] should obey the central [party], for example, if things involved overall 
considerations. (4) The minority should obey the majority, for example, if things involved 
different views. At last, he said, the party played a determinative role in everything.184 
                Interviewee No. 2 was a government official who was responsible for 
propaganda. He first gave a general talk on the factors that drove the development and 
change of this city. He said that development and modernization was about progress, so 
there were three aspects in modernization. (1) The material aspect: this had to do with 
technological innovation; (2) the sociological aspect: this referred to values and concepts, 
 
183 From talks of interviewee No. 1. 
184 Ibid. Italics for emphasis by me. 
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and it had to do with concept innovation; (3) the human factor: this had to do with talent 
innovation. All three came down to humans and centered on humans. The interviewee 
was very positive, self-confident and optimistic about himself, about Shanghai, and about 
this country. He said that the requirement of the development of human civilizations was 
progress, and the requirement of the society was that it wanted progress. Therefore, no 
one should be anti-human beings or anti-society, and this meant that everybody should 
pursue progress. If human history diverted from progress, it would need to return to the 
normal track. He gave an example on Hitler, saying that Hitler was anti-human 
civilization, so he had to fail and human history needed to turn its track back to 
progress.185 And the appearance of Hitler was because everybody cultivated the situation 
for him to appear; without the policy of Appeasement and other factors, he would not be 
able to appear. In general, a country should not impose its own values upon other 
countries. Development should not be just caring for one’s own area, one’s own nation, or 
one’s own country. There should be harmony, communication and cooperation. The 
subject of this era was peace and progress.186 
 
185 Here I suspected that even if his example was on Hitler, the real example he wanted to mention was 
Mao Zedong. I guessed what he wanted to express was that Mao’s Cultural Revolution was anti-human or 
anti-society, so Mao finally had to fail, and Chinese history had to turn its rail back to the normal track, 
which was reform. But because he was a government official, it was inconvenient for him to raise Mao 
Zedong as a negative example. So he chose Hitler as a substitute. 
186 From talks of interviewee No. 2. Here he meant the US should not impose its democratic values on 
China. There should be harmony, communication, and cooperation between countries that had different 
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                The interviewee then related his above talk to the state role in driving 
the development and change of Shanghai. He said that since the human civilization and 
the society wanted progress, and development and modernization were people’s desire, 
the government should follow such a normal track and pursue progress. The government 
had the most resources in its hands, so it was the most important organization in a society. 
The government’s role was to guide, to coordinate, and to organize the development. If 
the development went too fast, the government should slow it down; if it went too slowly, 
the government should make it faster. He mentioned that the government’s role in 
planning should not be discarded; it should make plans and guide a whole area to 
advance to the positive side. The government should serve the people to meet their 
demands, and it should be responsible not to be anti-society or anti-humans; otherwise it 
would be discarded by the people.187  
                Based upon the above ideas, the interviewee then talked about his self 
role. He put his self role in the bigger picture of the area development. He said that he 
had witnessed the development of this area: this area had played a leading role for [the 
development of] Shanghai, and Shanghai had played a leading role for [the development 
 
values, for example, between China and the US. 
187 Talks from interviewee No. 2 
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of] other places. And in this process, his self value was raised, his material life became 
better, his knowledge became more advanced, and his capability improved. So his 
understanding of self role was placed under the whole framework of collective 
development: when the collective development ran high, his self value ran high; because 
there had been such an aura of progress in the society and in the reform years, he as an 
individual could then gain an opportunity for the advancement of his self value. So he 
was very positive. The future, he said, would be positive and bright.188 That was his 
expectations of the future. 
                Interviewee No. 3 was also a government official whose job was to 
coordinate information and communication between the city and the central party. He 
analyzed three factors that drove or impeded the development and change of Shanghai. 
(1)Normative: the government in Shanghai was very normative, always following the 
rules. In the area of social order, the Shanghai government did a good job. Therefore, it 
was very secure in Shanghai. But because it was too normative, it lacked dash. (2)Crystal 
of wisdom: Shanghai was a city full of domestic immigrants, and just as the interbreeding 
children were smarter by 9 percent than other children, so the level of people’s quality as 
a whole in this city was raised by the intermingling of different elements. (3)The drive of 
 
188 Ibid. 
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innovation: the drive of innovation in the government of this city was very strong. It was 
a pattern of “small government, big society.” The government here was to offer service, 
not to directly participate in the socio-economy. In contrast, in the inland areas, often the 
party secretary was the president of the board in a company, and the socio-economy 
depended on the government to pull it up. Here in Shanghai the government’s role was 
like a judge, not a sportsman. The office that he worked in was to propagandize the image 
of the development of this area. The western society might not understand this area, and 
the office would hold news conferences periodically to help other provinces and the 
western media to understand more about this area. The interviewee said that he enjoyed 
his current job because he could contact different people and at the same time he could 
serve people.189 
                I asked him about his child to get a clue of his expectations of the 
future. About the child, the interviewee said that he would not set a goal for him to attain, 
but rather, he would create an environment for him to pursue his own life. However, he 
would teach his child on three things. First, be loving: think of others and respect others. 
Secondly, cultivate a consciousness of competition. The society would not center on you, 
[so] you must raise your capability to fairly compete with others. Thirdly, behave yourself. 
 
189 Talks from interviewee No. 3. 
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More people placed emphasis on freedom, but he would stress the importance of norms. 
You must inherit the norms of the previous generation, and the Chinese traditional virtues 
like respecting the old people, loving the young, and no picking up of things other people 
lost on the road. The interviewee was confident in himself, in the development of this 
area, and in the development of Shanghai. There was a kind of work zeal and positive 
aura around his working place (i.e., the government team). The drive, he said, came from 
a goal stimulation in the government that by 2010 they would build Shanghai to become 
an outward, modern, and multi-functional city—the prospect was very beautiful and 
everybody had been working toward such a beautiful common goal. The drive also came 
from his personal wish to make great progress and improve his own quality and 
capability.190  
                To sum up, government officials in this sample were all very positive 
and optimistic about themselves and the future of Shanghai. They saw their self value in 
the framework of the collective development of Shanghai. They all emphasized the 
importance of the quality of government officials, including knowledge and capability to 
do things and to communicate with others. They all emphasized the importance of the 
state role in driving the city’s development and change. None of them talked much about 
 
190 Ibid. 
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the negative factors that impeded the development and change of Shanghai. Their 
expectations of the future and the younger generations were positive; they enjoyed their 
jobs very much, and they saw their jobs as serving the people and serving the collective 
interests of Shanghai’s development and positive change. 
(2) The Enterprise People 
                Interviewee No. 4 worked at a foreign company that provided the 
parts of cars to car companies. He was in a position of high-level management . The 
company started its business in China very early (1993-1994), and developed very fast. 
Shanghai was a very easy environment, he said, for investment on the hardware and 
software facilities. Now the company’s major opponents had entered into Shanghai, so 
the situation for the competition was very fierce. The company planned to keep its 
original leading position with its advantage on research and development (R&D). This 
was not about traditional parts whose profit was not high; it was about high technology. 
It’s a German company that defined itself as a high-tech company. The R&D was 
focusing on electronic technology to meet three big trends: safety, environmental 
protection, and fuel saving. It had three strategies in the competition. First, it would focus 
on new fields to provide value for the customers and thus earning profit for itself. 
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Secondly, it would pay much attention to the Asian-Pacific, Chinese market. Thirdly, it 
planned to enter into non-vehicle fields globally like that of the motorcycle, and medical 
field.191 The interviewee said that Chinese market size was big because of its large 
population. Chinese purchasing power grew very fast. As long as in one year there 
emerged several new cities whose GDP per capita was more than 3,000 or 4,000 US 
dollars, there would be a promising market for high growth rate. So it was promising in 
the next three to five years; after five years, it was hard to say. The future was promising, 
but he said usually a company would not see as far as 10 years or 20 years (as stated in 
my interview questionnaire); it usually saw the next five years. For the parts of the cars in 
the European or American market, if there was a 1 % growth, it would be very good 
already. So the company paid great attention to the Asian-pacific, Chinese market.192  
                About the self role, the interviewee showed a high degree of 
self-confidence. He said that in the next five years, the most promising area was in 
Shanghai; his job would be here, and he did not want to leave here. He had got an 
Australian permanent resident qualification which was due in 2003, and he gave it up. He 
had had some advantages in his career: he worked in MNC (multi-national corporation), 
 
191 Talks from interviewee No. 4. 
192 Ibid. 
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he had an EMBA degree, and he had overseas work experience. So he told his boss that 
he did not want to leave here. The place and timing for him was just perfect. Especially 
people at such level [like him], having five to ten years of senior management 
qualification were now the hottest in the employment market. People having 
qualifications like him received telephone calls from talent-hunting companies every few 
days.193                                
                About the government’s role, the interviewee had a high evaluation 
of the Shanghai government, saying that the Shanghai government’s character was 
efficiency and transparency. Their work was pro-business, and “we have a deep feeling 
on this,” “the [Shanghai] government supports us very much.” “It very much meets our 
needs.” Especially to the top 500 companies, the Shanghai government had many 
favoring policies and support, and it was transparent. Because this was a foreign company, 
I raised the question of Chinese nationalism. He said, the company had a policy of 
promotion of indigenous talents, it did many things for China, and its development in 
China and training of indigenous talents had long-term  
benefit for the Chinese national car industry. Therefore, nationalism would not be a 
 
193 Ibid. 
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problem.194  
                Interviewee No. 5 was also working at an American top MNC and 
was also in a high management position. He looked about 40 years old or less. He first 
gave a general talk on the factors that drove the development and change of Shanghai. In 
general, Deng Xiaoping’s Southern-tour talks [in 1992] played a role of liberation from 
the conservative forces within the government: thus the general aura of turning to 
pragmatism. Specifically, (1) Shanghai originally had a strong industrial foundation. (2) 
The Shanghai people had a very deep complex of aristocratic decline. It used to be the 
Far Eastern “little Paris,” and was the earliest area of westernization [in China]. It had a 
strong character of intermingling different elements, and it accepted new things very fast. 
So when China decided the nation wanted reform and openness, it absorbed new things 
very fast—the fastest in the country. (3) Shanghai had gained support from the [central] 
government, especially in the recent 10 years. After 1989, Jiang Zemin was in power and 
had a policy leaning toward Shanghai. It had very high level radiation [effect]: its 
development was able to bring along the adjacent inland regions. Also, its city 
administration, infrastructure, and cadres were all of high quality. (4) Shanghai had a 
plural structure of industries. (5) Shanghai had contained talents from all regions. (6) The 
 
194 Ibid. 
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foreign investment in Shanghai had brought consumption, trained talents, and brought in 
advanced ideas and management models.195 
                The state role was very important as stated above at point (3). About 
the self role, the interviewee thought that an individual’s power [to drive a city or a 
society] was very small. Since he was not able to control the whole society and he could 
only control himself, the only thing he could do was to do his job well. He wanted to act 
as an instrument of communication to share with his friends and acquaintances new ideas, 
new concepts, and new ways of management, because not everybody had had the 
opportunity like him to enter into a big foreign company. In the future he also hoped that 
after he learned [new] knowledge, he would jump into national industries to help the 
development of Chinese national industries. He also worried that once China joined WTO, 
when the tariff went down, many Chinese national industries would fall. But he was 
optimistic about this. The time was short. Within five to ten years, the national industries 
must catch up to avoid being ousted in the competition. I asked him about the role that 
Chinese nationalism played in driving the economy, which was totally different from the 
American capitalists’ individualism. He said that this was also an area where the 
difference between China and the US lay. He said that because the US did not have 
 
195 Talks from interviewee No.5 
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history,196 and did not have a hundred years of national humiliation like China did since 
the Opium War, it would not have strong nationalism to play an important role in driving 
the national development. He said that China’s government officials had very strong 
ambition and aspiration to drive national development. I think he touched an important 
point that China’s development was to a great extent due to its officials’ will to pursue 
national wealth and power. This was the same as my assumption and my previous 
knowledge of Chinese nationalism. Finally he talked about himself. Though he wanted to 
enter into the national industries, the national industries could not afford to pay the salary 
that he was paid in the foreign company.197 
                Interviewee No. 6 was a young lady; she worked at a foreign 
pharmacist company. Her job was about communication and public relations. She first 
gave a general talk on the factors that drove the development and change of Shanghai. (1) 
Shanghai, for a hundred years, was the commercial port. The western culture first came to 
Shanghai, so the Shanghai people had the earliest contact with the western culture and 
industrialization. (2) Many of the old generation who received the western education 
were still alive; they were not unfamiliar with western culture and customs. After 1978, 
 
196 I think what he meant was that the US did not have long history and strong historical pride in many 
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the reform began, and the city people got along with people from outside of the country 
very fast. People from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese had connections of 
friendship, family relationships, investment, and cooperation [with the Shanghai people]. 
Globally, the trade began, and here in Shanghai, the labor was cheap, the level of 
knowledge and culture was high, the transaction was efficient, and business norms, 
courtesy, fax, and e-mail were all present. In the early 1990’s, foreign trade, export of 
processing products, capital from Hong Kong and Taiwan all came to Shanghai, and the 
city people’s self-confidence rose. Capital from America and Europe also came, adopting 
the form of a joint venture. At first the Chinese side opened slowly, occupying 51% of 
capital share. Both sides were testing the way of cooperation. Again, the Shanghai people 
accepted the business culture very fast. And the work manner influenced the manner of 
life. Originally the western way of dealing with jobs and the modern business manner 
was absent in the Chinese pattern. (3) The culture influenced Shanghai’s government 
officials, and the officials thus had richer and broader views, experiences, and 
understanding. They were more capable of dealing with things. (4)Also, the Shanghai 
people were far away from the central government, so they were more practical, not 
counting too much on ideology.198 
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                About the self role, the interviewee mentioned the similarity of 
cultures: the world was becoming an integral whole. Shanghai or other big cities had 
more opportunities to experience the fusion of foreign things with indigenous things. She 
emphasized that it was a fusion, not a total copy. So the government’s talk on nationalism 
and spirit civilization made sense. In her case, the more she contacted foreigners, the 
more she loved her own country. Foreigners did have their advantages, and if there was a 
process of progress [for the Chinese], she was willing to play a role in helping her 
countrymen [to become modern]. This would take a long time of education on modern 
philosophy and modern culture. This would require a fusion of Chinese and western 
knowledge of philosophy and history.199 In other words, the interviewee believed that the 
global culture had become an integral culture, and Chinese philosophy and history would 
be able to make contributions to the fusion of the western culture and the Chinese culture. 
                The interviewee’s expectations of the future were positive. She said 
that the enterprise’ future depended on the government’s policy. If the policy became 
more open, joining WTO, then the next five to ten years would be good; it would still be 
an “economic culture,” which was good for their enterprise. The problem lay in the areas 
of intellectual property right, public hygiene, and the medical system. The policy of 
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public hygiene could not be controlled by the ministry of foreign trade. I asked her about 
the political process. (1) “How would the enterprise influences the government’s policy?” 
The interviewee answered, “It’s hard.” (2) “Is there any lobby group?”  She said only 
the children of high level cadres or the retired old cadres could use personal relationships 
to affect policy-making in some grey areas. (3) “How about the media’s role?” She said 
that it was said that the media would act as the third side and play the role of supervision 
of the government and its policies, but the media were controlled by the government and 
belonged to the government. The media in America could criticize their government 
about the policy toward Iraq; here in China such thing was just impossible. (4) “Is there 
any informal channel to try to influence the government’s policy?” She said that in 
America the government and the academic circle could hold a forum to discuss issues on 
public hygiene; the European government was less active than the American government; 
and here in China their company depended more on themselves and very little on the 
government. I asked, “So the company could only passively wait for the policy and 
comply with it?” She said, “Yes.” Finally I asked her, “If you had a child, how would you 
guide him or her?” She answered, “Education. Not the school education, but he or she 
must understand Chinese philosophy and history, and the world philosophy and history. 
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Some people were sent overseas for study, but it was pathetic that they know very little 
about their own country’s philosophy and history.”200 So her expectations of the future 
were a fusion of Chinese culture and the western, modern culture to become a global 
culture, and she wanted to play the role of bridge through education—this was a 
long-term view and it would be a long-term process. 
                Interviewee No. 7 was a Taiwanese businessman. He was the boss of 
a small company and was less than 40 years old. He first gave a general talk on the 
positive or negative factors that drove or impeded the development and change of 
Shanghai. He first talked about the positive side. (1) Shanghai had strong power of 
consumption. (2) It had strong acceptability of foreign, new things, and it was very fast in 
absorbing new things. (3) It had geographical advantage: it was located in the center of 
coastal provinces, where there were no earthquakes; it was a plane, and it had a big 
deep-water harbor that was easy to enter and exit. Then he talked about the negative side. 
(1) The employees lacked activeness in work. They were self-protective, and did not take 
initiative to serve the customers. (2) It was hard to get money you needed from the bank. 
The institutions were complete, but the way of thinking lagged behind.201  
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                About the government’s role, the interviewee highly praised the 
Shanghai government. The Shanghai government had high efficiency in enforcing the 
laws. Living in Shanghai was very secure. And the government’s administrative 
efficiency was very high. They were really doing their job well. People in Shanghai only 
wanted stability. Living here was very comfortable. So he said that we should give them 
time, and should not demand things too much.  In 200 years,202 they could make 
progress to such an extent; it was great already. Five years later, when the software 
construction and the construction of the humanistic environment were completed, it 
would become better. They were using 15 years to catch up with what should be 
completed within 50 years. He gave the crisis of SARS as an example. Within one week, 
the spreading of SARS was under control; this really showed their administrative 
efficiency.203 
                About the self role, the interviewee was very positive. He emphasized 
initiative, service, and relationship. It was not necessary to be greedy, just step by step, 
[and he would succeed.] Next year (2005) his business would extend from domestic trade 
to foreign trade. He said he had the Taiwanese spirit of business, but did not look down 
 
202 From 1840 (the Opium War) to 2004, it should be 164 years, not 200 years. 
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upon the mainland Chinese people as some Taiwanese did. He would train the mainland 
employees, and once they had learned, everything could just follow the institutions of the 
company, and he would become relaxed and could just travel everywhere. It would take 
three to five years for this process to be done. After three to five years, he would have 
created his world.204 
                Interviewee No. 8 was a Taiwanese businesswoman, who opened a 
teashop and sold tea in Shanghai. She came here because her husband wanted to come 
here to sell tea, and she liked to drink tea, so, she followed her husband; originally she 
was not a businesswoman. She first talked about her self role: how she ran a successful 
business. “Doing business in Shanghai is fine.” “You have to deal with officials of the 
Customs, tax affairs, agency of industry and commerce, public security, fire-fighting, and 
hygiene.” Not only did one need to deal with upper-level officials, but one also needed to 
deal with base level officials like public security people [i.e., the policemen]. There was a 
Taiwanese saying: “The little official was intractable.” As long as one did not violate the 
law or did bad things, it was very free [doing business in Shanghai]. Public security in 
Shanghai was the best in this country. But although the economy ran so high, the level of 
people’s knowledge did not catch up. In restaurants you saw poor dining etiquette; in 
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traditional markets you saw people spit casually; in the bus station, nobody lined up. 
Running business here, first, one needed to avoid other people’s attention; secondly, one 
needed to know where one might encounter what, so that one would not fall 
somewhere.205 
                Taiwanese businessmen who came here had a high rate of failure. 
Only three out of ten could make it even, earning little, or earning a lot. The reasons for 
failure included ex-marital relationships, playing too much, and alcoholic addiction. 
Those who succeeded worked very hard, like 24 hours a day. Then she analyzed the 
reasons for business success. One had to work hard. The interviewee said that she worked 
355 days a year, only taking ten days off during the lunar New Year holidays. She was 
here to make money, not to play. Besides, if one came here to run a high-tech production, 
one should keep some part of the technology and should not share it all. Dealing with 
people was another important point. It took a clear mind to deal with other Taiwanese 
businessmen, the people around you, and the mainland Chinese. You must know how to 
reject something that you did not want, like alcohol; avoid being a “yes-man” in every 
situation. She also said sometimes when she had a good feeling about people, she would 
give a lower price, and thus she won a good reputation in the business circle. People 
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would introduce other customers to her, and that was an important reason for her success 
in business. The interviewee then gave several other examples to show that people’s level 
of knowledge had not caught up. So even if she had been here for five to six years, she 
had not accommodated her life well with the life style here. Because her business was 
successful, she was self-confident and positive about the future. She said she would close 
the business here after five to eight years, and then returned to Taiwan. She did not have 
traditional cultural ideas of leaving her business to her children.206 
                The interviewee said that Taiwanese businessmen came here to 
educate the mainland people. Somebody told her that she was good at teaching the 
employees, because they were very polite in answering the phone. She told her 
employees that telephone etiquette was the first thing to learn, because it was crucial in 
doing business. Young ladies should not sit with their legs wide open. Here lay the 
difference in education between mainland [China] and Taiwan. Taiwan’s education 
included etiquette lessons. The interviewee also made some comments about the 
Shanghai people. People from Shanghai liked to show off. They wore valuable things 
[pearls, rings, necklace, etc.] on their body, but would not let you go to their house lest it 
reveal the fact that they were not that rich. Now the economy had risen, the Shanghai 
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people could buy a house with 400,000 yuan, and spent 800,000 yuan in house decoration 
and adornments. They installed air-conditioners not for use, but more for showing off.207 
                About the government’s role, the interviewee mentioned several 
points. She said foreign capital kept coming in, and even if some Taiwanese enterprises 
did not want to come here, they had to. Beijing and Shanghai were two cities that foreign 
enterprises had to come to. So here lay the government’s role: they made use of foreign 
businessmen to build their own cities and inland areas. Another role that government 
played was macro adjustment and control of the economy. Still another role was 
promoting the rise of the consciousness of environmental protection in government. 
Finally she made some comments on the future of Shanghai and China. Shanghai’s 
modernized appearance was propped up by the government; the city was not mature 
enough. Again, it was because of the people’s level of knowledge or cultural upbringing. 
China might be good in some professional field, like launching the navigation satellite. 
But that was not something to boast of; when people would not spit casually, that was 
really an achievement. So unless China developed the talents of its people and sent a 
good number of students overseas to learn, things would not change. But for a country 
with a population of 1.3 billion, how many new talents and students would China need to 
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improve itself?208 
                Interviewee No. 9 was a partner of a small company which had only 
nine employees. The capital was only 500,000 yuan.209 He and his partner each share h
of the capital (i.e., 250,000 yuan). Their business was about logistics (i.e., material 
circulation) management. Their jobs included warehousing, transporting and distributing 
goods. He came to Shanghai because Shanghai was a big modern city, the relevant 
industries were well developed, and it was the center of the Yangtze River Delta, so there 
would be more business here. He said that he wanted to enter into a foreign company, but 
he was limited by his English proficiency. In 2001, he stayed in a logistics company 
named Menlo for one year. Now (2004) his company had signed a contract with a 
customer company. The contract was for one year, and it had only been nine months so 
far. The contract stipulated that the customer could break off business relations without 
giving notice. Though this was unfair to them, they had to tolerate it, because in the 
future there were still chances that they would have business relations with this company. 
He said that it was hard to open the markets of foreign enterprises or big enterprises, 
which meant it was hard to expand their business. Their company was too small; big 
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customers did not have trust in their services.210 
                About the expectations of the future, the interviewee mentioned three 
points. (1) He hoped that this company could grow to become big so that his marriage, 
housing, and children would be supported. (2) The other partner was now in a foreign 
enterprise which had closed the logistics department. (When the foreign investors merged 
the enterprise, what they saw was sea transport and air transport, not land transport; that’s 
why they closed the logistics department.) So he hoped that his partner would come to 
their own company and he himself could leave, because if he stayed, his salary was 
15,000 yuan,211 which was a high cost for their company. He hoped that he could go out 
and find a job in logistics; then it would be convenient for him to introduce some 
business to their own small company. He said that the reason was that he had an 
academic degree and his partner did not have one, and therefore it would be better if he 
went out. (3) He expected that someday they could open the markets of foreign 
enterprises or big enterprises. He would not give up, and would keep trying.212 
                I asked him a question about “spirit civilization” which was 
propagandized by the communist party. He said that it was just responsibility, faithfulness. 
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The company must be responsible to the customer, and the employee must be responsible 
to the company. I asked him about the spirit strength to sustain his pursuit, and he said 
that it’s quite simple: they just wanted to survive. Seven or eight years ago, those who 
entered into this field were all doing well because the profit rate was 40%. And he just 
entered this field when he came to Shanghai last year (2003); now the profit rate was 
20%. About the state role, he said that it was just about applying for the license and 
paying taxes. That’s it. The government disregarded them. They did not deal with the 
government much, and there was no party organization in their company. “Now the party 
organization was very slack. My girlfriend is a party member. I sometimes see her not 
join the party meetings or activities.” And in Shanghai the government did not impose 
unreasonable fees or payment shares like in other places.213  
                About his self role (or occupational drive/-motivation), he said that 
he felt that this field was proper for him. In general, the goods transport services had very 
low quality. For example, if the customer needed two trucks for their goods, the truck 
company would send two trucks. But after they left the customer, they would put all the 
goods in just one truck to save their cost, and thus the goods would be damaged; or they 
might be dishonest and stored the goods in their warehouse and told the customer that 
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their trucks were broken and needed to be fixed, thus impeding the arrival of goods in 
time. Some of them even scolded the customer; this was a buyer’s market: [when] you 
scolded the customer, of course he would not come to your business. The main concern 
for the interviewee was to survive and develop. The biggest source of pressure was to 
enter the markets of foreign enterprises or big enterprises.214 
                The way to do business was about commission and human 
relationships. The interviewee did not buy trucks. He was a middleman. The truck 
company did not need to find business. He would find it for them. He was able to do so 
because he stayed in Menlo, the logistics company, for one year and was in the position 
of director in some area, and therefore he knew some people. So it was crucial to 
cultivate human relationships. The method he utilized was an old Chinese one: giving the 
potential customers dinner treats. The first treat was just to make friends, and there would 
be little discussion of business; usually the potential customers were introduced by 
someone he knew, so the first treat would include several persons. The second treat was 
only two persons: the potential customer and him. This time both could open their hearts 
and get into direct discussion, including the commission. If you gave me one million 
yuan of business, I would give you 2% of commission. If you requested 10%, that was 
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also fine—then I would need 15% of profit, so in total there had to be 25% of profit. The 
interviewee said that there were many competitors; other people (the competitors) also 
knew how to use human relationships and commission to elicit business, so if it were not 
for the relationships [between me and the potential customers], why was I able to get the 
business?215 
                The interviewee also mentioned the relationships between him and 
the employees. Sometimes he would give some lectures to them, and share business 
experiences. The Shanghai government had regulations about employees’ rights, so he 
would buy medical insurance and financed other welfare needs for them. He said that if 
you treated people sincerely, in most cases people would treated you the same way. This 
was a private enterprise, so the employees worked hard. Finally he mentioned the 
newly-passed law of traffic safety had an influence on them. In the past, if the regulation 
said that a truck could carry five tons of goods, it was fine to carry ten tons, thus earning 
money. Now when the newly-passed law said that a truck was allowed to carry five tons, 
then you could carry only five tons. This had increased the cost.216 
                To sum up, in this sample, the business people all had a positive view 
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of the state role in driving the development and change of Shanghai. The mainland 
Chinese who worked in the MNCs (multi-national corporations) did not see Chinese 
nationalism as a negative factor for the business. They even wanted to act as a bridge to 
help their countrymen learn modern culture: modern ideas, modern concepts, and modern 
business manner. Working in the MNCs had not only given them higher salaries, but had 
also made them pioneers of the global culture. They expected the Chinese national 
industries to catch up with the modern way of management, especially within five to ten 
years when Chinese industries needed to compete with the global MNCs after joining the 
WTO. Taiwanese business people noticed that currently (2004) the mainland Chinese 
were lagging behind on the way of thinking or the way of doing things. One of them 
wanted to allow them more time to make progress and not to demand things too much. 
The other (the businesswoman) saw that it was hard for them to catch up unless there 
were lots of trained talents and overseas students (who had learned from the west) to lead 
this country and educate the people. The last case was a partner of a small company, and 
therefore, the biggest concern for him was to survive, to open the markets of the foreign 
or big enterprises. As a small, private enterprise, they did not deal with the government 
much. All interviewees in the business circle in this sample were self-confident, diligent, 
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and positive about their own future. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE INTERVIEW CASES IN SHANGHAI (2) 
 
                (3) The Media Professionals 
                Interviewee No. 10 and No. 11 were interviewed together, and 
interviewee No. 10 went first. During the interviews, each of them sometimes interrupted 
in the other person’s talks to make some comments on the same issue. They were both 
young, unmarried, and just entering into media business, working for newspapers. 
Interviewee No. 10 was a female. She first gave a general talk on the driving force that 
was carrying Shanghai forward. She said that it was tension: the Opium War as the 
contact point between modernization and pre-modernization. Originally country and 
country, continent and continent were separate and had distance [from each other]. 
Europe and America needed overseas trade market, needed connection, so there was 
tension. Such tension would burst when it reached a certain degree. Thus the geographic 
plates that were originally not relevant to each other had inter-continental contact because 
of economic-political development. China was forced to know the existence of another 
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world. Once it started, it became an irresistible power.217 
                About the self role (or occupational drive/- motivation), she said that 
becoming a news person was quite natural. By chance her university entrance exam 
brought her to the department of news, and her major in the university thus determined 
the job that she was in now. When she finished her master degree, it was time for a job. 
The media was fitting for her. The reason for her choice of Shanghai was a combination 
of Shanghai’s attraction, her ideas for a job, and family factors. She explained such a 
choice. There were two aspects for such a choice. On the bigger aspect, the media’s 
market would become larger in the later time; now in Shanghai, the media was regulated 
very tightly because of politics—it had huge limitations presently. On the individual 
aspect, personal capability and professional capability would have more chance for 
development.218 
                I asked her a question: “Somebody asked that why Guangzhou and 
Beijing were able to have newspapers that could lead the whole country, why was 
Shanghai not able to do so.” She said that from the perspective of [political] forces, 
Guangzhou and Beijing had cracks. There was competition between political forces. In 
 
217 Talks from interviewee No. 10. 
218 Ibid. 
 171
                                                
Beijing, it was the central government competing with the local government (i.e., the city 
government of Beijing); in Guangzhou, it was the provincial party committee competing 
with the city party committee. Another factor was that Guangzhou was at the front of the 
trend of reform and openness, so it was filled with business consciousness. Still another 
factor had to do with the Shanghai people’s character: they were more practical, more 
compliant, not like the Beijing people who liked to talk about politics. Guangzhou had a 
brave, pioneering spirit; Shanghai was milder. That’s why the South Weekend219 pleased 
neither the government nor the market. A year ago, it was the society’s public channel to 
supervise the government, but not anymore. Interviewee No. 11 interrupted here, saying 
that it had to do with the retirement of Premier Zhu Rongji—the South Weekend devoted 
20 pages to express their respect to the Premier. Interviewee No. 10 continued to say that 
it involved intra-party factional struggle.220 
                She said that this newspaper did not sell well in Shanghai; the 
Shanghai people did not have enough humanistic concerns with the disadvantaged. The 
South Weekend had a famous slogan: “Let the powerless become powerful; let the 
pessimistic advance.” Journalists of the South newspaper system were from the Beijing 
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for the disadvantaged in China. It was published in Guangzhou. 
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University, so they were cultivated in a city that was filled with political concerns. The 
Shanghai people were concerned more about earning money and living their lives; the 
Beijing people were concerned more about how to make the nation powerful. The South 
newspapers also did not sell well in Guangzhou.221 
                Interviewee No. 10 then returned to the topic of self role. She said 
that Hangzhou (the city that she lived in during her university and graduate work) was 
too quiet, too boring, and Shanghai was the only city around that had city air. You would 
be free here, and you could be exposed to different information, and meet more 
prominent people, and richer people. But Shanghai was too far away from nature; there 
was no place to play around. It was more tolerant, and had more uncertainty. Hangzhou 
was very certain; you could predict the next 10 years of it. Beijing and Guangzhou was 
too far away, and Hangzhou was too boring, so she chose to go to Shanghai. In general, 
Shanghai was very good, but she had anxieties: her level of personal development in her 
career and English proficiency, her love relationship, and whether she was living a life 
that she wanted. I asked, “What is that (the life that she wanted)?” She said, “a job that I 
love much, a man who loves me, health, money, being able to take good care of my 
family, and more experiences.” I continued to ask, “What are the barriers for you to 
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achieve that goal?” She said, “On career, my characters, my English proficiency, 
competition, and talents—I am not very intelligent. On love relationship, good men are 
rare. The female group now has a lot of changes. A woman has to take care of the family, 
and has to be good in her profession: she has to be both tender and capable. I want to 
meet an interesting and faithful man.”222 
                The interviewee continued to express her anxieties. She worried that 
the social development in Shanghai would be in a mess. Shanghai was westernized but 
not open, pursuing fashion but not tolerant, especially the middle-aged men—they were 
very stingy.  This was a society where those in power did not have enough wisdom. 
What if the buildings collapsed? There were not many trees and grassland, the air was 
becoming worse, and the culture was also in a mess. There were no traditional things, like 
folklore or hand-made products. Traditions were crucial for the cultivation of a person’s 
personality. The government did not know what traditions were, and where the good 
points of traditions lay. The government might understand modernization, but they lacked 
an understanding of traditions.223 
                About the government’s role, the interviewee said that whether the 
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government team could fulfill the job of modernization would depend on a mechanism of 
conscience that could bring about some people to use norms to manage the city. The 
government was the steering person of the boat; it needed a professional, modernized 
team. The individual’s ideals were dependent upon the grand environment, which 
depended on the government. Things as small as jobs, the media’s development, space for 
free market competition, and as big as the living environment, all depended on the 
government.224 
                About the expectations of the future, she said: health, positive 
development, norms, and nature. Shanghai’s development was at the sacrifice of nature; 
in the 1980’s, Shanghai was very beautiful; now all the beauty was gone. She thought that 
excellent planners and designers should be included in the government’s urban planning 
department. And she expected that the city would become more plural, tolerant, and 
warmer in human relationships.225 
                Interviewee No. 11 first made general comments about Shanghai. He 
had complex feelings about Shanghai, and did not very much see himself as a Shanghai 
person. But he said wherever he stayed, he did not develop a special sense of identity. He 
 
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid. 
 175
                                                
stayed in Beijing for half of a year, and saw many strange, crazy guys who were poor but 
culturally active—it was culturally plural and rich. Shanghai, in this respect, was 
culturally monotone. In Beijing, if you wanted to do something in a cultural circle, you 
had to belong to this circle. When there was a circle, there was trouble. In Shanghai, there 
were [cultural] circles, too. But an individual did not have to rely on a certain [cultural] 
circle. You could have your own world. The big difference between Beijing and Shanghai 
was that Beijing was culturally active, and Shanghai was culturally monotone. He studied 
philosophy in Germany for six years, and he felt that in Shanghai people’s way of dealing 
with people and things, their way of life, their speech and behavioral manners were 
similar to those in Europe. When he stayed in Beijing, he had cultural shock: he was not 
very much adaptable to the Beijing way of speaking and communication. His way was 
when he talked with friends, the talks went slowly and were about ideas; he had a habit of 
serious discussion. But most of the Beijing people talked about interesting things and 
nobody was serious; it was hard to direct the talks to such a serious track—conversations 
would not have to do with your profession. In contrast, in Shanghai, the way of life, food, 
drinks, and buildings were similar to coffee shops, internet bars, and street districts in 
Europe. So he had little psychological distance and felt comfortable in Shanghai.226 
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                About the self role, he said that he studied phenomenology, 
Heidegger, etc. Media was not his major, and in his high school days, he thought that he 
would spend his life in the university. Then gradually he learned that profession and life 
aspirations could be separate. Originally he saw them as one thing. His pursuit of 
knowledge started very early. During high school days, he read Russell’s The History of 
Philosophies, studied analytical philosophy and Nietzsche, and later cultural 
anthropology. He summed up his studies in three parts: the theoretical physics, 
philosophy, and literature. So it was a process of self-education. Then he entered into the 
department of German in the university, and then studied overseas in Germany. He said 
that German philosophy was detailed and deep, and Chinese philosophy did not ever 
match its quantity and quality. He got lots of joy from his studies, and he began his study 
of Chinese philosophy in Germany. Later on, he became doubtful about whether he 
should stay in the academy. If he wanted to study Heidegger to the doctoral degree, it 
would take seven to eight more years. Both time and economy did not allow him to do so. 
So he began to think seriously about the path of his life.227 
                At this time, by coincidence, he had a chance to enter into the media. 
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For him, the income in the media was fine, but how would the job in the media related to 
his life aspiration? During this period, he was studying neo-Confucianism in which the 
value of life lay in two things: internally becoming a saint and externally directing 
politics to the goal of the Great Harmony. He thought that working in the media might be 
relatable to the external goal of neo-Confucianism; thus he attained a solution for how to 
relate profession and life aspiration. He said that he was not placing great faith and hope 
in the media’s work. Some people thought that the media could rebuild China, and direct 
Chinese political change; he himself was not that optimistic. Yes, the media had great 
power, but it was not controllable by the individual. The only thing that he could hope 
was that people who worked in media were mostly good people, but even so things 
directed by good people might not necessarily be good. The media had its own regularity, 
and was not controllable by the individual. Then he gave two recent events as examples 
on how the media operated which was clearly against justice. One of them was that the 
general manager of the newspaper The South City was wrongly and unjustly condemned 
to be corruptive; in truth, he insisted on a just and correct report of an event which 
exposed the government’s injustice and wrongdoings. In other words, the general 
manager was put into jail because of his insistence on news conscience. Therefore, the 
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media was in a situation of absurdity. It was not controllable by an individual or a group 
of people who insisted on conscience.228 
                The interviewee continued to say that this did not mean that one was 
unable to do anything, as long as you played your role well and did a good job in your 
position, doing your best and leaving the result to heaven. You should not give up your 
ideals, but you should not have too high expectations and made the mistake of political 
childishness. The difference between life aspiration and profession was that the former 
was where your life enthusiasm lay and the latter was how you got your income and 
leisure. Maybe someday the media’s work could be related to the external goal of the 
Great Harmony. He had just entered into the media, so he still needed to observe and 
learn the complex situations. He had not set a goal, and did not hold high faith, just step 
by step; when there were opportunities, he would not give up, and if there were not, he 
would not be in despair.229  
                About the state’s role, I asked him that how the state role related to 
his profession and life aspiration. He explained that the government was very important. 
In appearance, the media seemed to be affected by the market; in reality, the 
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government’s administrative order could destroy a media outlet. For example, due to 
factional struggle, if the minister of the ministry of propaganda was changed, or if the 
general manager of a media was changed, the whole personnel that followed the previous 
person would change accordingly. Then a media outlet could die or change its nature. The 
reason was that the newspaper was defined [by the communist party] as the voice of the 
government, of the party. Such a position seemed to be neglected in ordinary times, but 
when there was a change of high-level personnel, everything changed.230 
                Since the media was positioned as the voice of the party and the 
government, I asked that what those things were that were not permitted to report. 
Interviewee No. 10 interrupted at this moment; she said that there was a propaganda 
pamphlet that specified the propaganda taboo: religion and ethnic affairs were surely not 
to be touched upon, and recently the forced demolition of the houses by the [housing 
estate] merchants could not be reported; that the launch station of a cell phone would 
influence people’s health could not be reported. Then she gave an extreme example: in 
the News Morning Post, you could not find the word “pig,” because it had to do with the 
Muslim faith. So, the meat of “pig” (i.e., pork), “pig” head would have to disappear, and 
Mr. “Pig” would have to be changed to Mr. “Cow.” She said that smart and politically 
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sensitive leaders were very cautious on these places. Interviewee No. 11 continued to say 
that in China the way of doing things was not straightforward; you needed to beat about 
the bush or circumvent something. This was the most challenging thing to the 
intellectuals. In ancient times [in China] there were also such things as hiding between 
the lines. So he mentioned his life aspiration here, since it had to do with the capability to 
see into the nature or core of things, to penetrate between the lines. He said that young 
people easily made the mistake of political childishness.231 
                About his expectations of the future, he said that he would not expect 
too highly, just hoping that people working with him would be easy to communicate with, 
and the job would be stable. He would stay in the media. Finally I asked him to add 
something more. And he added a point that in Germany, in Europe, or in America, the 
real places that intellectuals were able to exert their influences were, first, in the think 
tank or acting as policy advisors of the political elite, and second, in the media, and the 
media was the most direct public channel that one could make use of. Like Habermas 
said, “public space.” This was more influential than teaching in the university. In the 
current Chinese environment of the media, it was very difficult for the intellectuals to 
make use of the media to exert their influences. He said that he was gambling. The media 
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had a process of development. In the west, the people who occupied the media were those 
who had doctorates or those who were professionals. And in contrast, here in China those 
who worked in the media lacked seriousness, capability, understanding, and high levels 
of knowledge.232 
                He then said that his wish was to retire at the age of 45, and devoted 
himself to writing books. I asked that if he had a model author in mind. He said, first, 
Mou Zongsan (a neo-Confucianist in Hong Kong), and second, writing novels. I asked if 
the novels were to carry “Tao”? He said that they would be about history, like the 
reminiscences of the Roman Emperors. About carrying “Tao,” he mentioned that he 
wanted to re-explore the ethos of the neo-Confucianist intellectuals (about what issues 
they were thinking about, and what state of being they were in) in the late Ming dynasty 
and South Song dynasty, the two turning points of Chinese intellectual history. He finally 
said again that because of the outside (i.e., political) factors, intellectuals’ power could 
not be manifested in the media. Now the voice in the media was monotone. The media 
should be clear that all kinds of voices should be manifested.233 
                Interviewee No. 12 (also in a newspaper) was a typical idealist 
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journalist who had always stuck to news conscience and cared about the disadvantaged 
and the true benefit of the country, and saw the media as a public channel to supervise 
government; that was what interviewee No. 10 (the female one) told me in advance. After 
I explained my interview questions, he first told me that he would remind me [to be 
cautious in writing] if during the talks we touched upon the sensitive things since in my 
questionnaire I had referred to the government’s role. He, as others, first gave a general 
talk on the factors that drove or impeded the development and change of Shanghai. He 
said that in appearance the general answer, for a modern man, seemed to be the power of 
the market, the power of economy. But as far as Shanghai was concerned, if we traced 
back to the 1980’s, the early 1990’s to the middle of 1990’s, in fact, the change still had 
much to do with the state’s ideology, the political change. Shanghai was a core city of the 
planned economy after China’s liberation (i.e., after 1949); it did not enter into 
development in the reform years until the middle of the 1990’s. In the process of 
transition, political factors had to be considered besides the market factor. Chinese 
modernization had been going on for 150 years, but for the recent 50 years, up until now 
(2004), the market and the state were still the two most influential factors that existed. 
This also had its historical reasons. Shanghai, compared with other cities, did not have 
 183
as 
ghai 
e, though 
a 
                                                
much sense of history. It was a city that did not appear until the days of [western] 
colonization. So it was a young city. In the 1920’s and 1930’s, it further formed its own 
Shanghai culture,234 occupying its own [glorious] position in finance and shipping. It w
a young city and had had a prosperous past like that. So in the mindset of the Shan
people, there was a deep-rooted sense of the good old dream of prosperity, and this had 
led, in their mind, to an illusion of what this city should have been like. Therefor
this city was young, the influence of the potential psychology, culture, and the city 
dwellers’ characters could not be underestimated. Shanghai’s history, from the views of 
cross section, also reflected the reversals and zigzags of Chinese history of 
modernization.235 
                About the self role, the interviewee said that he represented a kind of 
people who, in the recent 20 years in China, were born in the rural area, and entered into 
the city through the university entrance exam and settled in the city. He called such a 
group of people “two sections people,” with the upper half of the body stretching in the 
air of the city and the lower half section of the body buried under the [rural] soil. I asked 
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him when were such a group of people born. He said around the end of 1960’s to the end 
of 1970’s; those who were born in the 1980’s had a good environment of urbanization, so 
it was easy to enter the city, and it’s hard for the generation earlier than his to enter into 
the city because of the strict household register system and the tough university entrance 
exam; so his generation lay between those two generations described above. He 
continued his talk on the “two sections people.” Their blood affinity and relative affinity 
were all in the village, but their society, human relationships, and career were all in the 
city. Another name for this group of people was, “the generation that cannot return to 
their home countryside,” which meant that there was no turning back, and there was not a 
piece of grass or tree familiar to them in the city. They were the domestic immigrants, 
and there was a sense of alienation for them in the city. Except using the same writing 
characters [with the city people], there was [sheer] blankness in other areas.236  
                Under such circumstances, these people were strongly goal-oriented, 
working harder, and assuming a color of material utilitarianism; but this was the reality. 
The pressure from material drive was the greatest. This group of people had been under 
heavy material pressure since their early days: from the family life to the school days, to 
the job and to the present time (2004). For the tuition, their families and they themselves 
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had to think of many ways to raise money. And buying a house and living in the city, the 
living cost was very high. The only way to resolve all these issues was to work very hard 
in their career. That’s why they devoted themselves much more than others. So the major 
driving force for their personal development (i.e., the self role) was the huge material 
pressure.237 
                In another aspect, when he opened the door of the media, it really had 
great temptation for him. This was a career that changed fast, had huge space for the 
market, and carried many social ideals. He advanced from knowing nothing about it to 
loving it to being unable to stop. So this was the second driving force for his self 
development (or professional motivation). If there were some barriers that impeded his 
self development or self fulfillment in the career, it would be the fact that the media that 
he was in was still under the control of politics. He said that in current China the media 
was not a profession of high profit; neither was it the best way for climbing up the 
bureaucratic ladder. If your heart was burdened with ideals, conflict and confusion would 
be immense. Another impeding factor for self fulfillment was that Chinese society had 
lost faith and values; now the society centered on money. This was a strong, invisible 
magnetic field that surrounded every individual, making the individual have to consider it 
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when making decisions--these problems might be for the purpose of survival. The 
interviewee then said, under the appearance of prosperity, there hid something which 
caused worries. And this had to come to the government’s role.238 
                About the government, last week he talked with an American. The 
American said that since the building of the PRC, the Chinese had been in constant 
revolutions, had been constantly engaged in reform by [political] movement. The 
interviewee asked the American, “In your views, has China now settled down?” The 
American answered, “No. Now it is still under movement: movement for capitalism.” 
The interviewee (No. 12) said he himself was confused, and he thought that the American 
must also have felt confused. The red China in foreigners’ eyes now was seen as 
capitalistic. The interviewee was himself within it (i.e., within China’s development), and 
was confused about how the government would reconcile the [socialist] institutions built 
by the government with the institutions of market operation and with the cultural values 
and notions, how the government would explain something contradictory or how to 
maintain a positive operation. He said that as far as the Shanghai government was 
concerned, these questions were suspended; they could not be discussed. The method the 
government adopted was like that of Singapore: big government, small society. Some 
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officials believed that as long as the economy went up, and the government and the 
people had money, these questions would all become pseudo-questions. The interviewee 
said that the media and the intellectual circle of course would not be willing to admit that 
these were pseudo-questions. And when the ordinary people saw that such methods 
which the government adopted gave them material benefit, they supported it.239 
                Now the problem most raised was Shanghai’s strong government. 
The power of this government was everywhere: it was in big public policies, it entered 
into the field of market, and it also entered into the field of private thought. He said that 
as far as an ideal society was concerned, this was not a perfect method. Now in media 
and the intellectual circle, many people were making efforts, through laws, to restrict the 
government’s power, and this had formed a covert game relationship between the 
government on the one hand, and the media and intellectuals on the other hand. I asked 
him to explain. He said that publicly the current media outlets were all led by the party, 
but after leaving the government’s conference, privately everybody was talking about 
how to supervise, restrict, criticize, and regulate the operation of the government. But for 
the time being, the hardships of such a process had made most of the people feel tired 
both physically and mentally. “Just see how many events have happened between the 
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media and the government in recent two or three years.” Despite all the above situations, 
he still felt “this is the best age, and this is the worst age.” These were the best words to 
summarize his feelings, he said.240 
               The interviewee still thought that currently China was in a time full of 
potential. At least now the factors such as big war, big natural disaster, and domestic 
chaos did not exist. Although some covert pressures did lurk in the market and in the 
government institutions, at least opportunities were greater than the pressure. The 
question was: “Are we able to arrange a fast operating machine (i.e., the government 
institutions) on a track to make it transform from rule of person to rule of law, from 
closure to openness, and from irrationality to rationality. Are we able to get rid of, since 
the recent time, bleeding and bleeding, suddenly turning left and suddenly turning right, 
opening and then closing, closing and then opening, and walk out of such state of 
constant turn-around and uncertainty, and go to a hopeful direction that we can devote all 
our efforts to; otherwise history may once again turn around.”241 
                The interviewee then stopped for sometime as if the interview had 
ended. Then he said, “I will add something more on Shanghai.” “Do not isolate it as a 
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Shanghai; Shanghai is China’s Shanghai. Behind the surprising prosperity, don’t forget 
that what kind of soil , factors had been left until today, don’t forget that if it were not for 
the opening of the rules, if it were not for the market power of the whole Yangtze River 
Delta, it would have been impossible for Shanghai to have its prosperity today.” He 
continued, “Shanghai is just Shanghai; it cannot represent the whole China. There still 
exists imbalance in the whole China. The economic imbalance and the imbalance 
between people’s ideas are huge. It will be very biased if one takes Shanghai as equal to 
the current China. More radical views will be that, such imbalance will lead to the 
situation that the strong become stronger and the weak become weaker, or the weak and 
the strong confront each other because of the loss of balance.” He said that now the state 
emphasized those underdeveloped areas such as the west and the north-east, but it was 
useless just the government called. Only when the rules of the game, the concepts of 
sustainable development and scientific development now much discussed, were 
institutionally arranged, from ideas to actions, could the problems be resolved. At present, 
there were over-heated investments in Shanghai, which had made Shanghai, in many 
respects, to become a mirage in China’s east coast. “Is this a universal sample to 
represent the whole China? I doubt it.”242 
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                Here the interviewee expressed his worry that I might take Shanghai 
as a universal sample to represent the whole China, when serious imbalance was 
everywhere in China. I did not mean to use Shanghai to represent the whole China, which 
would be a big mistake. My thinking was as follows. Shanghai was at the front of China’s 
modernization. I tried to place it in the long-term trend of China’s modernization since 
the Opium War (1839-1842). The ideas of the elite in Shanghai could not represent the 
disadvantaged (who were just struggling for survival), but they could reveal how the elite 
saw Shanghai’s development and change--its culture, its driving forces, its impeding 
factors, and its positive and negative aspects--in the broader picture of modern Chinese 
history since the Opium War. Their evaluations of the self role and the state role (in 
driving/impeding the city’s development and change) could tell us the relative weight that 
they placed for the state (the influence or control that the state had on personal life and on 
the city’s development) and the self (the degree of self fulfillment). And such information 
may guide us to the understanding of the individual’s self efficacy in the control of his 
own life, and in the contribution that he felt he could make to improve the society that he 
was in. Such self efficacy, in relation to the state role, allows us to evaluate the possibility 
of China’s democratization in the next 20 years (2004—2024). The information that 
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revealed in the Shanghai sample was about the long-term trend of China’s 
democratization, not about the current situation (especially not the prosperous or 
seemingly glorious appearance) in the whole China in the year of 2004. 
                Interviewee No. 13 also worked in a newspaper, and was less than 25 
years old. He first gave an analysis on the positive or negative factors that drove or 
impeded the development and change of Shanghai. “Looking outside from this cafeteria, 
you can feel what factors they are that are driving the development and change of this city. 
It is a force of growth—I travel globally very often—such kind of vigor is rare in any 
other place in the world.” If he would choose among the US, Japan, Russia, Europe, 
Africa, Asia, and Southeast Asia, Shanghai would be the one that was the most powerful 
in its force of growth. Its growth was displayed in the increasing quantity, not in the 
existing quantity. The force of growth became a very big characteristic. There were 
several factors for this. (1) Because there was a gap, there was leaping forward. There 
was a Chinese saying which said, “The knowledge of shamefulness makes one brave.” 
After the reform and openness, people have chances to make comparison. With 
comparison came the knowledge of the gap. With the knowledge of the gap came the 
knowledge of shamefulness. With the knowledge of shamefulness came bravery. Thus 
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came the force of growth. The feeling of shamefulness was: such a great country, with its 
5,000 years of history, now lagged behind other countries to such an extent! The world 
had developed to such an extent! (2) There was self-confidence hard to find in any other 
places; it was a determination and belief that we could make this city become one of the 
top cities in the world. (3)Currently this city had a kind of very huge containing power. It 
reflected in the fact that in many respects it was at the top of the world. It broadly 
adopted the strengths of other nations and places. Combining these three factors, the 
interviewee found that this city displayed an unusual force of life rarely seen in the world. 
It had been 160 years since the Opium War, and this was the first time in this place that 
there existed such force of life like the growing power of the bamboo after the spring rain. 
It could not be suppressed; it could not be resisted!243 
                About the self role, in the final analysis, it had much to do with the 
above three factors. (1) You had opened your mind and views, so you knew the 
international requirements, the international talents, and the international rules of the 
game. You saw the gap, and you would work hard to improve yourself. (2) You had 
self-confidence. During this range of age (from the university days to now, or from age 
18 to 25), you were able to attain the international requirements, the level of the 
 
243 Talks from interviewee No. 13 
 193
                                                
international talents, and the international rules of the game. (3) You were brave to adopt 
all others’ strengths. Therefore, both the individual [development] at the micro level, and 
the city development at the macro level, the interviewee said, were all about these three 
factors.244 
                His self role, the interviewee said, was a media worker. Entering into 
the media was more a coincidence, not a choice. Recently, in just a few years, the growth 
of the media and this newspaper was very huge like a hurricane, and with it he found his 
self role, a career merging with this newspaper, a career relying upon this newspaper to 
carry it forward. The enthusiasm for the career also had much to do with the above three 
factors. (1) Currently in Shanghai the media was in a state of underdevelopment, on the 
attitudes, on the contents, and on gathering and editing news materials. (2) He had self 
confidence in the prospect of market, in the aspect of audience, and in the quantity of 
growth. (3) He would imagine his newspaper as a Chinese New York Times or Shanghai’s 
New York Times, or Chinese USA Today or Shanghai’s USA Today. The column, the 
model of operation, the model of industry operation, and the innovative ideas, all these 
strengths could be contained broadly so that his newspaper could adopt all others’ 
strengths! Therefore, the interviewee continued; the career, the individual (the self), and 
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the city development were compatible with one another to create a powerful, ever-lasting 
driving force for growing upward.245 
                About the barriers that impeded Shanghai’s development and change, 
he said that the individual, the city’s development, the current generation (i.e., his 
generation), and the career all had the same big weakness. The current generation meant 
those who were born in the middle of 1970’s when the Gang of Four was crushed. They 
had had very good fortune [in personal development], but their characteristic was 
impetuosity. This was a big weakness and it was reflected in the city’s development, in 
how the individual deal with things and people: they only permitted or hoped that they 
could constantly make progress with a certain speed, and it’s very hard for them to 
tolerate developmental stagnation or backwardness. I asked that this sounded like a 
driving force, why he saw it as a barrier. He said that the coin had two sides. On the one 
side, it drove development; on the other side, it caused impetuosity. You could see that in 
the city development: the urban planning, the developmental speed, the over-heated 
construction or redundant construction. For the city, it used three to five years to move 
and resettle a huge population that originally took 50 years to complete; it involved 
rearrangement of the city’s construction and industry concentration. The mentality of the 
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city was that this was a good opportunity that was never seen before, so everybody 
wanted to add a piece of timber upon the fire [to make it even more glorious.] Nobody 
ever had time to stop to care about the relationship between human and nature, the 
distribution of the industries, the proper growth on GDP (now growing too fast), and the 
balance between development and stability.246 
                This was also reflected in the individual. When the current young 
men graduated and joined the people, they had super-high expectations about their 
profession. They could not tolerate something like that the previous two years they had a 
fine development and the third year their development became stagnant. Usually it was 
normal that one might have progress and regress. But the city, the work units, and the 
individual could not tolerate regress. I asked that since they could not tolerate regress, 
what would happen when there was stagnation. He said when there was regress, nobody 
was well prepared psychologically. Shanghai could not always have two-digit growth rate 
of GDP; someday some industries would reach their saturation point; it’s impossible for 
Shanghai to grow so fast year after year. It was reflected in career (the newspapers) also. 
Once they had success, the profit requirement every year would be higher. This year you 
completed the quota, next year the quota would be raised. They just could not tolerate 
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slowness, or regular progress. Thus there occurred a kind of overdraft.247 
                It was even more so for the individual. Many young people had grand 
plan for themselves when they graduated. Once they encountered some barrier, they 
would have sense of frustration and could not adjust themselves well. Therefore, on the 
one side this was the driving force of development, on the other side there were more and 
more mental problems because of the huge work pressure. European cities were mature, 
the mentality of the individual, the city, and the enterprises were stable, and relaxing. To 
make it clearer, the generation of these young men’s parents did not possibly have 
planning on their career; they were just chosen [to a career]. In the interviewee’s 
generation, it was the first time the individuals could have choices, and they thought that 
they could have choices on everything—this had become an inborn ideology. They did 
not have such idea of being distributed [on the career]; there existed huge sense of 
activeness, and no sense of passiveness. Once they encountered contrary situation in the 
reality, there would be huge amount of psychological imbalance. Some research found 
universally that 70% to 80% of young people were unsatisfied with their current job, but 
they had no choice but to accept it. There was a gap between the psychological 
expectations and the reality. The career did not match their ideas, and they could not calm 
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down about that. Their concerns about wealth, social status, and power were much 
greater than their concerns about the contents of life, health, and the quality of life. The 
coin had two sides. The cities, individuals, and enterprises that concerned more about the 
contents of life, health, and quality of life could not possibly have great force of life; this 
was the situation of European cities, individuals, and enterprises. Under such 
circumstances in China, the media were impetuous and not calm; they were creating an 
environment for the force of life: wealth, social status, and power. Every year the hottest 
topics for the media were the publication of the Forbes rich people, the silk fabric, the 
products for high-level consumption, and the famous cars, and this further aroused young 
people’s emotions.248 
                About the government’s role, the interviewee said that the 
government more hoped to see that Shanghai would for a long time keep such pulse that 
was never seen in the past 150 years, and for this purpose, they tried all they could to 
maintain such force of growth. This was also right. When a city was just in its 
adolescence, it did need the government to support and protect its vigor to maintain its 
life of growth; this was not the time for coordination. In the future, when the city’s 
development reached the saturation point, maybe the government would adopt an overall 
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perspective and care about the equilibrium such as the distribution of the industries, the 
public facilities, and whether the development should be based on GDP or humanistic 
concerns. Now the government’s role was a protector, an advocate, and a guide of such 
force of growth.249 
                About the expectations of the future, the interviewee first continued 
his comments on the current generation (i.e., the young people). Compared with last 
generation, both the advantage and the disadvantage of the current generation were that 
there were no historical burdens for them. Therefore, young people now inherently lacked 
many concepts, those moral norms or coercive things that imposed upon their parents’ 
generation. They did not have such concepts as sent-down to the mountain or to the 
countryside, work unit distribution of one’s career, and the “big-pot meal.” That’s why 
young people felt confused about the state policy to protect old workers—they took it for 
granted that economy should be distributed according to the labor devoted. They took it 
for granted for lacking all the above concepts. In correspondence with that mentality, 
since they lacked historical burden, they thought that they should have rights for choice, 
and should be able to control their own development. And [as stated above], once they 
encounter specific reality, they would have sense of frustration and resistance—they had 
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much lower capability than last generation who had went through unimaginable 
hardships and was able to shoulder much more pressure.250 
                About the future, the interviewee said that he was concerned about 
how the impetuous generation could have a calm mentality to make a reasonable 
arrangement for the future of the career. He never doubted the city’s future or prospect. 
But when the city no longer had big numbers of growth rate, both the city and the 
individual should be well prepared. For the city, what would it have to maintain the 
power of competition? What was its core competitive power: what would come to 
people’s mind when they spoke of this city?  For New York, it was financial center; for 
London, it was a conservative, serious city; for Tokyo, its price of goods was the highest; 
for Hong Kong, it was the most open society; and for Shanghai, what was it? The 
interviewee said, if it was the great containing power—being able to include and 
intermingle many differences, then Shanghai was successful. He told me that my concern 
[in the interview] was about the driving force (reasons, factors) for Shanghai’s 
development and change, and his concern was about what kind of problems would 
happen in the process of [Shanghai’s] development, that was to say: what were those 
things that the city, the individual, and the enterprises should pay attention to? Of course 
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his expectations for the future was that the city, the individual’s capability, the profession, 
would become better and better day after day, but these needed not to be discussed; these 
[promising prospects] had become common sense. What needed to be discussed was: 
balance among the city, the enterprise, and the individual. Every adolescent city should 
answered the question about the bottleneck [of development], not the speed [of 
development].251 
                I asked him about what the city, the enterprise, and the individual 
should do for the bottleneck. He said that for the individual, the key question was to 
control the rhythm of the individual’s development, and this had to do with the city. For 
the individual’s development, he should clearly recognize his own core competitive 
power, and transform his core competitive power in different time. For example, when 
you were young, you had the impulse, physical strength, and the spirit of disregard of 
everything; you could do your job well as a journalist. But people younger than you had 
the same advantages: impulse, physical strength, and the spirit of disregard of everything, 
and they could achieve what you could achieve with less time than you. Then your 
mentality would be different. You would want to be someone irreplaceable. So you might 
examine yourself, “Why am I a good journalist?” The answer could be: (1) the ability for 
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communication; (2) insights and analysis; (3) writing skill. Then you might extend these 
three qualities to different fields: (1) the ability for communication could make you 
competent on the job of public relationship, so you could be a good PR (i.e., public 
relationship person); (2) the ability of insights and analysis could make you competent as 
an analyzing person or an occupational manager; (3) the ability of writing skill could 
make you competent as a writer or a novelist or as an owner of a studio of writing books. 
Thus, you might transform your core competitive power and not to be replaced by people 
younger than you as journalists. Similarly, the city and the enterprise could transform 
their core competitive power and become irreplaceable.252  
                In the case of the city, Shanghai’s buildings or other advantages were 
not the nature or nucleus of its real core competitive power. It was easy to find a piece of 
land in the big cities of Japan or South Korea to build buildings or produce similar 
advantages that Shanghai currently had, then Shanghai would be easy to be replaced. 
Then, where would Shanghai’s real core competitive power lie? If it was economy, then 
Shanghai would be the eastern New York; if it was cultural buildings, then it would be the 
eastern Paris. Therefore, it could be Shanghai’s indigenous characteristic that it had great 
containing power: being able to include and intermingle many differences and never 
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rejecting any foreign culture. Whenever it needed to absorb others’ strengths, it would do 
so. Such characteristic was reflected everywhere. Its style of building was like the 
European style, its subway system was like that of German, its mechanic-electronic 
integration was like that of Japan, and its urban planning and design was like that of 
Britain and America. So Shanghai was never stingy in contact and communication with 
other cultures, and thus producing its own qualities. Shanghai’s culture, containing power, 
and qualities could be further traced back to 1930’s when it was the biggest city of the 
Far East, at that time Tokyo was just very small, Hong Kong was just a small fish 
beachland, and Seoul was just a colony. So what made Shanghai ever-lasting was not its 
tall buildings, coastline or productions, but its city’s core culture: what made Shanghai 
Shanghai was its Shanghai culture, its containing power; it was world-class, 
international-class metropolis, and the way of construction and development was to make 
it a global, world-class great city.253 
                To sum up, the media professionals in this sample felt strongly about 
the characteristics of the strong government in Shanghai; it was “big government, small 
society.” The power of the government was everywhere, from the big public policy to the 
market, and even to people’s private thinking. There were many things that were seen as 
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taboo that were not allowed to be reported, so the media professionals saw the state as a 
force of restriction or an impeding factor for the true benefit of both the city’s 
development and the development of the nation as a whole. An individual who had ideals 
in his heart had to go through hardships in their attempt to restrain the power of the 
government. This was because the media belonged to the government and was defined as 
the voice of the government’s policies and positions. An individual either reminded 
himself not to expect highly about the media’s function to bring progress to China, or had 
to be cautious not to offend the government. Too many unjust events had happened to the 
media professionals who held the news conscience. But even so, for someone who had 
ideals in his heart still saw this age as having hopes and positive prospects that still 
surpassed the negative possibilities. “This is the best age, and this is the worst age.” If the 
media could enjoy freedom of speech, then it was the best place for an intellectual to 
exert his influence and ideals. Although now the media still have many restrictions, the 
media professionals did not give up their hopes and ideals. The last interviewee talked a 
lot on the weaknesses of his generation, paying much attention to the problems that 
emerged in the process of Shanghai’s development. His hope was that young people of 
his generation could calm down and pay more attention to a reasonable plan for the future 
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when the growth rate slowed down and when the problems of imbalance in many areas 
needed to be resolved. Finally he gave examples to show that how an individual, the 
Shanghai city, and the enterprise could redefine its own core competitive power so that 
they would not be replaced in the competition. In general, the media professionals saw 
the government’s role as negative, and were making efforts to change the situation, 
though there were lots of difficulties.              
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE INTERVIEW CASES IN SHANGHAI (3) 
 
                        (4) The Intellectuals 
                Chinese intellectuals are a special group of people. They will never 
isolate a city as a city, and will always see a city from the point of view of national 
development. In other words, their concerns are about this country, about what the correct 
way is to make this country wealthy and powerful, and to improve the people’s life. In 
their eyes, city development is only an example, a case, of national development. Such a 
mentality is the tradition of Chinese intellectuals: they are always concerned about the 
true benefit of this country and its people. 
                Interviewee No. 14 was a professor of a university. He first gave a 
general talk on the positive or negative factors that drove or impeded Shanghai’s 
development. He said that 50 years ago, Shanghai was the cultural center and economic 
center of the whole country. And before 1949, it was also a “shadow” political center of 
the country: although the [central] government was in Nanjing, the prominent political 
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figures had residence in Shanghai; decision-making [of important policies] was done in 
Shanghai in the weekend, and Nanjing was only for practice. After 1949, Shanghai lost 
its status of cultural center of the nation; now only Beijing was the cultural center. 
Originally both Beijing and Shanghai were the cultural center. But Shanghai always kept 
its status of economic center. It was the area that produced the most profits, so it was the 
[important] fiscal point for the state. Before the Cultural Revolution, Shanghai was able 
to pay 600 billion yuan. Even such a big figure like Mao Zedong who dominated the 
overall situation could not let Shanghai be in chaos. So since the liberation (i.e., 1949), 
Shanghai was the area that had the most planned economy, having the most socialism. 
For the Cultural Revolution, you must have food, money, and fiscal income, so that the 
revolution could be carried out. Many people did not understand this point that Shanghai 
had the most planned economy, the most socialism.254 
                After the reform, the situation changed, but changed very little. It was 
in 1993 that Shanghai started to change a lot. There was the distribution of resources 
between the central government and the local areas, and Shanghai thus had more 
resources to develop itself. It became the area that developed the fastest. Deng Xiaoping 
said it was a big mistake that he did not let Shanghai become an economic special zone to 
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develop. This was just the political language. In fact, in the beginning, Deng dared not 
take a risk on Shanghai lest it become chaotic and the state would lose huge fiscal income. 
Now Shanghai enjoyed very great extent of openness; [whether] it was an economic 
special zone was just not important. So the driving force of Shanghai’s development and 
change was what Deng said, “Development is of paramount importance.” That’s the 
driving force.255 
                China had not developed for too long. From the highest leader to the 
ordinary people all knew the importance of development. If we did not develop and 
stayed backward, we would be beaten [again.] The modern history of China was a history 
of being beaten for more than a hundred years. That’s why the policy of reform and 
openness gained so much support from the people. Some people said Mao’s age was 
better, but such voice was weak; everybody wanted development. That’s one side. The 
other side was corruption, moral decline, and the society became not secure. But 
everybody thought that it was wrong to quit development just because there were these 
problems. The driving force was that everybody wanted development. In the past, the 
biggest challenge for the communist party was how to resolve the problem of food for so 
many people. Mao Zedong’s old way did not work. Now the new way (i.e., the policy of 
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reform and openness) had resolved this problem in just a few years. Why was it that in 
the past it was a big problem and now it was no longer a problem? Because in the past the 
way was wrong: in those days everything needed a ration ticket, and now that was gone. 
The trend of Shanghai’s development was still going on, and Shanghai would continue to 
develop. 20 years ago, Taipei’s development was much better than Shanghai; now Taipei 
lagged far behind Shanghai.256 
                About the self role, the interviewee said that he was more special; he 
saw scholarship as life, and were not concerned too much about its utility. He worked on 
history: rebuilding the original historical facts, and not caring whether or not it would 
have some utility for real life. Scholarship had its own inner logic, so he pursued 
scholarship for its own sake, just like pursuing art for the sake of art; he pursued purely 
academic knowledge. I asked that if he felt satisfactory about his goal. He said that he 
was satisfactory. He used to be an engineer, majoring in science and engineering. Later he 
transferred to liberal arts and found that it suited his interest. The university did not 
interfere in their research objects and methods. He had stayed in the university for more 
than 20 years. He said that surely they wasted 10 years of time in the Cultural Revolution, 
but it also depended on one’s determination. If one was determined to pursue knowledge, 
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one could always find books to read; otherwise his major was science and engineering, 
how could he turned to liberal arts? It’s all about self-education. He said that his 
academic focus was on Chinese historical geography, more specifically, political 
geography and cultural geography; it was about the administrative planning. It was when 
he was a graduate student that he found that he could do this. In his generation, those who 
were good in science were all good in liberal arts, but those who were not good in liberal 
arts were also not good in mathematics, physics, and chemistry. So it was easier to 
transfer from science and engineering to liberal arts, but it was difficult to transfer from 
liberal arts to science and engineering.257 
                About the government’s role, I asked him if there were some areas or 
views that were sensitive and could not be discussed. He said that it was much better now. 
He could publicly express his ideas of administrative planning that advocated dividing 
China into 50 provinces. Especially his university had free academic aura: giving lectures 
in class was free, and students were free too; the school did not interfere. Then I asked 
him about his expectations for the students. He said that academically they should play a 
role of a milestone. Dissertation should be something that others could not circumvent; 
people had to refer to it; at most people could supplement it on the basis it had built. 
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Scholarship should not follow what others had achieved; your ideas should be innovative. 
About his child, he said that he did not have any specific expectation for his child. He 
wanted his child to be independent and autonomous—it’s more like the western way of 
education.258 
                His expectations for Shanghai were the balance of the hardware and 
the software. Here the software meant human’s quality. In the daytime or at night, 
Shanghai had little difference from Tokyo; it attained the standard of an international 
metropolis. But people’s quality lagged behind. People would not line up when waiting 
for the bus. Some young men had cars, and when they found somewhere in the car was 
dirty, they mobbed it clean and then just threw the mobbing paper away through the car 
window. Such behavior made him feel bad. He said [if] the educated persons behaved 
like that, needless to say, the uneducated persons would be worse. He said that to improve 
the people’s quality needed one or two generations of incessant efforts. I asked him about 
the academic circle of history. He said that in the recent 10 or 20 years, the circle of 
history was basically healthy. Now China had become wealthy and powerful, so there 
were chances for scholars to do some research that looked irrelevant to the national 
economy and people’s welfare. But still, there were some people repeated the topics that 
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others had done, doing some mainstream scholarship that could bring them fame.259 
                Interviewee No. 15 and No. 16 joined the interviews together. No. 15 
was a professor, and No. 16 was a graduate student who was going to advance to the 
Ph.D. in about 3 months. They interrupted the other person’s talks several times. 
Interviewee No. 15 first gave a general talk on the positive or negative factors that drove 
or impeded Shanghai’s development and change. He said that Chinese modernization was 
a stimulation-response model. It was pushed by external factor; it was not originating in 
the internal factor. That was to say: it would not go on the path since the Opium War if it 
just followed its internal development. The external factor was the western powers’ 
invasion of China. Then the intellectuals gradually waked up to the crises, and the 
intellectuals’ efforts further awakened the industrial-commercial circle. In this process, 
the government played the roles of an organizer, an obstructionist, a protector, and a 
destroyer.260 
                The interviewee (No. 15, the professor) said that Chinese 
modernization went a long curve on its road. From the Opium War to the 1911 revolution, 
it was the correct road. Then learning from the Soviet Union, China diverted itself from 
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the mainstream of world development, and went to the least promising road in the Cold 
War—the Soviet Union’s road was a road leading to the dead-end. Then he said Deng 
Xiaoping’s role in history was to move the country back to the track of modernization, so 
he thought Deng Xiaoping, despite his unforgivable errors on the June Fourth incident [in 
1989], was still greater than Mao Zedong. Almost at the same time, the KMT in Taiwan 
walked on the mainstream road (i.e., democratization).261 
                The interviewee said that Shanghai was the most typical case in view 
of more than 400 years of colonization history in the world. France, Portugal, and Spain 
did not leave healthy heritage for the colonized country. But England left the institution 
of civil service and legal institutions; when the [British] suzerain was gone, the local 
land’s transition of modernization all went more smoothly. So Shanghai’s strengths today 
were mostly because England had left its legacy during its half-colonization age. The 
quality of Shanghai’s people and cadres, the legal institutions, and the civil service, 
legal-rational bureaucratic system, in spite of going through distortion in Mao Zedong’s 
age, still played its role [on Shanghai’s modernization]. Shanghai’s transition to 
modernization, compared with other cities, [was still the best]. In addition to the policy 
favor [from the central government], the Shanghai cadres’ and people’s innate rationality, 
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the aura of city life, British rational attitude, not tending to violent resolution, not 
win-lose game, compromise, and win-win approach all came from the England’s legacy. 
The interviewee (No. 15) said that he did not completely oppose colonial history. 
Colonization surely had its negative side, and this had been much discussed in the 
mainland’s textbooks, but it had left [positive legacy] to the underdeveloped areas. He 
said that in China the term “colonial” had carried negative connotation, but originally 
“colonial” was a neutral term; it should be neutralized.262 
                Then the interviewee (No. 15, the professor) mentioned Beijing. He 
did not like Beijing; Beijing was always bureaucrat-dominating, and the citizens, and the 
society, contained very little proportion of modernization. Beijing’s bureaucrats had very 
strong tendency towards ideology, and its citizens had narrow-minded nationalism; 
Shanghai also had this aspect, but this city had different historical heritage. What else 
could Beijing have except bureaucrats? When Beijing’s intellectuals came to Shanghai, 
they felt that Shanghai was still the best in dealing with western affairs.263 
                Then interviewee No. 16 (the student) spoke. He was born in a 
village in 1978 (the year the reform began), and felt very deeply about the huge change 
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that the reform brought to people. The reform had very great influence on ordinary 
people’s life in both the material aspect and the aspect of spirit and notions. There were 
many factors involved: the government permitted people to do things that were originally 
inhibited; the people spontaneously sought survival and wealth. [The most important 
factor was] the power of market. Many things formerly unimaginable now became 
organized. Then he gave three examples. (1) In Shandong province, the products like 
oranges now were transported by the big truck. Formerly the peasants never thought of 
such ways; now things became organized. (2) In the place he came from, there was no 
need for the government to promote one-child policy, because the economic pressure had 
caused people to automatically bear one child and then stop. It’s difficult already for a 
family to support one child on education. (3) His father told him that he would work 
harder on the agricultural work so that he and his wife could buy insurance. In the past, 
people’s notion was raising a son to take care of them when they became old; now they 
had the notion of insurance! So all these examples demonstrated the power of the market: 
its influence on people’s life in the rural area.264 
                Then he turned his talk to Shanghai. The life of the citizens in 
Shanghai was different from the life in the inland area (that he came from), and this was 
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because of modernization. What he felt deeply was legal-rational bureaucratic system: 
systematic way of doing things, and following the regulations when doing things. In the 
inland area, it was still the old manner: human warmth and human relationship. But, the 
interviewee (No. 16) said, in the process of [Shanghai’s] modernization, the officials who 
carried ideology and who were conservative were not different from the cadres in their 
place. Here in Shanghai, the party discipline and the party mission were stricter and 
tighter than those in their place. He said that doing things by following the regulations 
agreed with modernization, but this system of the party’s work conflicted with 
modernization265—this was an interesting contradiction that he pointed out. 
                Interviewee No. 15 (the professor) spoke at this moment to further 
explain such a contradiction. He said the historical tradition of Shanghai was better than 
other cities. Dealing with the western affairs was smoother in this city. On the other hand, 
for 50 years, Shanghai had been following the extreme leftist line. After 1949, whenever 
there was leftist political movement, Shanghai was the starting place. So Shanghai was a 
very strange place: on the one hand, it was the most modernized place; on the other hand, 
for 50 years, the communist party had made the most efforts in this city, so there was 
leftist legacy. Why? Because Mao Zedong thought that Shanghai was the headquarters of 
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the capitalists, the cadres Mao sent here was ideologically leftist. Therefore, Shanghai’s 
cadres all had two colors: they were both westernized cadres and leftist party cadres—the 
former agreed with modernization, and the latter was against modernization and was 
irrational. For generations, the Shanghai cadres all carried two colors. I asked, “Don’t 
they conflict with each other?” The interviewee said, “merging, and harmonious.” He 
also said, from developmental point of view, the party part, which came from the party’s 
ideological control of the cadres, was weakening, and the westernized part was 
strengthening. He further said, such contradiction had to do with Deng Xiaoping’s 
thinking on reform: economically, open, open, and more open—economically turning 
right; politically, tight, tight, and tighter—politically turning left. These two opposite 
factors, for more than 30 years, were always in internal tension. The coastal cities all had 
such phenomenon, like Shenzhen, and Guangzhou.266 
                The interviewee (the professor) continued to say that somebody even 
thought that the leftist ideology was used to protect the economic rightness. In other 
words, the leftist ideology was just for putting on a face for Beijing to see, and in essence 
there was less and less identity with it. Some seemingly leftist cadres spoke very different 
words in other occasions. So the ideology was weaker and weaker day by day. The 
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interviewee then said to me, “Give mainland more time! Give mainland more time!”267 
By this he meant that the mainland would become democratic with time, but if Taiwan 
went the independence route, the war would be unavoidable and it would destroy all the 
progressive elements that were currently happening in the mainland China; all mainland 
needed was time—it would become a democracy like the mainstream road of world 
development, like what happened in Taiwan in the 1980s. 
                About the self role, the interviewee (No. 15, the professor) said that 
an intellectual like him, the role of life was made by the experiences of the previous 30 
years, and the most important among them was the Cultural Revolution, which had 
molded his characters: on the positive side, he had a sense of responsibility towards the 
nation, the world, and the fate of human beings; on the negative side, it was easy for him 
to be politicized. For the reform and openness, his most urgent wish was that Chinese 
nation could successfully pass the challenges of modernization. This included two things: 
economically, the privatization of property rights, and politically, constitutionalization 
and democratization. I asked, “The reform is now called the initial stage of socialism; if 
the property rights become privatized, could it still be called as socialism?” He said, “So 
this [theory] does not make sense; every step was against [socialism].” That’s why Deng 
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Xiaoping advocated “No debate.”268 
                The interviewee (No. 15) continued to say that since the Cultural 
Revolution, he began to be concerned about the country, so he majored in the history of 
the western political thoughts to seek for the prospects of China’s democratization. Then 
interviewee No. 16 (the student) spoke about his self role. He said he was still young and 
had not joined the society yet; the big issue [like democratization] also concerned him, 
but the urgent self pursuit was the personal economic problem, which was big pressure 
on his shoulder. He was concerned more about completing the Ph. D. degree and found a 
teaching job in the university so that he could be filial toward his parents. In order for 
him to be able to complete his academic pursuit, his sister stopped to go to school in the 
third year of junior high school. So the whole family had made great sacrifice for him. He 
said that as a student of liberal arts, surely he was concerned about public issues, but 
personal issue concerned him more. He wanted to repay the love that his families had for 
him.269 
                Interviewee No. 15 spoke. He said that his career was a teacher, not a 
statesman. He used his profession to serve the process of [Chinese] democratization. 
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There were two ways to achieve this. First, leading students; secondly, writing articles 
and books. In the process, he went through several times of ups and downs. When he 
contacted the side of modernization, he became confident; when he was suppressed by 
the ideology, he had to go through troubles. About the relationship between his self 
pursuit and the government’s role, he said that he insisted on independence: not 
confrontation, not cooperation [with the government]. This would surely bring troubles to 
him, and he could undertake all these troubles. The government sometimes suppressed 
him, and sometimes also wanted to hear his views through some channels. He said there 
were two sides of the reform: politically, the reform of political institutions lagged behind; 
economically, the reform brought about some social progress and some social space, and 
this was mostly due to the economic reform. I asked, “So you are satisfied with your life 
pursuit?” He said, “Yes and No.” “Yes, if I had a second time of life, I would still make 
the same choice. Of course there were times that I made mistakes when I was young. [But] 
the profession [will stay the same].” “No, because the age that we live in is an ambiguous 
age. There is no freedom of speech; we should have been able to talk freely. I always 
have a feeling of dancing with shackles on.” I asked, “Then, should you push the edge?” 
He said, “Yes, I have been pushing the edge.”270 
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                About the expectations of the future, the interviewee (No. 15) said 
that China would have two kinds of prospects. The first one was more optimistic. If the 
situation outside [it meant Taiwan’s independence] did not worsen, the irrational [events] 
inside did not happen, the economic reform would clear up the dated institutions. The 
second one was more pessimistic. It was hard to guarantee that there would not be 
irrational conflict. It would happen in the social-political field: there was contradiction 
between the government and the intellectuals for modern constitutionalism and modern 
democracy; there was only economic reform and no political reform; there was the 
polarized socioeconomic division. The disadvantaged group might grab Mao Zedong as 
their symbol to conflict with the direction of economic reform. There could be small scale 
of conflicts or great scale of confrontations. This was a hidden danger.271 
                Interviewee No. 16 (the student) spoke. He said, the trend would 
become well. The inland area did not have open knowledge. The rural economy was 
backward, and some peasants felt that Mao Zedong’s age was better: there would not be 
such socioeconomic division in Mao Zedong’s years. In his views, the market institution 
was in general successful. The lack of reform in political institutions was something to be 
worried about. But the great direction should be carefully optimistic; it should be going 
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upward.272 Then interviewee No. 15 (the professor) spoke. Once again he said, “Give 
mainland more time.” Now the ideology is weakening. If mainland could have some 
more time, [it would democratize.] He said, all his life witnessed that China moved 
backward for 70 or 80 years, and then backed to the original starting point, and then 
restart again. Then he said, another hidden danger was Taiwan’s independence. If there 
was war, not only Taiwan’s 23 million people, but also mainland’s South-eastern coastal 
area, the most advanced areas in mainland, would once again be damaged. Then the 
mainland would once again regress for many years. So the next 20 years could destroy 
the process of Chinese modernization. In his mind, in 20 years, the inhibition on speech 
and the control of newspapers would open; if not, there would be chaos. One-party rule 
would be more difficult to change; this was purely Leninist party, not like the KMT 
which was partially Leninist party, so it was more conservative. There should be a 
sequence: first, the opening of the inhibition on speech, then the opening of the control of 
newspapers, and finally, the opening of the party system. If all three were open at the 
same time, the society might not be able to bear it.273 Interview No. 16 (the student) said 
that at most we could only deal with two things at the same time, and we should do that. 
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As to specifically how to operate such things, now mainland and overseas Chinese did 
not have enough thinking on this: how to conduct the first step; how to operate.274 
                Interviewee No. 17 was a professor in a university. He first gave a 
general talk on the factors that drove the development and change of Shanghai. He said 
that it had to do with Shanghai’s history and its current state. Compared with other big 
cities, Shanghai was more orderly, and this was an obvious characteristic. It was closer to 
the western type of society. There were two factors for this. The first one is about the 
history. Shanghai was opened since the middle of the nineteenth century, so the western 
cultural, economic, and political influence spread into this city very early, and thus 
Shanghai was able to get into a fusion of cultures. It was at the front of the trend [of 
modernization.] Also, Shanghai had a tradition of Concession (i.e., the leased territory). 
The Concession area was totally different from non-Concession area. The western way of 
city management, the operational aspect and experiences [were influential.] In addition, 
not only the outer appearance such as the western buildings, but also the cultural aura had 
its influence. The style of Shanghai’s dialect carried English homophony, and the western 
culture had influence on the citizens. So these experiences had made very good historical 
preparations for Shanghai. Although decades had passed, such influence did not disappear. 
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The above factor was on the relationship with the west.275 
                Another factor was that Shanghai had been a city of immigrants. The 
immigrants came from all areas in China. There were overseas students, and university 
graduates from outside areas. In Shanghai’s company, there was a high proportion of 
people from other parts of the country. So there were activeness, educational background, 
creativity, and individual’s goal pursuit. Under such cultural background, Shanghai’s 
officials had broader views, acute thinking, and sensitivity to new things. Their 
decision-making reflected the characters of the new age, and thus was different from the 
fixed pattern of the inland areas.276 
                About the self role, the interviewee said that his job was academic 
work and teaching; he identified with such a role. His interest and characters made it 
fitting for him to play such a role. In the academic research, he had a feeling of 
achievement; this area enabled him to exert his strengths. He said that not only in natural 
science, but also in liberal arts, there was no ideological interference, and he himself 
would not let his research be interfered by the ideology. Since the latter part of the 1990’s, 
the ideological interference became less active; even criticizing Marx was no problem. 
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[It’s important] to have freedom in research so that the academic work could be deepened. 
So he could say what he wanted to say, and could have critical response and critical 
transcendence to the western questions. His professional field was philosophy, including 
Chinese philosophy and the western philosophy. He thought that philosophy was about 
the pursuit of wisdom, so there should be no boundary to distinguish between Chinese 
philosophy and the western philosophy. His goal was not just on history of philosophy; 
he wanted to be a philosopher. He said that in every age there should be constructed 
views on the old questions. So he wanted to, as stated above, have critical response and 
critical transcendence to the western questions.277 
                Another positive factor for his life pursuit was about income, 
especially after the latter part of the 1990’s. He said that without economic freedom, there 
could not be freedom of thought. His income was so good that buying a car or a house 
was easy for him. There were negative factors for his life pursuit, too. There were 
different kinds of administrative work and many conferences that would occupy his time 
and energy. He disregarded 80% of them, but still, some of them could not be rejected, 
for the sake of human relationships; he had to accept some work that he was unwilling to 
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do.278 
                About the government’s role, he mentioned two points. First, there 
was too much management. This was not about ideology, but the government offered 
research fund, putting it in a plan, so it was still a planned management. It could be 
hundreds of thousands or millions yuan in a plan, and the plan needed to organize 
scholars to be engaged in collective research. Although as an individual, he could 
disregarded it altogether, sometimes it was the school that mobilized scholars to compete 
for it, and as a member of the school, it’s not good that you did not cooperate. Secondly, 
there was insufficient communication between the people and the government. When one 
saw the problems of the city’s real life, like the city traffic problem and the pollution 
problem, one did not know how to communicate with the decision-makers. There was no 
channel, no way to do that.279 
                About the expectations for the students, he thought that philosophical 
training was a resource to the students’ job in the future. About his influence on the 
society, he said that publishing articles was the major way; he was also concerned about 
real problems, not just on studies.280 But most of his time was on his professional 
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academic field. About the expectations of the future, he focused on the issue of 
democracy. He said that no doubt there should be development on democratization. But 
he doubted that whether Taiwan’s democracy was fitting for the mainland. He said that 
Chinese modern history had lots of lessons. Now in Chinese village elections, there were 
underworld factor and money politics. If China totally let go of the control, what result 
would it be? Nobody had the answer. In addition, confrontation like Bush versus Gore [in 
America], or Chen Shuibian versus Lian Zhan [in Taiwan] was not good; in China, during 
the Cultural Revolution, there were factional confrontations which evolved into wars. 
Nobody had the answer [whether or not this would be the result of China’s democracy.] 
This was a question of [different] historical environment. In the America, however 
disorderly it might seem to be, it could always be in orderly state; in China, when the 
Qing dynasty collapsed, and Yuan Shikai died, the result was warlords fighting one 
another, and finally it needed a man like Mao Zedong to take care of the situation. So 
China at that time had paid a great cost [for its pursuit of democracy and lack of a strong, 
powerful central government to maintain the order]. So could China let go of the control 
completely? He doubted it. This could become a disaster for the international society 
because China was not North Korea, it had a population of 1.3 billion. Once it plunged 
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into chaos, nobody [in the international society] could bear it. If China tried it, and once 
again it became a situation of the warlords fighting one another, [what would this be like?] 
281 
                He raised Iraq as an example: everyday there were explosions. Once 
China let go of the control, the situation would be hundreds of times of that in Iraq. Some 
said that it had been 21st century already. [But in] the 21st century, brutal and barbarous 
behavior was still happening. So he said China should adopt the approach of gradual 
improvement. Then he criticized the [overseas] democratic movement people. He said 
that they were pursuing their interests [, not for the benefit of China.] They were mean; 
they were nothing. The American government valued them, but they lacked 
understanding of Chinese reality. These people were engaged in power struggle, 
competing for who the true representative of the [democratic] movement was. They 
pursued their individual interests, and disregarded of the national interests. They 
demanded that the America should apply economic sanctions against China. Economic 
sanctions meant that millions of people would face unemployment! They supported 
Tibetan independence and Taiwan’s independence. If these people were in power [in 
China], China’s prospects would be really poor. He said, “We can’t let history repeat 
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itself.” He argued that before the 1911 revolution, if the Qing government adopted [Kang 
Youwei’s] reform line, it would be more fitting for the current situation, and the cost 
would be lower.282 
                Then he said Eastern Europe and Russia had their long cultural 
traditions; they were not like China after 1911 revolution and the whole country plunged 
into warlord conflicts. The Cultural Revolution was also grand democracy; you let go of 
the control completely, and then you had chaos! Just a little interest competition, and the 
power struggle would be intense. Then he gave two examples. In Taiwan, the green camp 
versus the blue camp, and overseas, the power struggle within the democratic movement, 
all these were under the flag of democracy and happened in the background of China. By 
this the interviewee was arguing that China’s cultural background was very different, so it 
could not have democracy as Eastern Europe and Russia, and his examples of both 
Taiwan’s democracy and the overseas Chinese democratic movement conveyed the 
message that democracy in China would become intense factional struggle for power, or 
even brought about the situation of warlords fighting one another, so it was not fitting for 
China’s current situation.283 
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                The interviewee continued his argument, saying that the current level 
of democracy in China was absolutely and clearly not enough; it lacked channel of 
communication [between the people and the government.] But an immediate letting go of 
control like Europe and America or Taiwan would absolutely cause big problems. He 
mentioned social harmony, equality, and freedom, saying that the general goal for China 
should be healthy democracy and freedom, but the way should be discreet improvement, 
instead of bombastic talks that disregarded the reality. He said, in the final analysis, when 
the economy developed, democracy had to come. If China now changed to become a 
democracy, it would bring about counter-effect: [the reform] would move backward.284 
                He continued to say that now was the most relaxed time in China 
since 1949. Then he said that the Voice of America had its bias: It said that China saw 
Taiwan as a renegade province; it did not understand that this was the outcome of civil 
wars between the KMT and the CCP. If China had had sufficient sea and air forces, 
Taiwan would have been unified. This was the outcome of the Cold War; it had nothing to 
do with the anti-fascist war in the world. The western countries did not follow the fact [, 
seeing China like a fascist power on the Taiwan issue.] The fact was not that simple.285 
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                Then he turned to the current situation about Chinese intellectuals. 
He divided Chinese intellectuals into two groups: the leftists versus the rightists. The 
rightists were singing the bombastic words, very much idealistic. For them, China had 
better move the American presidential system to China now! Everybody hoped that this 
would be fulfilled, but considering China’s reality, was this feasible? What should be its 
possible outcome? Yes, the goal was democracy, but the key question was about the path 
and the way. Some said that Chinese society was dictatorial historically, but Liang Qichao 
said that historically it was also serious that the society was like a dish of sand. If there 
was not a relatively powerful central government to consolidate the society, there would 
not just be Taiwan’s independence; there would be serious factional politics: the society 
would be separated as several factions and each of the factions would be a 
military-business-political coalition; this was totally possible! Then he gave Afghanistan 
and Iraq as examples. China was a big country, and the peasants had low-level of 
education and lacked class consciousness—they lacked a strong self identity as a group. 
So it was very easy that they were used by any political force as long as there were 
attractive slogans that touched their heart. By this he meant that the factional politics or 
civil conflicts might happen to divide this nation into several parts like what happened in 
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Afghanistan or Iraq.286 
                Finally I asked a question about his expectations for the intellectuals. 
Again, his talk centered on democracy. He said, that intellectuals had different views was 
a good thing; it’s really bad to have only one voice. But the focus of the intellectuals 
should be placed on cultural construction which included academic work, science, and 
liberal arts. Intellectuals should not be engaged in bombastic talks and beautiful words to 
arouse the people. One should conducted solid learning, not just borrowed some ideas 
from Heyek or Rawls, and talked about positive freedom and negative freedom; one 
should have solid learning, not just shallow learning. And they should take into serious 
consideration the Chinese real situation. Hu Shi said, “More research of real problems, 
less talk of Isms.” Philosophy, politics, economy all had specific problems. So the 
intellectuals should conduct solid research, and should not misguide the society. They 
should be responsible to express their ideas, both on Chinese current situation and on 
theories.287 
                Interviewee No. 18 was also a professor of a university who taught 
history. He first gave a general talk on the factors that drove Shanghai and China. First he 
 
286 Ibid. 
287 Ibid. 
 232
                                                
emphasized external factor. He said that without the stimulation of foreign powers, China 
would not have marched on the path of modern market economy. Although, like Weber 
said, commodity economy, trade, market, and consumption had been present in the old 
time, many characteristics of western market economy were still absent in Chinese 
[traditional] society. He expressed the central concern of his scholarship as follows: 
China had thousands of years of glory, its agricultural efficiency, compared with 
[historical] Europe, was not low, and the development of its small peasant agriculture was 
very delicate, why did it fall in the recent hundred years? The answer he found was the 
relationship between power and money; that is, the absence of separation between power 
and money, or between the government and the enterprises, which characterized the 
western market economy. Traditional Chinese society was characterized by a political 
institution which concentrated power in the central government; the central government 
had total control of the whole economy. Such an institution inhibited the growth of 
modern market economy, and thus China lagged behind the western powers in the recent 
history. The Opium War, especially the second Opium War stimulated Chinese elite 
stratum. Thus China started its process of modernization.288 
                Then he also emphasized the internal factor. He said he did not 
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approve of the ideas which saw traditional China as a feudal society in which the natural, 
agricultural economy inhibited Chinese [economic] development. He said that there were 
two errors in such ideas: (1) [Traditional] Chinese commodity economy always occupied 
a not-low proportion in the economy and had been very active. (2) Agricultural economy 
was not the natural enemy of capital economy. He explained why Chinese commodity 
economy was active: it was because Chinese had special tax system which required the 
people to pay the tax by money, and therefore agricultural products and services had to be 
exchanged with money. This was different from the situation in Europe. Then he 
emphasized that Chinese economic rationality and economic capability were not a 
problem [for economic development;] the problem lay in the political institution. In the 
recent 500 years (i.e., since the Ming and Qing dynasties), Chinese commodity economy 
had developed very well. Silver kept coming into China. In 1843, Shanghai was opened, 
and this was the fundamental turn for Shanghai; with its geographical advantage, 
Shanghai was engaged in trade. Thus, it was a natural historical process that Shanghai 
turned from a port city to an industrial-commercial city, and then to a financial city. So he 
emphasized again that Chinese economic rationality and economic capability was not a 
problem; the problem was that China had a political institution of highly-centralized 
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concentration of power, which controlled the power of economic revenue: it totally 
controlled the economy. The institution could never resolve the power-money 
relationship, [or] power-money combination: using power to gain money and using 
money to gain power. Such an institution that power and money could not be separate led 
to the situation that the government and the enterprises could not be separate. He said that 
such an institution was against modernization. Some people thought that it was culture, 
but he thought that it was political institution that inhibited China’s development.289 
                Shanghai’s development, in general, started with the opening of it in 
1843. It was a window for the international economy and world cultures to enter into 
China. The Concession areas were free from the governance of Chinese government; 
therefore, they had become laboratories for [the western] institutions and cultures. So 
Shanghai became both the economic and cultural center of the whole country. After 1949, 
it was still the domestic economic center, complying with the planned economy; but in 
the world, it had lagged behind. It was not seriously damaged during the Cultural 
Revolution because it was the base for the Gang of Four. In the reform years, Shanghai 
was late for change. For a long time, it operated according to the original political 
institution, daring not to do things that went beyond the socialist line. After Deng 
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Xiaoping’s Southern tour in 1992, it began to change and changed very fast. This was a 
fundamental turn from the planned economy to the market economy. Once it shifted to 
the market economy, the market economy had its own logic.290  
                Then he emphasized the importance of government policy and 
institutions: when they changed, everything changed. Foreign capital and foreign bank 
came in, and Shanghai revived its vitality like in the 1930’s. Then he said Shenzhen did 
not have the technological and cultural advantages that Shanghai enjoyed. There were 
universities, research institutes, engineering technological workers in Shanghai. Also, the 
Shanghai people had brain power for running business. Therefore, such historical legacies 
made Shanghai different from other cities; the Shanghai people were very practical, very 
pragmatic. So both internal factor (the technological and cultural advantages that it had) 
and external factor (foreign capital, and talents from all parts of this country) played a 
key role in Shanghai’s development.291 
                About the self role, the interviewee said that he was an intellectual: 
all his life was dealing with books. That’s his career. He happened to be distributed, under 
the planned economy, to a field that he was interested in: he liked to study history, and he 
 
290 Ibid. 
291 Ibid. 
 236
                                                
liked to be a teacher. Then he said the greatest change after reform was that there was no 
more political movement. Deng Xiaoping was very great on this. The recent 20 or 30 
years were the best time in [the PRC’s] history. He no longer had too much fear. The 
degree of freedom on research and publishing was greater. Intellectuals should be free 
and independent intellectuals.  He said he also had the traditional spirit of intellectuals: 
being concerned about the fate of this nation, and the history, and he had a sense of social 
responsibility. So he distinguished himself from more westernized intellectuals; he was 
more critical of the development of this nation, and he thought that this was true 
patriotism. Intellectuals could not cure [the society’s] disease, but could diagnose the 
illness. He said that the government should welcome the diagnosis. Now it was better; the 
government might not listen or might not be happy, but it’s no problem to speak it out. He 
said that only because one had deep love of the country would one criticize it; if one felt 
that one did not care, there was no love in one’s heart. So he still had the traditional 
intellectual’s spirit.292 
                Then he said that the intellectual’s role and the government’s role 
should be clearly defined. The intellectual could not replace the government, whose role 
was about feasibility and operationalization. The government might not listen, but the 
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intellectuals had their role and function: to comment. This was especially true for the 
profession of liberal arts. Economics and technology might have operationality, but the 
function of liberal arts was to comment. The government should not interfere in or 
suppress the scholar’s speech; the responsibility of the government was to listen and 
choose: if the contents of the speech were usable, the government could use them; if not, 
the government could neglect them. If both roles were clearly defined, there would be no 
confrontation or conflict between the government and the intellectuals. The interviewee 
said that in class he would say whatever he wanted to say, but in newspapers and journals 
he would refrain. He said it was the most important thing for the intellectuals to speak 
honestly. So his role was to comment. Then he said no matter what, all intellectuals must 
be concerned about the society.293 
                About the expectations of the future, I asked him three things: the 
expectations for the intellectuals, the expectations for his children and students, and the 
expectations for China. He expected that the intellectuals could be open-minded to 
contain and accept the [rich] resources of all kinds of thoughts and cultures in the world, 
and then coming back to indigenous characteristics. In other words, he advocated 
indigenous scholarship, but this would need the rich stimulation from all kinds of 
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thoughts and cultures in the world. He said that Chinese modernization was a very special 
case in the world; the current modernization theory could not fully explain it. [The 
experience of] Chinese modernization was never seen before in the world history, and 
there must be a lot of scholarship to conduct. It would make contribution to sociology, 
political science, and economics. He said that Taiwan’s experience of success might not 
be applicable to the mainland because the mainland was a big country, and there was 
serious imbalance in the development. It would not be difficult for Shanghai and the 
coastal regions to develop, but it would be hard for the whole country to develop. 
Another point was that development had to be continuous; in the past China’s 
development had been seriously damaged, now the reconstruction should not break the 
previous basis, it should adopt an approach of gradual change, and it should not use a 
revolutionary way. The revolutionary way might just change a group of people, and did 
not change the institutions, and such change could not achieve anything.294 
                Then he pointed out that the current academic circle had too much 
utilitarianism, but this was oriented by the government. The government used a system of 
evaluation and assessment to define the levels of scholarship; this had led to 
utilitarianism. Scholarship needed deep thinking, but the system of evaluation and 
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assessment just regulated the quantity of words and articles published in the core journal. 
In order to pursue the quantity to complete the mission, scholars might give up deep 
thinking, and then good works became less. The reason for the existence of such a system 
was that there were too many technical officials or leaders, and these leaders used the 
way of managing technology to manage liberal arts. He said that there were different 
characters between technology and liberal arts. When scholars pursued quantity, the 
quality lowered down.295 
                About the expectations for his children, he said that he was open on 
that: let the children go their own way. This was because he found that, in today’s society, 
if you regulated the children too much, it might cause antipathy. He raised one point: the 
training of psychological quality was absent in the education. Young men today were 
very weak; they could not bear frustration. This was because they had good conditions of 
life, not like the interviewee’s generation. In the old days of their generation, conditions 
of life were worse, so the individuals needed to struggle, thus they became strong. His 
attitude towards his children was American way: after the children worked, they should 
be independent economically and lived their own life. The interviewee had the same 
attitude towards his students: He would teach everything he knew without any reservation, 
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but they should go their own way. Each student had his own individual personality, 
characters, and quality. He respected each one’s characters, and especially considered 
their differences. They should have their own opinions, daring to question what they were 
taught. They should ask “why” in everything. He expected the students to work hard in 
the three years (for Ph. D.) Learning history would surely benefit them, for it was a 
special way of thinking.296 
                About the expectations for China’s future, the interviewee said that 
viewing from the aspect of optimism, the road of gradual change had good prospects: 
continuous change, no turning back. Rush would surely not work. But if it had reached 
the critical point of change, there should be no hesitation. So [on democracy] rush would 
not work, it took [mature] conditions. On the other hand, viewing from the aspect of 
difficulty, there were hidden dangers. The interviewee mentioned two things. (1) 
Especially for such a big country as China, there were still many poor people. Peasants 
were 50%, or 60% of the population, and underdeveloped areas were still large. The 
complete modernization [of China] was an exceptional case in the world history. He said 
that we should see the existing contradictions and problems; the western countries spoke 
well of us, but we should keep our mind clear and awake. The division in the income 
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level was a source of vitality, but high differentiation and polarized division in the income 
level would lead to social instability. And if you wanted to solve this problem, you had to 
slow down the speed of development—this had become a special situation in China’s 
development. The problem of social welfare, and the social welfare in the large rural 
areas, needed economic strength to solve it.297  
                (2) This was also a big problem; it’s about the restriction of 
[government’s] power. The people were poor, so they were unhappy about the corruption. 
Illegitimate and illegal incomes were serious. The government needed to expand the 
legitimacy of the regime by the restriction of power. “How did we do that? It needed 
exploration. This problem needed to be taken seriously. It still had to do with the big size 
of population. But it still needed to be done; there should be no fear of it.”  [Should it be] 
direct election or universal election of the leaders? For China, the way should be step by 
step. It needed [mature] conditions.298 
                The interviewee then mentioned Taiwan. He said that he had two 
points on that. (1) Taiwan had democracy, but it was not orderly. (2) Having democracy 
was better than not having it, but one should not idealize it. The western philosophy said, 
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you could not have the best government; you could only expect the government was not 
the worst. He then turned back to China. For China, there were both hopes and hidden 
dangers. He did not hope that the situation became chaotic, but you needed to do it so that 
there would not be chaos. He said that in the past China had many lessons on this. For the 
huge gap in the income level and government corruption, there should not be slowness; 
for democracy, there should not be rush. If the situation needed to be resolved and you 
did nothing, it would lead to problems after sometime of accumulation, but rush would 
also cause problems. Finally he mentioned his worry on Taiwan’s independence. He said 
nobody wanted to go into war. Whoever on the position of leader could not bear the 
responsibility of letting Taiwan go the independence route. So he worried about war, and 
this was one of the hidden dangers. He concluded the interview by saying that history 
was unpredictable; there were many rational and irrational factors, so history was 
unpredictable.299 
                To sum up, in this sample, Chinese intellectuals all carried a spirit of 
social responsibility, and all were concerned about the fate of the nation. That was why 
they were honest in pointing out the problems or hidden dangers of the nation. Their self 
role was to do their best to teach students, spread ideas, and make comments for the 
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government’s references. They all stressed the importance of independent scholarship; the 
government should not interfere in or suppress the thoughts and comments of the 
intellectuals. They see reform as much better time for the intellectuals than Mao Zedong’s 
years. But for the liberal intellectual, self pursuit was still like “dancing with shackles 
on.” They used their profession to pursue their ideals. They all see democracy as the 
future of this nation, but had very different opinions on the way to achieve it. Because 
China is a big country, the change should be step by step. Liberal-minded intellectual 
used the profession to serve the prospects of Chinese democratization. 
Non-liberal –minded intellectual had serious criticism on the rightist’s attitude and the 
overseas democratic movement. In general, they upheld intellectual independence, 
supported democratic prospects, and worried about the tendency of Taiwan’s 
independence, especially its outcome: war. 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
 
                Will China become a multiparty democracy? My hypothesis in this 
dissertation is this: the greater the extent that Chinese elite thinking on development and 
change reconciles the tension between Chinese nationalism and collectivist, family-like 
ethics on the one hand, and the western democratic ideals based on each self-seeking 
individual’s subjectivity on the other hand, the greater the chance that China’s political 
development will lead to a multiparty democracy. As stated in chapter one, since the 
Opium War, the Chinese (intellectual and political) elite have been driven by an 
aspiration to save this nation, so they educated and mobilized Chinese people to awaken 
them to the crises that China was facing, and to rise up to save China. Nationalism thus 
dominated the Chinese mind and heart and became the most powerful driving force of the 
society’s development and change. Up until now, generation after generation of Chinese 
elite have been thinking and practicing different prescriptions (or paths) to save this 
country. National wealth and power has become the shared, collective goal for the whole 
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nation to pursue. 
                The problem is this: how can the Chinese fulfill the common goal of 
national wealth and power? Different elites at different times gave different answers, and 
there were three approaches sequentially. The nature of the approaches was related to the 
elite recognition of the advantages that the western powers had. Because of a series of 
military defeats, at first the Chinese elite thought that the western advantages were just in 
technology, so the Chinese began the Self-strengthening Movement (1860-1893). The 
goal of this movement was to improve Chinese military technology and build a strong 
naval force. After 30 years of efforts, it seemed that China had successfully built a strong, 
modern naval force. But the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) totally destroyed the naval 
force and the self-confidence of the Court. The Self-strengthening Movement that took 30 
years of efforts thus collapsed. The technological approach proved insufficient.300 
                Then came the second approach: the institutional approach. Kang 
Youwei and his student Liang Qichao proposed a constitutional monarchy whereas Sun 
Yat-sen advocated revolution to overthrow the Qing Court and build a republic. Both 
Kang and Sun were shocked and disappointed by China’s defeat in the war with Japan 
because Japan had previously been viewed as China’s younger brother who learned many 
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things from the elder brother, China. Now even “little Japan,” learning from the west, 
could defeat China. This was a big shock, realizing how weak China had become. So 
both Kang and Sun recognized that the western powers’ advantages were not just on 
military technology. The true advantages were in the political institutions. Kang wanted 
to be engaged in a Confucian Reformation, retaining the imperial monarchical system but 
adding constitutionalism to the imperial monarchy. Sun, modeling on the American 
system, wanted to build a republic. Kang and Sun thus competed with each other for 
which way China should go. Kang’s efforts ended up with a failure in the Hundred Days 
Reform (1898), and he and Liang Qichao fled overseas to continue their movement 
promoting a constitutional monarchy for China. Sun Yat-sen’s efforts finally succeeded in 
1911, and thus China built the first republic in Asia. Nevertheless, the Northern warlord 
Yuan Shikai tried to terminate the republic and revert to the imperial monarchy in which 
he assumed the throne as Chinese emperor. Such efforts caused huge opposition 
nationally, and Yuan failed and died. After Yuan’s death, the whole nation plunged into 
warlord politics and wars. Therefore, both Kang’s and Sun’s institutional approach failed 
and proved insufficient.301 
                Then came the third approach: the cultural approach. A group of 
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prominent intellectuals, gathering in the Beijing University and led by Hu Shi and Chen 
Duxiu, launched a new cultural movement. They thought that the reason why Sun 
Yat-sen’s efforts to build a republic could not succeed was that the Chinese people’s 
thoughts were not awakened, and the success of building a republic should be based on 
the change of people’s ideas, especially the ideas of the youth. Hu and Chen believed in 
the power of education, so they pinned their hopes on Chinese young people. The essence 
of the new cultural movement was democracy and science. They spread the ideas of 
liberalism and individualism, and relentlessly attacked Confucianism for its social ethics 
and customs, on the issues of women’s rights, and as an obstacle to the growth of an 
individual’s independent personality constrained by the long-established family system. 
In short, they wanted to build for China a new civilization based on democracy and 
science, and urged the Chinese to discard Confucianism; their central concerns were 
modern civilization and its humanitarianism.302 Hu Shi raised a slogan of “complete 
westernization,” later changing it to “sufficient merging into the world culture.”303 
                Unfortunately, since the May Fourth incident (May 4th, 1919), the 
new cultural movement was diverted to assume a political color, and the leading 
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intellectuals of this enlightenment movement divided into two groups: the leftist camp 
and the liberal camp. The leftist camp, represented by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, 
advocated that China follow the Russian path, learning from the proletarian revolution 
then happening in Russia. The liberal camp, represented by Hu Shi, continued to 
advocate the western or the American path. The leftist ideas led to Mao Zedong’s China 
and later to the reform China, and the liberal camp brought its ideas to Taiwan after 1949, 
contributing to Taiwan’s democratization in the 1980’s.304 Mao’s way proved to be a 
failure to bring national wealth and power to China.305 Nevertheless, Deng Xiaoping’s 
reform still retained Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thoughts as ideological 
guidelines. And Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have had no interest in bringing the country 
to the path of democratization.306 
                Returning to my hypothesis, Hu Shi was a very good example of a 
patriotic intellectual driven by nationalism. His career was to save China by education. 
He advocated liberalism and individualism, and at the same time, he guided his readers, 
students, and friends to build a life purpose that defined self value as being a useful 
person to the society. He believed that if people were good, the society and the nation 
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sources. 
305 See chapter 4. 
306 See chapter 5. 
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would be good. He encouraged Chinese young men who aspired to save this country to 
train themselves to become a useful talent first, and then they would be able to contribute 
their talents to the society and the nation. So in Hu Shi’s thinking, we find that he could 
successfully reconcile the tension between Chinese nationalism and collectivist, 
family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns) on the one hand, and western democratic ideals 
based on each self-seeking individual’s subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment) on the other 
hand. He had the spirit of Chinese traditional intellectuals’ characters of being concerned 
about the society, the fate of the nation, and the fate of human beings. This was the 
collectivist, family-like ethics that saw the society as a family, and as the central concerns 
of one’s life purpose. And because of modern Chinese history of being invaded, such 
collectivist, family-like ethics in one’s mind and heart naturally turned to nationalism: an 
urgent concern of how to save China in a social Darwinist international world. 
                Hu Shi’s thinking or his prescription was: train yourself first, and 
then someday you would be able to make a contribution toward the situation of China. 
Therefore, self-seeking subjectivity or self fulfillment was defined as benefiting others’ 
life, benefiting the society, and benefiting the country. But even so, the essence of Hu 
Shi’s thinking was still liberalism and individual’s independent personality. Collectivist 
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concerns did not have to conflict with liberalism and individualism. Thus the tension 
between collectivist, family-like ethics and each individual’s self-seeking subjectivity 
disappeared! The tension between nationalism and democratic ideals was reconciled 
successfully as well. This is the best example supporting my hypothesis.  
                In what follows, I will divide my interviewees in Shanghai into four 
groups of elite, and focus my discussion on how each interviewee reconciles the tension 
between nationalism and democratic ideals, or between collectivist, family-like ethics 
(i.e., social concerns) and self-seeking subjectivity (or self fulfillment). As I said in 
chapter 7, the ideas of elite in Shanghai could not represent the disadvantaged (who were 
just struggling for survival), but they could reveal how the elite saw Shanghai’s 
development and change in the broader picture of modern Chinese history since the 
Opium War. Their evaluations of the self role and the state role (in driving or impeding 
the city’s development and change) could tell us the relative weight that they placed for 
the state (the influence or control that the state had on personal life and on the city’s 
development) and the self (the degree of self fulfillment). And such information may 
guide us to the understanding of the individual’s self efficacy in the control of his own 
life, and in the contribution that he felt he could make to improve the society that he was 
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in. Such self efficacy, in relation to the state role, allows us to evaluate the possibility of 
China’s democratization in the next 20 years (2004-2024). 
(1) The Government Officials 
                Interviewee No. 1 was a party cadre. He said it very clearly: people in 
his generation (he was 52 years old in 2004) did not have such ideas of self value 
fulfillment, his pursuit of life goal was to be diligent and sincere, acting as a bolt of the 
party (the party being a machine). His generation had a value of self sacrifice for the 
benefit of collectivity. Collective interests were much more important than self interests 
and concerns. So in this case, the interviewee did not have democratic ideals, and did not 
play the role of individualist self-seeking subjectivity. His self fulfillment was to serve 
the people by serving the party; his concern was not about “self,” but about the benefit of 
the whole nation or the collectivity. There were no individual’s interests; there were only 
the people’s interests, which should be defined by the party. This was the typical 
mentality of a sincere party cadre. But he mentioned the generation gap. His son would 
never do a job like his; his son wanted to be a big boss. There were different value 
directions between the two generations. Young men today had stronger “self.”307 
                Interviewee No. 2 was a government official whose job was about 
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propaganda. He placed his self role under the whole framework of collective 
development. He said that the society and the people wanted development and 
modernization, so the government should meet their needs, that is: development and 
modernization. In the process of collective development, his self value was raised, his 
material life became better, his knowledge became more advanced, and his capability 
improved. So his self fulfillment was dependent on collective development. He was very 
positive, self-confident, and saw the future as positive and bright. In this case, the 
interviewee’s self role totally merged into collective development. Since collective 
development did not include democracy as a goal, the interviewee did not have 
democratic ideals as his value. For him, the self-seeking individual’s subjectivity (i.e., his 
self fulfillment) was to serve the process of collective development.308 
                Interviewee No. 3 was also a government official whose job was 
about propaganda. He also enjoyed his current job very much. His self role or self 
fulfillment also depended on collective development. He was also very positive and 
self-confident. There had been a kind of work zeal and positive aura around his working 
place. The drive of work came from a goal stimulation that by 2010 they would build 
Shanghai to become an outward, modern, and multi-functional city. Because the 
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prospects were so beautiful, everybody had been working toward such a beautiful 
common goal.309 
                In short, government officials in this sample enjoyed their jobs very 
much. Their self fulfillment had merged into collective development. They did not 
experience tension between nationalism and democratic ideals because democratic ideals 
were not included in their value system. For them, the individual’s self-seeking 
subjectivity had merged with the collective common goal. 
(2) The Enterprise People 
                Interviewee No. 4 worked at a foreign company. He showed a high 
degree of self-confidence about his self role. He had a high degree of self fulfillment and 
self efficacy: he could completely control his life. He had a high evaluation of the 
Shanghai government, saying that they were pro-business, efficient, and transparent. And 
he said that nationalism would not be a problem for his company because his company’s 
development in China and training of Chinese indigenous talents had long-term benefit 
for Chinese national car industry. He did not show any sign of nationalist feelings; he just 
enjoyed very much his current job, his talents and experiences, and the prospects for his 
career. This was a man of high degree of self fulfillment. There was no tension between 
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nationalism and the western business culture: He had successfully merged these two 
aspects, though he did not mention democratic ideals. He just enjoyed his self fulfillment 
very much, but did not mention his social concerns. So in this case, there was no tension 
between nationalism and democratic ideals, and there was no tension between the 
self-seeking individual’s subjectivity (the self fulfillment) and the collectivist, family-like 
ethics (the social concerns).310 
                Interviewee No. 5 worked in a big foreign company. He showed 
strong nationalist feelings; he even thought of jumping into national industries to help his 
country, so that Chinese national industries would be able to compete with world 
industries. In other words, he was patriotic even if he worked in a foreign company. He 
wanted to play a role of communication to share with his friends and acquaintances new 
ideas, new concepts, and new ways of management that he learned from the big western 
company. He was in a position of high-level management, so the degree of self 
fulfillment was high. So in this case, the interviewee successfully merged his nationalism 
with western ideas, concepts, and ways of management, and his self fulfillment or 
self-seeking subjectivity included collectivist social concerns, wanting to exert his talents 
to help Chinese national industries. He did not mention democratic ideals, but he saw the 
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western ideas, concepts, and ways of management as new knowledge that his countrymen 
should learn.311 
                Interviewee No. 6 also worked in a foreign company. She emphasized 
the fusion of Chinese culture and western culture. She said that one should understand 
Chinese philosophy and history and the world’s philosophy and history. She also wanted 
to play a role of bridge to help her countrymen catch up with the west and understand the 
modern business manner, and more broadly, the world culture. On nationalism, she said 
the more she contacted foreigners, the more she loved her own country. So she wanted to 
help her countrymen to become modern. So in this case, the interviewee’s nationalism 
merged with the western culture, or western business manner. Her self fulfillment or 
self-seeking subjectivity merged with her social concerns that her countrymen still lagged 
behind the modern, global business manner, or modern, global culture. She expected the 
future as a fusion of Chinese culture and the western culture.312 
                Interviewee No. 7 was a boss of a small company, and was a 
Taiwanese. He had a high evaluation of Shanghai’s government for its administrative 
efficiency. He said that they were doing their job well, and we should give them time and 
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should not demand things too many from them. He enjoyed his self fulfillment very much 
since he was a successful businessman. Because he was from Taiwan, he did not have 
Chinese nationalism. So in this case there was no problem of reconciliation of the tension 
between nationalism and democratic ideals (or, western culture); also, his self fulfillment 
or self-seeking subjectivity was to become a successful businessman, so he did not have 
social concerns (or, collectivist, family-like ethics that saw the society as a family) 
extending to the mainland Chinese society.313 
                Interviewee No. 8 was a successful businesswoman from Taiwan; she 
opened a teashop and sold tea in Shanghai. She was very good in dealing with people and 
things; she was capable in business. Because she was from Taiwan, she did not have 
nationalism for China. Therefore, the problem of reconciliation between the tension of 
nationalism and democratic ideals (or western culture) did not exist for her. She had 
many opinions about the Shanghai people and about China, and she said it was hard for 
China to catch up on modern concepts and modern culture, unless China sent a lot of 
students and talents overseas to learn from the west. So her self fulfillment or 
self-seeking subjectivity was to earn money and had little to do with Chinese social 
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improvement.314 
                Interviewee No. 9 was a partner of a small logistics company. His 
concerns were to survive economically and be able to open the market from foreign 
enterprises or big enterprises. He did not deal with the government much except applying 
for the license and paying the tax. He did not show any sign of nationalism or any 
concern about democratic ideals. His pressure came from economic survival and opening 
the market. His self fulfillment was to succeed in logistics business, and he showed no 
sign of collectivist spirit. So in this case, nationalism or collectivist, family-like ethics 
was just irrelevant. All his concerns centered on business success because his company 
was small and needed to survive first.315 
                In short, the enterprise people in this sample can be divided into two 
groups. The first three interviewees (No. 4, 5, and 6) all worked in a foreign company, 
and they merged nationalism and the western culture (new concepts, new ideas, and new 
ways of management) very well: they loved their country and hoped that their 
countrymen could catch up with a new, modern, and global business manner. Their self 
fulfillment also merged with their social concerns very well. For this group of enterprise 
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people, western culture was not the enemy of their nationalism; rather, they saw the 
western strengths and wanted to help their countrymen to absorb and learn these strengths 
to become modern or be able to compete globally. The second group of interviewees (No. 
7, 8, and 9) did not have Chinese nationalism in their mind and heart either because they 
were from Taiwan or because the problem of survival surpassed other concerns. Also, 
their self fulfillment was about business success, and they did not show social concerns 
or collectivist, family-like ethics toward this society. None of the six enterprise people 
ever raised democratic ideals for discussion. Most of them evaluated highly the quality, 
capability, and efficiency of the Shanghai government. 
(3) The Media Professionsls 
                Interviewee No. 10 was a young lady working in a newspaper. She 
expressed her anxieties about three things: personal development, her expectations about 
future love relationships she might have, and the city’s development. She was very clear 
about what her life pursuits were and the barriers for her to attain those pursuits. She also 
mentioned the government’s role, that an individual’s ideals were dependent on the grand 
environment, which depended on the government. She did not show strong feelings of 
nationalism, but talked about the negative role that the government played in restricting 
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the reporting of news. She was concerned about the development of society, thinking that 
those in power did not have enough wisdom to govern the city well: they might 
understand modernization but lacked the knowledge about the good points of traditions. 
So in this case the interviewee loved her country and the society (natural nationalism and 
collectivism), but saw the government as a negative factor for the development of both 
the media and the media professionals. Though she did not talk about democratic ideals 
directly, she would expect that in the future the restrictions on the media should be 
dismissed. Certainly she would welcome democracy. Also, the problems that she 
mentioned in her social concerns could only be resolved when the media became a public 
voice channel rather than a voice channel for the party-government. She belonged to the 
young generation, so she saw self fulfillment and life pursuit as natural, and the 
government’s restrictions as unnatural which should be dismissed in the future. In short, 
the interviewee had a natural reconciliation of the tension between nationalism and 
democratic ideals, and between the collectivist, family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns) 
and self-seeking subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment or self efficacy).316 
                Interviewee No. 11 also worked in a newspaper. He said that he 
would not expect too highly of the media because of outside (i.e., political) factors. The 
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media was under the control of the government and was in a situation of absurdity: Some 
people were put into jail because of their insistence of news conscience and correct 
reporting. Therefore, one should not make a mistake of political childishness and expect 
too highly of the media. Yes, the media was powerful, but it was not controllable by the 
individual or a group of people who insisted on news conscience. Nevertheless, this did 
not mean that there was nothing one could do. One should not give up one’s ideals, and 
should do one’s best in one’s position and leave the result to heaven. So in this case, the 
interviewee certainly loved his country and would embrace democracy if that was 
possible, and this meant that the interviewee had a natural reconciliation of the tension 
between nationalism and democratic ideals, and between the collectivist, family-like 
ethics (i.e., social concerns) and self-seeking subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment or self 
efficacy).317 
                Interviewee No. 12 worked in a newspaper. He said that now (2004) 
the problem most raised [by the media professionals] was Shanghai’s strong government. 
The power of this government was everywhere: it was in big public policies, it entered 
into the field of market, and it also entered into the field of private thoughts. Now 
privately everybody was talking about how to supervise, restrict, criticize, and regulate 
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the operation of the government. But the hardships of such a process had made most 
people feel tired both physically and psychologically. Nevertheless, the interviewee still 
felt that “this is the best age, and this is the worst age.” At least opportunities were more 
than the pressure. He still felt that the current China (2004) had hopes and positive 
prospects that still surpassed the negative possibilities. So in this case, though the 
interviewee did not have strong feeling of self efficacy (to change the society), he had 
attained a reconciliation between his nationalism (love of this country) and democratic 
ideals (to supervise and restrict the government’s power), and between the collectivist, 
family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns for the disadvantaged) and self-seeking 
subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment or self efficacy as a media worker.)318 
                Interviewee No. 13 paid much attention to the weakness of his 
generation, and the problems that would emerge in the process of Shanghai’s 
development. In short, young people today were impetuous; they were concerned about 
wealth, social status, and power, and could not tolerate developmental stagnation or 
slowness. They were less concerned about the quality of life, health, and the balance 
between development and contents of life. The government had similar problems: they 
were concerned only about the speed of development, and lacked the concerns of the 
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relationship between human beings and nature, the distribution of industries, and the 
balance between development and stability. Therefore, the individual, the media 
profession, and the city development were all in a state of rush, impetuosity, and 
overdraft. The interviewee was concerned about how the individual, the media profession, 
and the city development could calm down and think of a reasonable plan and find the 
core competitive power that would be irreplaceable. He said, one should answer the 
question of the bottleneck of development instead of the speed of development. So in this 
case, the interviewee’s social concerns and self fulfillment had attained a reconciliation. 
Though he did not mention nationalism and democratic ideals, he had praised highly the 
quality of containing power (i.e., the power of being able to include and intermingle all 
kinds of differences or absorb all others’ strengths.) Such quality would make him see 
democratic ideals as one of many things that Chinese had to learn. Thus, democratic 
ideals would be seen as benefiting China, and a reconciliation between nationalism and 
democratic ideals would be attained by the interviewee.319 
                In short, the media people all saw the government as a negative factor 
that impeded the development of the media and the media professionals. None of them 
mentioned democratic ideals, but they all acknowledged that the government needed to 
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be supervised, criticized, restricted, and regulated in its use of power. The four cases of 
the media professionals all reconciled the tension between nationalism and democratic 
ideals, and between collectivist, family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns) and the 
self-seeking individual’s subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment.) 
(4) The Intellectuals 
                Interviewee No. 14 was a professor of a university. He said that from 
the highest leaders to the ordinary people, everybody knew the importance of 
development because China had not developed for so long a time. If China would not 
develop and stayed backward, China would be beaten [by the strong powers] again. The 
modern history of China was a history of being beaten. That was why the policy of 
reform and openness could gain so much support from the people. Everybody wanted 
development, and that was the driving force of national and Shanghai’s development and 
change. In other words, he was saying that nationalism was the driving force of national 
development and change. He enjoyed a great deal of the feeling of self fulfillment, saying 
that the school did not interfere in their research object and research method. So in this 
case the interviewee enjoyed his self fulfillment very much, and at the same time his 
social concerns revealed that he had the spirit of traditional Chinese intellectuals: He 
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loved his country, was concerned about the society’s problems (the people’s quality) and 
saw that development had brought national wealth and power to this country. He did not 
mention democratic ideals, but praised highly the freedom he enjoyed in doing research. 
He had natural feeling of nationalism, enjoyed the current state of the government since 
there was no interference in his research. From his talks we might not be able to say that 
he had attained a reconciliation of the tension between nationalism and democratic ideals, 
but we can say that the reconciliation was between nationalism and independent, free 
scholarship. Also, he had attained the reconciliation between the tension of collectivist, 
family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns, and love of this society) and his self-seeking 
subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment and self efficacy-- the feeling that he could control his 
life and make contributions to the academic field.)320 
                Interviewee No. 15 was a professor in a university. He said that 
Chinese modernization went a long curve on its road. From the Opium War to 1911, the 
road was correct. Then China diverted from the mainstream of world development and 
went to the least promising road during the cold war: the Soviet Union’s road which 
would lead to a dead-end. He said Deng Xiaoping’s historical role was to move China 
back to the track of modernization. All his life witnessed that this country move 
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backward for 70 or 80 years, and then back to the original starting point and restart again. 
He said that for the reform and openness, his most urgent wish was that China could pass 
the challenges of modernization, and this included two things: economically, the 
privatization of property rights; politically, constitutionalization and democratization. If 
externally Taiwan did not go the independence route, and internally irrational conflicts 
and confrontations did not happen, then the economic reform would clear up the dated 
institutions and mainland China would become a democracy. So in this case, the 
interviewee had attained a reconciliation of the tension between nationalism and 
democratic ideals, and between collectivist, family-like ethics (i.e., social concerns, and 
love of this society) and self-seeking subjectivity (i.e., self fulfillment, or self efficacy.)321 
                Interviewee No. 16 was a graduate student and would advance to the 
Ph. D. program in three months. He said that as a student of liberal arts, of course he was 
concerned about public issues, but the most urgent need for him was to resolve personal 
economic pressure. He wanted to complete the Ph. D. degree and find a teaching job in 
the university so that he could repay the love and sacrifice from his families. He said that 
from his experiences in the inland area and Shanghai, the market institution was in 
general successful, and that although the lack of reform in political institutions was 
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something to worry about, the great direction of the reform should be carefully optimistic 
and should be going upward. So in this case the interviewee had attained a reconciliation 
of the tension between nationalism (love of his country) and democratic ideals (the 
expected reform of political institutions), and between the collectivist, family-like ethics 
(social concerns, and love of this society) and self-seeking subjectivity (self fulfillment, 
or self efficacy.)322 
                Interviewee No. 17 was a professor of a university who taught and 
worked on philosophy. He said that although the goal for China should be democracy, the 
way to achieve the goal should be gradual improvement. It was very important for China 
to have a strong central government to maintain order; for without that, the pursuit of 
democracy would make China plunge into warlord conflicts like the years after 1911 
revolution, or plunge into national chaos like during the Cultural Revolution. His 
argument centered on this point that if China let go of control now (2004), the whole 
country would be in chaos. So in this case the interviewee did not reconcile the tension 
between nationalism (love of his country) and democratic ideals; rather, he saw 
democracy more as a source of chaos, a source of factional conflicts that might lead to 
war! He criticized those intellectuals who advocated democratic ideals in China as 
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singing bombastic words and disregarding Chinese reality. He was the defender of the 
current Chinese political system. His self fulfillment or self-seeking subjectivity was 
about academic work; he saw himself as a philosopher and teacher and enjoyed such a 
role very much. At the same time, from his strong criticism towards the liberal 
intellectuals, he showed very strong collectivist spirit (i.e., social concerns) and the 
family-like ethics (love of this society.)323 
                Interviewee No. 18 was a professor of a university who taught history. 
On the role of intellectuals he said that intellectuals should be free and independent 
intellectuals; the government should not interfere in or suppress the scholars’ speeches. 
The responsibility of the government was to listen and to choose, and the role of 
intellectuals was to comment. On his self fulfillment he said that he also had the spirit of 
traditional [Chinese] intellectuals: being concerned about the fate of this nation, and the 
history, and he had a sense of social responsibility. So he distinguished himself from 
more westernized intellectuals: he was more critical of the development of this nation, 
and he thought this was true patriotism. So in this case we saw clearly that the 
interviewee successfully integrated his self fulfillment and the social concerns. His 
self-seeking subjectivity had merged with his collectivist, family-like ethics. He did 
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mention democracy and democratization of China. He said China should not rush on 
democracy; it should adopt a path of gradual change because it needed the conditions to 
become mature. It [also] needed exploration on how to democratize. His self fulfillment 
was to comment on the problem of Chinese development, and to educate students. So for 
him, true patriotism (or, nationalism) was to criticize the problems of this nation’s 
development, and one of the problems was the restriction of the government’s power. So 
here he attained a reconciliation of the tension between nationalism and the democratic 
ideals.324 
                In short, the intellectuals in this sample all carried the spirit of the 
traditional Chinese intellectuals: being concerned about the fate of this nation, its people, 
and the society. Their self fulfillment, besides professional academic pursuit, was to serve 
those collectivist concerns by education or writing articles or books. Except for one of 
them, their nationalism made them see that democratic ideals would benefit this nation, 
and the way to build democracy in China needed further exploration. In other words, their 
nationalism merged with the democratic ideals, and their self fulfillment merged with 
their collectivist, social concerns: they used their profession to serve development, the 
process of modernization, and the prospects of democratization in China. 
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(5) The Conclusion 
                In this sample, except two persons, both the media people and the 
intellectuals all could naturally attain a reconciliation of the tension between nationalism 
and the democratic ideals, and between collectivist, family-like ethics and the 
individual’s self-seeking subjectivity. Even one of the exceptional persons (interviewee 
No. 17) expected that China would become a democracy when economic development 
reached a certain level. Another person (interviewee No. 14) was uncertain; we can only 
say that he had attained a reconciliation between nationalism and independent, free 
scholarship because he did not mention democratic ideals or western culture. So we have 
here seven out of nine persons in the media group and the intellectual group who were 
pro-democracy. In addition, three out of six persons in the enterprise group could 
successfully reconcile the tension between nationalism and the western business manner 
or the world culture; we can count these three persons as pro-democracy in the long-term 
(20 years: 2004 to 2024). Another three persons in the enterprise group either were from 
Taiwan or focused on the economic survival, so they lacked Chinese nationalism and 
democratic prospects for China in their mind and heart. And all three of the government 
officials did not include democratic ideals in their value system. So finally we can only 
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say that 10 out of 18 persons (55.5 %: three enterprise persons, four media professionals, 
and three intellectuals) were pro-democracy. Four out of 18 persons (22.2 %: three 
government officials and one intellectual) were not pro-democracy. Three out of 18 
persons (16.6 %: the three enterprise persons) were not concerned about the issue of 
democracy in China, and one out of 18 persons (5.5 %: the intellectual) was uncertain. 
Again, the Shanghai sample was used by me to represent a long-term trend towards 
democracy, not to represent China’s overall situation in 2004. So if this small sample is 
representative of the larger populations from which they are drawn, we can now say that 
the prospects of democratization (to a multiparty democracy) in China in the next 20 
years (2004 to 2024) are good. 
                What might this democracy look like? Here we may change the 
question to: Is the nature of this democracy a system based on each self-seeking 
individual’s subjectivity? My answer to that question is: Yes, but not based on 
individualism. In the above sample, only four persons (22.2 %: interviewee No. 4, 7, 8, 
and 9) in the enterprise group did not show obvious social concerns, the other 14 persons 
(77.7 %) all merged their self-seeking subjectivity with the collectivist, family-like ethics. 
In other words, their self fulfillment was to use their profession to make a contribution to 
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the society that they were in, whether it was the Shanghai society, or more broadly, the 
Chinese society. So if China achieves successful democratization, such democratization 
likely will lead to a communal or social democracy325 because of the collectivist nature 
of Chinese culture. 
                This will be a democratic system that combines traditional elements 
(communal spirit) and modern elements (based on an independent individual’s 
self-seeking subjectivity). Under such democratic system, a free, independent individual 
will not just be concerned about himself or his interests, he will also, under his free will, 
be concerned about other people’s welfare. On the macro level, the Confucian ideal of 
“Great Harmony” will be the political and cultural goal of such a democratic system, so 
the culture likely will be a democratic form of Confucianism, and the political system 
likely will be a Confucian democracy that both respects each individual’s free will and 
self-seeking subjectivity, and has Confucian spirit of sharing, fraternity, love, and mutual 
support. On the micro level, the balance in the combination and integration of traditional 
elements and modern elements will depend on each individual’s free will and free choice, 
so it will be different from person to person, and it may fall on a point on a spectrum with 
 
325 I was inspired by my advisor of this dissertation, Professor Paul R. Viotti, to use the term “communal 
democracy” or “social democracy” to describe such a democratic system emerging in Chinese cultural 
background. 
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liberalism at the one end, and Confucianism at the other end. We can expect most 
individuals to incorporate that balance in their personal value systems. 
                How will democratization happen? In the above sample, the 
government officials did not include democratic ideals in their value system, so the 
process of democratization likely will not start from the government. The business group 
foresaw the fusion of Chinese culture with the western culture as the Chinese future, but 
their development relied on the government’s policy, so they could be the supporters but 
not the starters of the democratization process. The media belonged to the government 
and was under the strict control of the government, so the media group could not start the 
process. Only the intellectuals enjoyed a certain degree of independent scholarship, and 
all intellectuals in the sample displayed a spirit of traditional Chinese intellectuals: being 
concerned about the fate of this nation, the development of this society, and the welfare 
of the people. Just like Hu Shi, they had the power and tool of education in their hands; 
they can help students and readers change their worldviews. Since the Opium War, this 
has always been the case: the first group to awaken (to the crises) has always been the 
intellectuals, and then their efforts help awaken other elite strata and, following them, the 
whole nation could be mobilized. In the above sample, the intellectuals did demonstrate 
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understandings that are supportive of democratic outcomes over the long term. I have 
found substantial evidence of favorable prospects for democracy. So my conclusion is: 
China has favorable prospects for becoming a multiparty democracy; any democratic 
system that emerges likely will be a Confucian democracy (communal or social 
democracy); the Chinese culture will become a combination of liberalism and 
Confucianism; the balance of traditional elements (Confucianism) and modern elements 
(liberalism) will depend on each individual’s free will and free choice; the process of 
democratization will start with the intellectuals, and then spread to the whole nation. 
Finally, will this democratization process likely happen in the next 20 years (2004 to 
2024)? I will give a positive answer based on responses from the people I interviewed. 
               (6) The Theory of Deep Democracy and the  
                 Difference It Will Make to Chinese Democracy 
(A) The Concept of Deep Democracy 
                In this section I am going to introduce a novel theory of “deep 
democracy” developed by Haider Khan and see what difference it can make to Chinese 
democracy. There is important distinction between deep democracy and the formal 
democracy. Haider Khan explains:  
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        Khan (1994, 1998, 2007) presents deep democracy as a structure in     
addition to formal democratic apparatus such that the practice of such democratic 
life can be reproduced with the basic values intact. Change is not precluded. But all 
such changes should deepen democracy, not weaken it. Deep democracy in this 
sense is intimately connected with economic and social justice. Ultimately, it calls 
for a transition to a culture of creativity, diversity and tolerance.326  
Such a concept of democracy emphasizes “full economic and social justice,” and 
becomes possible when a cluster of conditions is fulfilled. These conditions fall into three 
categories: economic, political, and social-cultural.327 
(B) Three Categories of Broad Conditions for Deep Democracy 
                Khan explains these three categories as follows:328 
        1. At the economic level an adequate conceptualization of the relationship      
between the market and non-market processes in the context of high technology is 
necessary in order to promote what Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have called 
capabilities (Sen, 1992; Crocker, 1995; Nussbaum, 1995). It is important to be 
aware of the role that differences such as gender, regions (ethnicity), etc. can play 
                                                 
326 Haider A. Khan, “Democracy in Bangladesh: From Crisis to Sustainability,” Journal of Bangladesh 
Studies ( April-May, 2008): 6. 
327 Haider A. Khan, Technology, Development and Democracy: Limits of National Innovation Systems in 
the Age of Postmodernism (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1998), p. 98. 
328 Ibid. 
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here. Different (types of) people may have different needs. A democratic economy 
must address those needs as adequately as possible, given the productive capacity. 
Technology would need to be conceptualized anew in democratic terms. . . . 
        2. At the political level, adequate means and resources must be provided in 
order to ensure free deliberation and participation by all the different groups in 
society. This must apply to the development and evaluation of technology system as 
well. . . . 
        3. At the social-cultural level valuing differences by promoting social and 
cultural relations that display freely a radical heterogeneity in society can be seen as 
the crucial cultural condition. No single determination of human capacity but a free 
play of all the social forces necessary to bring about the active, participatory, 
emancipated human culture is what is implied by this set of requirements. To use 
Felix Guattari’s phrase only a ‘molecular revolution’ at the level of small groups 
and individuals can bring this about. . . . 
                As stated above, at least a cluster of conditions (that fall into these 
three categories) needs to be fulfilled for the concept of deep democracy (“with full 
economic and social justice”) to be “tenable.” Thus Alan and Khan offered the following 
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cluster of conditions.329 
(C) Cluster Conditions for Deep Democracy 
    1. Ending of economic and other status inequalities; 
    2. Public emphasis on furthering democratic autonomy, internationalism, and  
individuality; 
    3. Adequate incomes for all socially recognized work, as well as for children, the 
handicapped, the aged, and others not able to work in order to promote equality of 
capability;330 
    4. Respect for and articulation of differences in public life and within parties; 
    5. Downward democratic congruence of and within ordinary social institutions, 
including work place democracy; 
    6. Debate over the history and future of the movement-the nature of deep 
democracy-in neighborhood assemblies and schools; 
    7. Cultivation of respect for civil disobedience, strikes, and other acts of protest on 
major public issues; 
    8. Integration of local and national leaders into features of ordinary economic and 
                                                 
329 Ibid., pp. 101-102.  
330 Italics by me. 
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political life and creation of arenas for criticism; 
    9. Curtailment of all direct political intervention in the arts, religion, and personal 
life; 
    10. Establishments of independent judicial, policy, communication and electoral 
review bodies; 
    11. Diversity of perspective in communications and education; 
    12. Use of differential, serial referenda on central issues; 
    13. Public funding of issue-oriented committees as well as parties; 
    14. Takeover of some security and civil judicial functions by neighborhood or 
regional democratic associations; abolition of centralized, especially secret police 
powers and units; 
    15. Universal public service, military or community; restructuring of armed forces in 
a defensive, civilian-oriented direction; removal of authoritarianism of rank and 
status, and institution of policy; 
    16. Proportional representation of parties; 
    17. Abolition of patriarchy; 
    18. Adoption of democratic child-rearing practices; 
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    19. Full freedom of social intercourse of diverse groups; 
    20. Full freedom of diverse cultural expression; 
    21. Encouragement of the arts and varying modes of expression so that every 
individual can experience and struggle with the challenge of non-dominating 
discourse; 
    22. Practice of radical forms of individual and group subjectivity leading to what 
Guattari has termed the molecular revolution; 
    23. Adoption of technology and innovation systems which will reinforce the 
conditions above, rather than undercutting them. 
Khan further emphasizes the complete nature of deep democracy: “Deepening democracy 
is thus an integrated process where all the dimensions of social life are implicated. These 
diverse processes must work together and reinforce one another.”331 
                In condition 3, the equality of capability is important and is to be 
promoted. Khan thinks it “useful to clarify and elaborate upon the idea of social 
capabilities,” and “summarize following Nussbaum and Sen and give a social 
interpretation of all the capabilities.”332 This social capability approach focuses on the 
 
331 Haider A. Khan, “Democracy in Bangladesh: From Crisis to Sustainability,” Journal of Bangladesh 
Studies ( April-Mat, 2008): 7.  
332 Ibid. 
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micro-level: each individual should have equal capabilities to live his life “up to the limit 
permitted by natural possibilities.”333 
(D) Summary of Social Capabilities334 
   1.Being able to live to the end of a complete human life, as far as possible. 
    2. Being able to be courageous. 
    3. Being able to have opportunities for sexual satisfaction. 
    4. Being able to move from place to place. 
    5. Being able to avoid unnecessary and non-useful pain and to have pleasure    
experiences. 
    6. Being able to use the five senses. 
    7. Being able to imagine. 
    8. Being able to think and reason. 
    9. Being acceptably well-informed. 
    10. Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves. 
    11. Being able to love, grieve, to feel longing and gratitude. 
    12. Being able to form a conception of the good. 
                                                 
333 See capability item No. 26. 
334 Haider A. Khan, “Democracy in Bangladesh: From Crisis to Sustainability,” Journal of Bangladesh 
Studies ( April-May, 2008): 7-8. 
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    13. Capability to choose; ability to form goals, commitments, values. 
    14. Being able to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s own life. 
    15. Being able to live for and to others, to recognize and show concern for other 
human beings, to engage in various forms of familial and social interaction. 
    16. Being capable of friendship. 
    17. Being able to visit and entertain friends. 
    18. Being able to participate in the community. 
    19. Being able to participate politically and being capable of justice. 
    20. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the 
world of nature. 
    21. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
    22. Being able to live one’s own life and nobody else’s. 
    23. Being able to live in one’s very own surroundings and context. 
    24. Capability to have self-respect. 
    25. Capability to appear in public without shame. 
    26. Capability to live a rich and fully human life, up to the limit permitted by natural 
possibilities. 
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    27. Ability to achieve valuable functionings. 
                As Khan points out,  
     These capabilities are distinct and of central importance. One cannot easily trade 
off one dimension of capability against another. They cannot be reduced to a 
common measure such as utility.335  
Also, following Croker,336  
        ‘Capability ethic’ has implications for freedom, rights, and justice going far 
beyond simple distribution of income considerations. If one accepts the capability 
approach as a serious foundation for human development, then it follows that going 
beyond distributive justice is necessary for a complete evaluation of the impact of 
economic policies.337  
Khan further points out,  
         In evaluating any policy regime. . . from this perspective, not only do we wish 
to pose the question of efficiency but also the whole set of questions regarding 
human freedom, in particular, the positive human freedom to be or to do certain 
things.338 
 
335 Ibid., p. 8. 
336 Ibid. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Ibid. 
 282
        (E) What Difference Does Deep Democracy Make to Chinese Democracy?             
                The theory of deep democracy, together with the social capability 
approach is consistent with Confucian political ideal (“Great Harmony”) and the ideal of 
political liberalism. The most urgent problems for China today are corruption of 
government officials and social injustice on the distribution of income. The institutional 
origin of all the problems in China is its one party dictatorial rule. Deep democracy and 
the social capability approach, with its nature of completeness, do address these problems 
both in the immediate need of overcoming corruption and seriously unjust social division 
and in the long-term need of overcoming political dictatorship. The immediate problems 
need to be solved as soon as possible, and the long-term problem of democracy needs to 
be solved in a gradual, step-by-step way. If we see it from the perspective of the three 
categories of the conditions for deep democracy, it will become even clearer. At the 
economic level, a democratic economy addresses the needs of different types of people as 
adequate as possible. Thus, social injustice will be overcome. At the political level, free 
deliberation and participation by all the different groups is to be achieved for sure. Thus, 
political dictatorship will be overcome. At the social-cultural level, “a free play of all the 
social forces necessary to bring about the active, participatory, emancipated human 
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culture is what is implied by this set of requirement.” Thus, not only the fusion of 
Confucianism and political liberalism can be achieved naturally, but also different 
cultures of ethnic groups will be able to be expressed freely and completely. In short, 
deep democracy and social capability approach is exactly what China needs: Chinese 
democracy, under the practice of deep democracy and social capability approach, will be 
rich, active, flourishing, and emancipated. The practice of deep democracy in China will 
be able to lead this country to overcome domination and control in any form.339 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
339 Haider A. Khan, “Value, Social Capabilities, Alienation: The Rights to Revolt,” CIRJE Discussion 
Paper, in (http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/03research02dp.html) 
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APPENDIX 
访谈的问题 
 
是什么样的力量在驱动着 (或限制着) 这个城市的发展与变迁 推动着它向未来二
十年迈进？ 
 
1. 总的 一般性的
了解 
2. 国家的角色 (正
面的与负面的) 
3. 自我的角色 (正
面的与负面的) 
包括行业的角色 
(正面的与负面
的) 
4. 对未来的期待 
(正面的与负面
的) 
 
访谈的对象包括四种群体的人： 
 
(1) 政府官员 
(2) 学者 (知识份子) 
(3) 企业人员 (商人) 
(4) 媒体人员 
 
每一个人可以谈大约 30分钟，或者更多，如果他 (或她)这样选择的话。这个问题
是开放式的，而且是半结构式的，如以上所示。 这个研究是在
_______________________ 
由丹佛大学的「人作为研究主体之保护的制度审查委员会」所通过。 
 
